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Abstract 
Over the last two centuries, stock exchanges have emerged as a central component of the 
capitalist system. While stock exchanges are now widely accepted as legitimate economic 
actors, and share trading favoured as a legitimate investment vehicle, this has not always 
been the case. The process by which exchanges, as organisations, became socially accepted 
(or legitimate) has received minimal scholarly attention, particularly from a historical 
perspective. To this end, this study examines the organisational legitimacy of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) from its establishment in 1887 until the end of World 
War II. Using both original archival material from the JSE Archive, and other published 
sources, the study shows that much of the Exchange’s early development can be understood 
as concurrent processes of legitimation. After its establishment, the Exchange’s legitimation 
occurred in four overlapping waves. First, it thrived despite a lack of legitimacy. Although 
market activity and Exchange membership increased rapidly, the Exchange was mostly seen 
as incompetent during this time. The Exchange did not yet function as a public institution, thus 
it only sought the approval of its members. Second, as public participation and government 
interest in the market increased, the Exchange extended its legitimation efforts beyond its 
members. This was achieved by increasing its control over Exchange members, as well as 
trading and listing procedures, to improve its competence as a market intermediary. Third, 
after gaining a critical level of competence, the Exchange shifted its attention to the moral 
dimension of its activities, although it still strived to improve its competence. Thus, the 
Exchange sought to dissociate its activities from gambling, to demonstrate its importance for 
investor protection, and to show its commitment to the values of the society it served, 
particularly during times of war. Fourth, the Exchange became accepted as a necessary and 
respected economic actor. Besides the Exchange’s continual demonstration of its 
competence, this broader acceptance resulted primarily from several instances of government 
and legislative sanction for the Exchange’s operations and existence, as well as a broader 
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This above all, to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man.1 
 
Benjamin Woollan, 16 January 1888 
at the opening of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
  
                                                 
 
1 Eric Rosenthal, ‘On ‘Change Through the Years: A History of Share Dealing in South Africa (Johannesburg: 
Flesch Financial Publishers, 1968), 149. The quote originates from William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 
III, as spoken by Polonius.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Over the last two centuries, the stock exchange has become a key actor in the world economy, 
to the extent that very few countries do not have a stock exchange. Academic literature 
generally agrees that the presence of a stock exchange supports economic development and 
growth.2 Recent history makes clear the central position of stock markets in the global 
economy. The World Bank estimates that the total value of stocks traded globally has 
increased from US$6 trillion to US$77 trillion during just the last three decades, while stocks 
traded as a percentage of GDP have increased from 46% to 117% over the same period.3 The 
same is true for South Africa – the total value of stocks traded has increased from US$9 billion 
to US$410 billion over the last three decades, while stocks traded as a percentage of GDP 
have increased from 9% to 117% over the same period.4 The level of trust placed in stock 
exchanges by their home countries, and society as a whole, is therefore significant. However, 
this has not always been the case. Stock exchanges, as all other organisations, did not 
emerge being trustworthy and socially accepted.5 They needed to convince a variety of 
audiences that their existence is justified and that their operations are sound. More formally, 
the stock exchange, as an organisation, needed to convince those audiences that its actions 
are “proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions”.6 When the stock exchange succeeded in soliciting trust, it became a 
legitimate economic actor, accepted into the “broader cultural framework”.7 Naturally, the 
legitimacy of an organisation is not static, since it is continuously evolving, as are the norms, 
values and beliefs against which the organisation's legitimacy is measured. The stock 
                                                 
 
2 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine. "Stock markets, corporate finance, and economic growth: an overview." 
The World Bank Economic Review 10, no. 2 (1996): 223-239; Ross Levine and Sara Zervos. "Stock market 
development and long-run growth." The World Bank Economic Review 10, no. 2 (1996): 323-339; Scott L. 
Baier, Gerald P. Dwyer Jr., and Robert Tamura. "Does opening a stock exchange increase economic growth?" 
Journal of International Money and Finance 23, no. 3 (2004): 311-331; Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine. "Stock 
markets, banks, and growth: Panel evidence." Journal of Banking & Finance 28, no. 3 (2004): 423-442; 
Aboudou Maman Tachiwou. "Stock market development and economic growth: the case of West African 
Monetary Union." International Journal of Economics and Finance 2, no. 3 (2010): 97. 
3 World Bank, World Development Indicators Series, CM.MKT.TRAD.CD and CM.MKT.TRAD.GD.ZS, 2018. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Roy Suddaby, Alex Bitektine, and Patrick Haack. "Legitimacy." Academy of Management Annals 11, no. 1 
(2017): 461. 
6 Mark C. Suchman. "Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches." Academy of Management 
Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 574. A vast number of definitions for legitimacy exists in the literature. The most 
seminal definition is given here, and an overview of the varying definitions is given in Chapter 2. 
7 Cathryn Johnson, Timothy J. Dowd, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway. "Legitimacy as a social process." Annual 
Review of Sociology 32 (2006): 55. 
3 
exchange, therefore, needed to identify and engage with appropriate audiences in order to 
sustain its legitimacy.8 Failure to maintain its legitimacy could result in sanctions,9 diminished 
access to resources,10 and could threaten the very existence of the organisation.11 The 
process by which a stock exchange gains and maintains legitimacy is therefore fundamental 
to its existence, as well as its successful integration into broader society. In most countries, 
the incumbent stock exchanges have been in existence for decades, if not centuries, and 
therefore it can be assumed that contemporary legitimacy has generally been established. 
The measurement of contemporary stock exchange legitimacy is therefore not the question 
under investigation. Instead, this study focuses on how the stock exchange first established 
its legitimacy, and how it maintained its legitimacy in a dynamic environment. As Duguid noted 
of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), “…it would not suffice to begin even an attempt at a 
sketch-history of the great institution (…) at a point where it had attained all the advantages of 
firm establishment and sound constitution. Something must be told of the chrysalis stage out 
of which the Stock Exchange evolved into the state in which it has now flourished for a hundred 
years.”12 In other words, some consideration must be given to how the Exchange emerged 
and evolved to its prominent state, a process that is, no doubt, underpinned by its desire to be 
socially accepted, and thus legitimated. The long-term nature of establishing and maintaining 
organisational legitimacy necessitates a historical perspective. The process of legitimation, in 
the case of a stock exchange, however, has received minimal scholarly attention, particularly 
from a historical perspective.13 To this end, the purpose of this study is to explore the 
legitimation of the JSE between 1887 and 1945. 
1.2 THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE 
The history of the JSE is one of constant change. During its lifetime, Johannesburg has 
changed from a nearly non-existent mining town to one of the largest cities in Africa. The JSE 
experienced times of significant political instability during, amongst others, the South African 
                                                 
 
8 David Deephouse and Mark Suchman. "Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism." In The Sage Handbook 
of Organizational Institutionalism, ed. Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Roy Suddaby and Kerstin Sahlin 
(London: Sage, 2008), 54. 
9 John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer. "Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior." 
Pacific Sociological Review 18, no. 1 (1975): 122; W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, 
Interests, and Identities (Stanford: Sage, 2014), 59. 
10 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Free Press, 1960); Dowling and 
Pfeffer, Organizational legitimacy; Scott, Institutions and organisations, 2. 
11 Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, Legitimacy as a social process, 54; Deephouse and Suchman, Legitimacy in 
organizational institutionalism, 52. 
12 Charles Duguid, The Story of the Stock Exchange: Its History and Position (London: Grant Richards, 1901): 
2. 
13 Alex Preda. "Legitimacy and status groups in financial markets." The British Journal of Sociology 56, no. 3 
(2005): 451-471. 
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War (1899 – 1902), the First World War (1914 – 1918), the Rand Revolt (1921 – 1922), and 
the Second World War (1939 – 1945). The Exchange, during its first six decades of existence, 
served under six Ministers of Finance, eleven Heads of State, and five monarchs.14 It has 
remained broadly in the same physical location, yet found itself in the South African Republic 
(ZAR) (under Afrikaner rule), the Transvaal Colony (under British Imperial rule), and the Union 
of South Africa (a self-governing dominion of the British Empire).  
Stock exchanges perform a central role in facilitating the flow of capital between investors, 
who supply capital, and companies, that demand capital. While shares were traded in 
Johannesburg before the JSE (or any other local exchange) was established, the need soon 
arose for a formally organised market, with definite trading procedures and some semblance 
of investor protection. For this reason, Benjamin Woollan, an English businessman, founded 
the JSE in November 1887,15 only 16 months after the discovery of the main gold reef.16 The 
rising number of mining and financial companies at the time mandated the establishment of a 
stock exchange to raise sufficient capital to finance large-scale mining operations.17 By the 
turn of the 20th century, these mines produced a quarter of the global gold output.18 The rapid 
growth and sheer scale of gold output by these mines highlighted the capital-intensive nature 
of their operations, and thus the need for effective and swift access to capital. Capital 
transactions, multiplying in size and frequency, needed to be facilitated by an exchange within 
a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost, in order to reduce the friction of exchange and 
facilitate trust between market participants.19 As the size and complexity of the capital market 
increased, the Exchange needed to grow commensurately in order to maintain stability in the 
market. As citizens became shareholders, the Exchange also became increasingly important 
as a secondary market, where shares could be traded between investors. The successful 
interaction between investors, the stock exchange, and companies was therefore fundamental 
to the survival and success of all three these parties, as well as to the development of the 
                                                 
 
14 Heads of State include the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Governor-General of South Africa, Prime 
Minister of South Africa, State President of South Africa, and President of the Republic of South Africa.  
15 Kathryn Lavelle, The Politics of Equity Finance in Emerging Markets (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 167. 
16 Although there were earlier discoveries of gold in the Johannesburg region, the main reef was discovered in 
July 1887, and the JSE was founded on 8 November 1887. 
17 Lavelle, The Politics of Equity Finance, 167. 
18 Jean-Jacques van Helten. "Empire and high finance: South Africa and the international gold standard 1890-
1914." The Journal of African History 23, no. 4 (1982): 529. 
19 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 14. North argues that institutions are important vehicles to reduce the friction of 
exchange and facilitate cooperation. As such, the JSE becomes both an organisation and an institution. The 
development of the Exchange as an organisation and its institutionalisation will be explored in subsequent 
chapters. 
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mining industry upon which the South African economy was subsequently built.20 Central to 
this interaction is the stock exchange as an organisation.  
The history of the JSE presents a particularly useful case to study the origins of organisational 
legitimacy for two reasons. First, because of the high level of dynamism that the organisation 
endured throughout its formative years, it constantly responded to changes in society. Second, 
during the last century, perceptions of the stock exchange shifted, from being viewed as the 
bane of society to a central institution in the capitalist system. In their seminal paper, Dowling 
and Pfeffer (1975) suggest that “an empirical focus on organisational efforts to become 
legitimate can aid in explaining and analysing many organisational behaviours taken with 
respect to the environment” and that this can “generate hypotheses and a conceptual 
perspective that can direct additional attention to the issue of organisational legitimacy”.21 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) accurately capture the essence of this thesis: through an in-depth 
analysis of the Exchange’s efforts to become legitimate and to maintain its legitimacy, the 
study aims to contribute to the understanding of the organisational behaviour of stock 
exchanges.  
1.3 TRENDS IN STOCK EXCHANGE HISTORIOGRAPHY 
This study explores the legitimation of the JSE during its first six decades of existence, from 
its establishment in 1887 until the end of the Second World War. This period, although not 
explicitly identified in the historiography as such, represents a critical phase in the global 
permeation of the stock exchange – a process substantially driven by the efforts of each 
exchange, as well as those of networks of exchanges, to establish and maintain their individual 
and collective legitimacy.  
In this part of the introduction, the discussion focuses on two avenues within the broader 
historiography. The first part considers the historical literature on a variety of stock exchanges 
and markets, in order to contextualise this study within the broader exploration of stock 
exchange history. From this discussion emerges a variety of perspectives on stock exchange 
development, as well as the limited scholarly attention that stock exchanges have received 
from the perspective of organisational legitimacy. The second part considers the literature that 
focuses mainly on the historical development of the JSE. Although dominated by 
commemorative works commissioned by the Exchange, the literature does offer some 
perspective on the development of the Exchange over time.  
                                                 
 
20 Lindsay Bremner. "Reinventing the Johannesburg inner city." Cities 17, no. 3 (2000): 185. 
21 Dowling and Pfeffer, Organizational legitimacy, 122. 
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Unlike both avenues of the broader historiography, this study departs from the descriptive 
historical norms to invoke the concepts of organisational legitimacy in exploring the history of 
the JSE. The study shows that much of the early history of the stock exchange can be 
understood as concurrent processes of legitimation at different levels of organisational 
development. 
1.3.1 The London Stock Exchange 
Despite being preceded by the Amsterdam securities market,22 and far exceeded in size by 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),23 the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has received the 
most scholarly attention from a historical perspective.24 Some attention has also been afforded 
to other, less prominent exchanges.25 Generally, the stock market preceded the formation of 
the stock exchange – an essential point of departure for most studies on the history of stock 
exchanges. As Ranald Michie argues, with increased trading activity comes the need to 
organise markets formally. Therefore, the development of a stock exchange is often the result 
of a development in share trading in a specific location.26 The hallmark of the stock exchange, 
as opposed to the stock market, is its specialist intermediaries, fixed location, and barriers to 
entry.27 Before the emergence of stock exchanges, stock could be traded at any place, 
including on curbs and in coffee houses, by anyone, often to the detriment of market integrity. 
The emergence of stock exchanges represented a fundamental shift towards a market where 
stock and share transactions were facilitated, coordinated, regulated and standardised for the 
sake of efficiency and investor protection, leading to unprecedented growth in the global stock 
market during the last two centuries. As this study demonstrates, it was the pursuit of 
legitimacy that drove such growth throughout the first half of the 20th century, at least in the 
case of the JSE. 
                                                 
 
22 Surprisingly, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange has received very little attention in the historiography. For an 
overview of the history of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, see Lodewijk Petram, The World’s First Stock 
Exchange (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
23 As the world’s largest and one of the most prominent stock exchanges, the NYSE has received a fair degree of 
historiographical attention. See James Edward Meeker, The Work of the Stock Exchange (New York: Ronald 
Press Company, 1922); Charles Geisst, Wall Street: A History (London: Oxford University Press, 2004); Steve 
Fraser, Every Man a Speculator: A History of Wall Street in American Life (New York: Harper Collins, 2005). 
24 Ranald Michie, The Global Securities Market: A History (London: Oxford University Press, 2006); Arthur 
Pierre Poley and Frank Herbert Carruthers Gould, The History, Law and Practice of the Stock Exchange, 4th 
edition. (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1926); Duguid, The Story of the Stock Exchange; Edward Victor 
Morgan and William Arthur Thomas, The Stock Exchange: Its History and Functions (London: Elek Books, 
1969). 
25 William Arthur Thomas, Western Capitalism in China: A History of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Sydney: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2001); Ellen Louise Hertz, The Trading Crowd: An Ethnography of the Shanghai Stock 
Market. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
26 Michie, The Global Securities Market, 93.  
27 Ibid. 
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Some of the earliest publications on the history of stock exchanges allude to legitimation in 
the transition from market to exchange. In The Story of the Stock Exchange (1901), Charles 
Duguid considers the history of the LSE from a somewhat commemorative perspective.28 
Duguid’s meander through the early history of the stock market in London primarily focuses 
on the nefarious activities in the market (from the odd scheme to the grand failure that was 
the South Sea Bubble) and the resultant scorn poured upon stockbrokers and jobbers by 
society. Due to the illicit nature of many transactions at the time, “the terms stockbroker and 
stockjobber soon became terms of obloquy”. 29 It would take a long time before obloquy 
evolved into admiration – a process which Duguid traces in great, and often anecdotal, detail. 
Duguid focuses extensively on how stockbroking became a respectable pursuit, and how 
members of the Exchange, over the course of three centuries, came to be venerated members 
of society. At the end of the 17th century, the stockbroker “still had to bow his head beneath a 
torrent of obloquy”,30 but by the late 19th century, Duguid argues that the Committee of the 
LSE “had done much (…) to uphold the fair name of the House and to enhance the respect in 
which it is held by the outside public”.31 In the process of becoming a legitimate institution, the 
Committee wielded considerable influence over the market, sometimes even unwittingly. As 
the Royal Commission of 1877/1878 reported, the strict enforcement of the rules governing 
the Stock Exchange, a private concern, had (somewhat inadvertently) been beneficial to the 
interests of the broader public.32 In the minds of the public, the Exchange had evolved into a 
body representing public interests. The Committee, in performing, what Duguid terms, its 
“judicial” and “administrative” functions, was central to this evolution.33  
Similarly to Duguid’s work, The Stock Exchange: A Short Study of Investment and Speculation 
(1911) by Francis W. Hirst offers a somewhat superficial historical overview of both the LSE 
and the NYSE. This is not a commemorative publication, but instead aimed at the novice 
investor who desired a peek behind the veil of mystery shrouding the business of the 
Exchange at the time.34 At the time, as Hirst points out, “investment” was a relatively new 
word, and thus the book focuses not on the “art of making money” but “the art of keeping 
money” through the vehicle of the stock exchange.35 The historical focus is motivated by Hirst’s 
assertion that “stock markets of to-day are not only more interesting but far more intelligible if 
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we can approach them with the lantern of experience in our hand”36 and as such the narrative 
shifts regularly between historical anecdote and investment advice. Along the same lines, C.F. 
Smith’s The Early History of the London Stock Exchange (1929) focused on, among other 
things: the transmission of trading procedures between the Dutch and the English; the 
emergence of a “specialised class of brokers”37 in the early London market; and the shift in 
public attitude towards stockbroking. Smith noted that although stockbroking was initially the 
subject of “considerable degrees of odium”, its value in providing a “free and continuous 
market for capital” was eventually recognised.38 
By the 1920s, the LSE had an extensive membership and an established stature. Thus, 
historians of the day shifted their focus from colourful historical accounts to matters relating to 
the regulation and governance of the Exchange. In The History, Law, and Practice of the Stock 
Exchange (1926), Arthur P. Poley and Frank H. Carruthers Gould approached the history of 
the LSE from a governance perspective, focusing less on the socio-economic aspects of the 
Exchange’s history (as earlier studies had done), and more on the laws and rules (official and 
unspoken) governing the Exchange and its numerous members. The book includes a verbatim 
copy of the Rules and Regulations of the LSE at the time.39 Poley and Carruthers Gould 
viewed the Stock Exchange as a legal entity emerging from the Companies Act, placing less 
emphasis on the social nature of the Exchange.40 E.V. Morgan and W.A. Thomas depart from 
the focus on the Exchange, to consider the development of the London stock market as served 
by the Exchange, and the macroeconomic dimensions of its development. Despite being titled 
The Stock Exchange: Its History and Functions, the authors focus primarily on national debt, 
international investments, domestic commerce and industry, as well as bull and bear markets 
characterising the stock market within which the Stock Exchange operated up to 1968.41  
The most distinguished work relating to stock exchange history is that of Ranald Michie. 
Despite having a broader focus on financial history, Michie has written prolifically about the 
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LSE,42 the development of the British capital market,43 and more recently, the global securities 
market.44 Central to this historiography is Michie’s The London Stock Exchange: A History. 
The book distinguishes between market and exchange, and thus focuses most of its attention 
on the development of the LSE from the active stock market preceding it. In this distinction, 
Michie defines the stock exchange as a “market where specialized intermediaries buy and sell 
securities under a common set of rules and regulations through a closed system dedicated to 
that purpose”.45 Michie argues that without the formal organisation of the market the LSE 
brought about, securities trading would not have proliferated as it has over two centuries. The 
Exchange, as an institution, performs a central role in the flow of capital, nationally and 
internationally. Michie’s analysis embraces the complexity that drove the development of the 
Exchange. The book is not fixated only on internal developments within the organisation, but 
also considers broader economic, political and regulatory forces. “[T]he form that the market 
took (…) reflected a complex interaction of economic and non-economic forces conditioned 
by the altering circumstances of the time”.46 Michie shows the impact of war and other political 
shifts on the regulation of the market, which often represents times of rapid (and permanent) 
regulatory change. This theme also receives much attention in this study. Alongside the focus 
on the formal structure of the market, effected through the Exchange, Michie also highlights 
its informal characteristics – the importance of trust, and the social networks that often 
underpinned trust between members.47 
Before the culmination of Michie’s research in the abovementioned book, other studies of his 
also contributed to its development. His 1985 study, The London Stock Exchange and the 
British Securities Market, 1850-1914, highlights gaps in the historiography of the LSE at the 
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time, in that the focus was primarily on its “internal history and development to the virtual 
exclusion of its external relationships”.48 Michie explores the interaction between the LSE and 
other British exchanges in the broader development of the British securities market. Michie 
has also approached the history of the LSE from a comparative perspective, primarily 
comparing it with the other premier stock exchange of the world, the NYSE. In The London 
and New York Stock Exchanges, 1850-1914, Michie shows that despite emerging at more or 
less the same time “to organize the street trading in government debt”,49 their reactions to 
subsequent changes in their respective environments differed significantly. Michie furthermore 
highlights that shared customs, laws, language and purpose do not necessarily equate to 
organisational similarities – an important observation that also emerges in this study. The JSE 
adopted a particularly British identity through shared statutes, the movement of members 
between London and Johannesburg, and open communications with the LSE, but, similarly to 
the NYSE, it was by no means a copy of the LSE “transplanted into a different environment”.50 
Michie expands on the work in his 1987 book of the same title.51 Due to the lack of peers in 
the Southern African capital markets, the JSE is not studied comparatively in this study. Some 
attention is given instead to its relationship with London, and to a lesser extent the smaller 
exchanges of South Africa (most of which had a fairly brief existence).52 Michie also considers 
the relationship between the LSE and other stock exchanges before World War 1,53 and the 
effect of information technology on the LSE since 1700.54 
Several more focused studies supplement Michie’s wide gaze over the LSE’s history. Edward 
Stringham’s The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club, for 
instance, conceives of the LSE’s formation as a contradiction of Hobbesian theory. A 
Hobbesian perspective would predict that “stock markets (…) develop only after government 
has implemented rules and regulations to eliminate [fraud and default risks]” and yet the LSE 
preceded any formal regulation as a self-regulating organisation.55 Stringham attributes the 
success of the Exchange, as a self-regulating organisation, to the alignment of members' and 
customers' interests. Because the government did not impose the rules, the rules could be 
shaped by market forces in order to facilitate the protection of customers (to the benefit of 
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members).56 Similarly, Bernard Attard considers, quite specifically, the role of jobbers in the 
LSE. In his paper Making a market: The jobbers of the London Stock Exchange, 1800-1986, 
Attard describes the role of jobbers (also known as dealers) as market makers. Such jobbers 
acted as providers of market liquidity due to their unfailing willingness to buy or sell for profit, 
and therefore “saved a broker the necessity of finding someone who could exactly match his 
business”.57 
Research by Larry Neal and Lance Davis highlights key aspects in the development of the 
LSE. They approach the development of the LSE from a less descriptive historical perspective 
than Michie, instead introducing a theoretical focus and bringing certain quantitative elements 
to the fore. In their 2006 paper, The evolution of the structure and performance of the London 
Stock Exchange in the first global financial market, 1812-1914, Neal and Davis explore the 
early dominance of the LSE because of its unique “microstructure” and the path dependence 
of its governance structure. At times the path dependence created ideal conditions for 
innovation and, at other times, it impeded the flexibility that was necessary for further 
innovation.58 A working paper by Neal entitled The London Stock Exchange in the 19th century: 
Ownership, structures, growth and performance considers the development of the Exchange 
not from the broader economic, political and regulatory perspective, but rather by focusing on 
the structure and path dependence of the Exchange as an organisation.59 Neal and Davis 
compare the LSE to other major exchanges. Another study, published with Eugene White, 
compared the historical listing requirements of the London, Berlin, Paris and New York stock 
exchanges. Their central thesis is that the listing requirements of the London and New York 
stock exchanges differed fundamentally from those of Paris and Berlin, in that they reflected 
the common-law legal system and self-regulation of listings. This contrasted with the Paris 
and Berlin exchanges, where securities needed political validation in order to be quoted. The 
authors also refer to this group of stock exchanges as “the first global financial market” in the 
period 1825 to 1914.60  
Neal and Davis also explore the effect of path dependence on the regulation of the early 
London, New York and Paris stock exchanges. Here, the duo argue that the way the initial 
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rules of the exchange were formulated had a profound effect on the subsequent functioning 
of the exchange. The “institutional rigidities” arising from the exchange rules are entrenched 
by the unwillingness of members to accept changes in the rules that might affect their 
livelihood.61 Davis and Neal also explore the effect of structure on efficiency of the London, 
New York and Paris exchanges. Here, the authors argue that the rules of an exchange can 
be seen as its “micro structure” and that the structure “will have a substantial impact on the 
efficiency of the exchange in terms of costs, scope, volume, and level of penetration”.62 The 
paper focuses primarily on the effect of differences in transaction clearing and property rights 
on the subsequent development of these exchanges.  
While the London and New York exchanges are often viewed as the two leading stock 
exchanges and therefore often compared, much attention is also afforded in the literature to 
the NYSE and Wall Street. 
1.3.2 The New York Stock Exchange and other North American exchanges 
One of the earliest studies on the NYSE was The New York Stock Exchange by Francis L. 
Eames.63 Eames considers the history of the Exchange, from its humble origins at the 
Buttonwood Tree in the late 18th century, to its more permanent state in 1894, when the book 
was published. The study also explores more specific aspects of the Exchange’s history, such 
as failures on the Exchange, and the effect of communication technology on the market. 
Eames calls it “a curious fact” that no history of the NYSE as an organisation had ever been 
written. He tasked himself with writing the history “for those members of the Exchange who 
have an interest in the history of their organisation, and a pride in its growth and 
development”.64 Another early work on the NYSE is The Work of the Stock Exchange, by J. 
Edward Meeker, first published in 1922. Meeker was, interestingly, also the economist to the 
NYSE. In much the same way as Hirst’s The Stock Exchange, the book is part historical 
exploration and part investment manual, although much more comprehensive and voluminous 
than that of Hirst. As in most other cases, the book details the genesis of share trading, and 
the subsequent development of a formalised market structure in the form of a stock exchange. 
Meeker views the exchange as “the highest state which the evolution of markets has thus far 
attained”, arguing that a market organised through the exchange is “the safest, the most 
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democratic and the most efficient sort of market known”.65 Meeker argues that the 
establishment of an exchange rests squarely on two factors – high demand and 
standardisation. “Taken in charge by regular organisations and controlled by rules, such 
markets become exchanges”.66 Although some attention is afforded to the historical 
development of the Exchange, the book is, for the most part, a snapshot of the practices, 
procedures, rules and operations of the stock market at the time. Subsequent work has 
highlighted the history of the New York stock market. Deborah Gardner’s Marketplace: A Brief 
History of the New York Stock Exchange offers a short but lucid historical account of the 
NYSE. The narrative, interspersed by a great number of illustrations and photographs, touches 
briefly on the occurrence of casual stock trading in New York before exploring the emergence 
of the Exchange as an organisation. To this end, the discussion focuses less on the socio-
economic context within which the Exchange developed, and more on the internal decisions, 
role-players, and inventions within the confines of the Exchange. In certain ways, the work is 
more commemorative than analytical, which is also borne out by the fact that it was published 
by the NYSE. In The Origins of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, Stuart Banner 
considers the early development of the NYSE. Banner argues that the NYSE's success could 
not merely be attributed to economic expansion, but to the stockbrokers' ability to self-regulate, 
govern the market, and resolve disputes efficiently.67 
From a more generalist perspective, Robert Sobel explores the history of the NYSE between 
1935 and 1975, a period of considerable development for the Exchange as it emerged from 
the Great Depression.68 Sobel considers both key role-players and watershed events that 
shaped the development of the Exchange, and thus, the market. He also highlights the 
importance of the process of professionalization at the Exchange for its subsequent 
development. Sobel later published a long history of the New York stock market.69 Similarly, 
Wall Street: A History by Charles R. Geisst traces the historical development of the Wall Street 
market from its origins right up to its contemporary dominance of global securities markets.70 
In this historical account, however, Geisst does not delineate what is included in the term Wall 
Street. As such, the discussion focuses more on episodes that swayed the market than on the 
organisation that facilitated the market. Although covering a shorter period, Ranald Michie's 
The London and New York Stock Exchanges, 1850 – 1914 provides a more detailed account 
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of both the Exchanges’ internal operations. One of the most salient observations by Michie is 
that the friction between the two governing committees created organisational inertia. In 
contrast, the single governing committee of the NYSE made for a much nimbler organisation.71 
On the other end of the spectrum, Every Man a Speculator: A History of Wall Street in 
American Life by Steve Fraser considers not the inner workings of the exchange but the 
cultural and social elements making the stock market an essential part of American economic 
life. As such, the book focuses more on perceptions of Wall Street in popular culture, as well 
as the network of organisations and characters embodying Wall Street, than on the NYSE 
itself.  
Departing from the descriptive historical norms, Jonathan Macey and Hideki Kanda approach 
the development of the NYSE from the perspective of internal and regulatory structure in their 
1990 paper The Stock Exchange as a firm: the emergence of close substitutes for the New 
York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges. Here the authors argue, much like Michie would later on, 
that “the nature and purpose of organised stock exchanges” was “one of the most poorly 
understood elements of modern economic life”.72 This assertion is based on the Exchanges 
bearing the brunt of public criticism in the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, despite the 
crash being the result of a multitude of forces beyond the Exchanges’ control. The authors 
challenge the view that stock exchanges are “philanthropic institutions organised to act in the 
public interest”, arguing instead that they are “self-interested economic organisations”.73 
Macey and Kanda also allude to the legitimating effect of stock quotations – besides providing 
liquidity, monitoring and reduced transaction costs, a quotation (or listing) provides "a 
signalling function that serves to inform investors that the issuing companies' stock is of high 
quality".74 They describe this later in the paper as “lending reputational capital to listing firms”.75 
It should be pointed out, however, that in many instances the stock exchange provided such 
reputational capital to its quoted stocks (and members) unwittingly, and saw its role only as 
that of a facilitator of transactions. The early LSE rarely rejected membership applications, 
and both the LSE and NYSE listed “anything that generated business”, although becoming 
more selective as the number of applications increased.76 It will be shown later that this is also 
true for the early history of the JSE. Despite the American historiography being dominated by 
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the NYSE, there are also histories of the Chicago77 and Philadelphia78 Stock Exchanges, as 
well as the NASDAQ.79 More recently, and further afield, Geoffrey Poitras offers a history of 
the early Vancouver Stock Exchange, founded in 1907. Poitras gives a detailed account of the 
Vancouver Stock Exchange’s history, focusing on the role-players and internal operations of 
the early exchange.80 
1.3.3 European exchanges 
Perhaps the oldest literature on European stock exchanges originated from Germany. Die 
Börse by Max Weber, published in 1894, provided a somewhat philosophical “sketch” of the 
“purpose and outwards organisation of the exchanges” to the individual who is not connected 
to the stock exchange. Here, Weber explored the origins, functioning and social characteristics 
of the exchange in general, before comparing the Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt exchanges.81 
Shortly afterwards, Henry Crosby Emery considered the effect of the German Exchange Act 
of 1896 as an instrument for regulating speculative markets in Germany, and the resultant 
effect on German stock exchanges.82 Weber later returned to the stock exchange in Die 
Börsenverkehr [Commerce on the Stock and Commodity Exchanges] in 1924.83 Here, Weber 
again gave a very descriptive overview of the operations and procedures of the stock market, 
while also commenting on its nature and purpose from a somewhat philosophical viewpoint. 
Weber alluded to the importance of properly functioning markets (and thus exchanges) for 
economic power – “The greater temptation to gamble that presents itself to the domestic 
public, and the financial losses that they are responsible for inflicting upon themselves, must 
be borne as part of the costs of war in the struggle among nations for a dominant economic 
position”.84 
More recently, in The World’s First Stock Exchange, Lodewijk Petram explores the history of 
the stock market in Amsterdam, which emerged in the 17th century as a result of shares issued 
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by the Dutch East India Company or Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC). Despite 
the title implying a focus on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Petram does not distinguish 
between the stock market and the stock exchange, to the detriment of the analysis. He gives 
prominence to the emergence of the market, and episodes that threatened its stability, but 
much less to the stock exchange (as an organisation) regulating the stock market. Thus, the 
relationship between market and exchange remains largely unexplored. The author also 
(peculiarly) argues that despite fostering the earliest of active stock markets, Amsterdam did 
not “gain any economic benefit from it”, in that the investment activity was a zero-sum game.85 
This assertion is contrary to many other studies of stock markets and exchanges, most of 
which view them as emblems of economic progress. Petram’s viewpoint was perhaps 
motivated by the fact that the secondary market in VOC shares constituted the entirety of the 
Amsterdam market for some time. This assertion, however, discounts the contribution of the 
stock exchange to the development of financial infrastructure in the Netherlands and Europe 
in general.  
In a more focused manner, Sergey Gelman and Carsten Burhop explore the efficiency of the 
Berlin Stock Exchange between 1892 and 1913, using a daily stock market index and 
autoregressive econometric models. The authors show that the information efficiency of the 
market was “nearly as efficient as the modern UK stock market or the stock markets of 
Scandinavian countries”.86 In considering the efficiency with which the market absorbs 
information, the authors do not directly comment on the evolution of the stock exchange as an 
organisation, but rather on the market it served. Stijn van Nieuwerburgh, alongside Frans 
Buelens and Ludo Cuyvers, explores the relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth in Belgium between 1873 and 1935. Although the focus was not directly on 
the stock exchange as an organisation, the authors conceive of the stock exchange as the link 
between the stock market and the broader economy, highlighting that institutional changes in 
the economy affected the stock market via the exchange.87 Departing from the strictly 
quantitative approach of the previous papers, Carsten Burhop and Sibylle Lehmann-
Hasemeyer explore the geography of German stock markets in 1913, paying particular 
attention to how geography influenced the listings on several German stock exchanges.88 In 
order to explain geographical differences in listings, the authors also consider the regulatory 
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environment of the Exchange, trading procedures, and transaction costs, all of which are 
essentially controlled by stock exchanges. The study only considers the effect of the Exchange 
as an organisation on the market indirectly.  
1.3.4 Asian and Australasian exchanges 
In Western Capitalism in China, William Thomas explores the development of the share 
market and the subsequent emergence of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Unfortunately, as 
Thomas notes, the conventional primary sources of a stock exchange history, which include 
“the minute books of the regulating committee, the original rule book, later additions and 
amendments, and the share lists” were generally no longer in existence.89 The study, 
therefore, relies on share lists that appeared in the local press, as well as more recent 
secondary sources. Thomas considers both the economic context within which the share 
market emerged, and the organisational development of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, right 
up to its demise in 1941 as a result of the Second World War. The latter part of the book 
considers modern manifestations of the stock exchange in China. In exploring its 
development, Thomas highlights that the stock exchange in general “has become a symbol of 
development as the possession of a central bank is a sign of financial respectability”.90 The 
study does not employ a particular analytical framework, and as such, it approaches the 
development of the share market in purely descriptive terms. While some attention is afforded 
to the Stock Exchange itself, the study primarily focuses on the share market and the effect of 
political shifts and market fluctuations on its development. In contrast to Thomas’ descriptive 
exploration of the Shanghai stock market, The Trading Crowd: An Ethnography of the 
Shanghai Stock Market by Ellen Hertz approaches the stock market from an anthropological 
perspective, focusing instead on the social and cultural elements of “stock fever” that emerged 
in Shanghai nearly three decades ago. The study is not explicitly historical in its approach and 
use of sources. However, it manages to illuminate the historical path dependence of the stock 
market in a social and cultural sense. The study does not pay particular attention to the internal 
operations of the Shanghai Exchange as an organisation, although it is described as the 
“symbolic centre of China’s vast securities market”.91 Hertz furthermore highlights the lack of 
legitimacy of the Shanghai stock market due to government interference, and the tendency for 
the market to be seen as a vehicle for gambling rather than investment – two important matters 
in the development of any stock exchange.92 
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Australasian stock exchanges have received notable scholarly attention from a historical 
perspective. Histories of the stock exchanges at Adelaide,93 Melbourne,94 Brisbane,95 and 
Sydney96 explore the development of the Australian stock market and the network of 
exchanges that supported it. Further afield, David Grant also wrote a history of the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange.97 
1.3.5 African exchanges 
Besides the JSE, the histories of very few other African exchanges have received scholarly 
attention. In Cape Town’s Forgotten Stock Exchange, Pierre Morgenrood briefly gave an 
overview of the Cape Town Stock Exchange, which existed from 1901 to 1926.98 As in 
Johannesburg, Morgenrood showed that share dealing in Cape Town preceded the formation 
of a stock exchange, as early as the 1830s.99 Share transactions were often concluded in the 
local chamber of commerce, but formal facilities did not emerge until 1901. With the discovery 
of diamonds at Kimberley, the focus shifted away from Cape Town, towards Barberton and 
then Johannesburg after the discovery of gold.100 Morgenrood argued that the Cape Town 
Stock Exchange was not established due to the discovery of some commodity (as many other 
South African exchanges were) but rather as a result of the disruption caused by the South 
African War (1899 – 1902) which forced the JSE to close for more than two years.101 
Morgenrood traced the establishment of the Exchange, as well as its mode of operation, but 
concluded that the Exchange fell out of favour after the formation of the Union, which made 
Johannesburg the financial centre of the Union. According to Morgenrood, this led to the 
decline and ultimate liquidation of the Exchange. As is shown in this study, however, the 
demise of the Exchange was not due to decline but rather to a mutual agreement between the 
Cape Town and Johannesburg Stock Exchanges to amalgamate.  
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A more comprehensive account of stock exchange development in Africa comes from Rose 
Ngugi’s Development of the Nairobi Stock Exchange: A Historical Perspective.102 Ngugi traces 
the long-term development of the Nairobi share market and the subsequent development of 
the Exchange in light of certain “institutional and policy changes that have shaped [its] 
development pattern”.103 Ngugi categorises the Exchange’s development in three phases – 
the initiation stage, which was dominated by foreign investors; the formalisation stage, during 
which first self-regulation and then formal regulation took hold; and the 
revitalisation/restructuring stage, during which the institutional and policy context of the 
Exchange was enhanced and formalised to encourage stock market growth.104 Ngugi also 
alludes to the legitimation of the Exchange, highlighting firstly the graduation of the Exchange 
from a non-formal market to a formal organisation, and, secondly, the emergence of a 
regulatory body, “aimed at enhancing the confidence of investors”.105 At more or less the same 
time, George Karekwaivenani considers the early history of the Rhodesian Stock Exchange, 
a predecessor to the modern Zimbabwean stock market.106 The author highlights the 
emergence of no fewer than four local stock exchanges in the late 19th century, all of which 
had closed down by 1902. Between 1903 and the Second World War, Rhodesia had to rely 
on the LSE and the JSE, until the Rhodesian Stock Exchange was formally established in 
1946.107 Unlike the commodity-dependent exchanges of early Rhodesia and South Africa, the 
author points out that the Rhodesian Stock Exchange emerged from a well-diversified 
economy with a “thriving manufacturing sector”.108 Karekwaivenani traces the formation of the 
Rhodesian stock market, from which several exchanges were born, and ultimately focuses on 
the formalisation and internal organisation of the Rhodesian Stock Exchange, and its 
subsequent growth.  
1.3.6 A global focus 
The Global Securities Market: A History by Ranald Michie explores the vast history of 
securities trading from the 12th century up to modern times. In the process, Michie touches on 
the development of various stock exchanges, including those of France, Germany, Britain, 
Switzerland, North America, Australia, and others. While securities of various forms existed 
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for centuries, Michie highlights the proliferation of the stock exchange as an organisation 
during the second half of the 19th century, partly resulting from the “European diaspora of the 
nineteenth century”.109 Michie offers a bird’s-eye view of the development in securities trading 
on a global scale, and therefore does not consider in much detail the operations of any 
particular stock exchange.  
Considering financial globalisation from the perspective of the stock exchange, Klaus Weber, 
along with Gerald Davis and Michael Lounsbury, explores the global expansion of stock 
exchanges between 1980 and 2005, focusing on its effect on the various economies adopting 
stock exchanges.110 The authors perceive the stock exchange as a centrepiece of financial 
globalisation, and show the prevalence of stock exchanges globally between 1800 and 2005. 
1.3.7 Historiographical trends 
An important distinction which is not always apparent in the historiography is that between the 
stock market and the stock exchange. In most, if not all cases, the stock market precedes the 
stock exchange, and the stock exchange emerges as a vehicle for the organisation and 
protection of the market. Over time, perceptions of the stock exchange shifted from disdain to 
admiration, a process which is alluded to in varying detail throughout the historiography. As 
the business of the stock exchange became socially accepted, and technically sophisticated, 
the literature evolved in unison to consider its practices, its jargon, its increasing focus on rules 
and regulations, and its impact on the economic life of the society within which it is located. A 
clear shortcoming in the extant literature, however, is the lack of explicit analytical and 
theoretical frameworks, particularly those rooted in institutional theory and its derivatives. Very 
few studies have approached the historical development of the stock exchange from any 
particular theoretical perspective, and therefore lack the vocabulary and analytical frameworks 
those theories afford. The contribution of this study, then, is rooted in the fact that it 
approaches the development of the stock exchange not from a purely descriptive perspective, 
but from the perspective of legitimacy theory. Now that the breadth, depth, and varying 
perspectives in the analysis of stock exchange history have been outlined, the next section 
will show that the JSE has not received much systematic, analytical scholarly attention. 
  
                                                 
 
109 Michie, The global securities market. 
110 Klaus Weber, Gerald Davis, and Michael Lounsbury. "Policy as myth and ceremony? The global spread of 
stock exchanges, 1980–2005." Academy of Management Journal 52, no. 6 (2009): 1319-1347. 
21 
1.4 A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE 
Several scholars have written on the history of the JSE, although the process of legitimation 
of the Exchange remains unexplored. An overview of the existing literature is presented here. 
1.4.1 Early works 
E.E. Kennedy’s Waiting for the Boom (1890) gives a personal account of Kennedy’s nine 
months in Johannesburg, at a time when the next gold boom was rumoured to be near. 
Kennedy provides an anecdotal account of his time at the Exchange, interwoven with useful 
information on the Exchange’s operations, and the perceptions thereof at the time. Although 
not explicitly focused on the development of the Exchange, Kennedy highlights certain 
colourful individuals and episodes that shaped the character of the early Exchange. 
One of the earliest references to the JSE in academic literature appears in Ernest Arndt’s 
Safety for Savings (1934).111 In this paper, Arndt explores whether adequate investor (saver) 
protection was afforded by “those to whom [savings] have been entrusted”, and thus considers 
the banks, the stock exchange, insurance companies, and others. Arndt gives a scathing 
review of these institutions and the general lack of regulation and control. When discussing 
the stock exchange, Arndt asks rhetorically: “Are the interests of the South African community 
adequately safeguarded, and has everybody the assurance that everything that goes on in 
our exchanges is above board? Does one not constantly hear rumours of market 
manipulations, of unloading stocks at artificial prices and buying in again at artificially low 
figures?”.112 Arndt argues that “the Johannesburg Exchange has been labelled as the worst in 
the world, with the exception of one institution abroad”.113 Keeping in mind that the paper was 
written in the middle of the Great Depression, Arndt’s views may have been influenced by the 
circumstances of the time. He emphasises that the need for adequate investor protection 
stems from the fact that “the Johannesburg Exchanges are not mere local organisations but 
national institutions”.114 The importance of the Exchange to the investing public was 
understood, but it had not yet been accepted as a legitimate institution. 
Supplementary to Arndt’s general publications on the safety of savings in South Africa, are a 
number of papers that consider the JSE either from a narrow focus or in passing. M.H. Emdon, 
for instance, explores the credit facilities on the JSE, examining the functioning of time 
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bargains (forward transactions with delayed delivery and settlement) and other forms of credit 
on the Exchange.115 Emdon also considers the external credit facilities employed by Exchange 
members, mostly in the form of bank overdrafts. In much the same way as Arndt, Emdon 
laments the lack of legislation and control, and argues that an improved “legal standing of 
brokers in relation to their clients” would see more short-term capital and better interest rates 
in the market.116 While not directly concerned with the development of the JSE, C.S. Richards’ 
survey of company promotions in South Africa (1933 – 1934) argues that the Committee of 
the Exchange had been “most conservative”117 in granting quotations on the official list, despite 
earlier assertions that the Exchange listed any share that generated business. Richards 
echoes the sentiments of Arndt and Emdon, in his argument that investor protection was 
inadequate from a legal perspective, and that the “Stock Exchange facilities and organisation 
in this country also require investigation, alteration and improvement”.118 An earlier article by 
Richards compares the newly opened Open Call Exchange (which opened in Johannesburg 
in October 1933) with the JSE (at the time nearly celebrating half a century of existence).119 
This is one of the earliest and only comparative works on South African stock exchanges, and 
also one of very few that are devoted to any other exchange but the JSE. Richards attributes 
the formation of the Open Call Exchange to, among other things, inadequate facilities at the 
JSE and frequent dissatisfaction with prices obtained on the JSE by both investors and 
brokers. He expresses doubt over the open nature of the new exchange, arguing that brokers 
could hardly obtain best prices with “their clients at their elbows”.120 Richards points out in 
another paper, however, that as far as mining shares were concerned, the JSE was 
remarkably efficient due to the concentrated nature of its listings, the rapid publication of 
prices, and the fact that much of the transactions were on a cash basis (resulting in rapid 
settlement).  
In 1937, J.H. Cloete published Johannesburg Stock Exchange Practice: A Guide to the 
Practice and Law of Share Transactions and to the Business of Members of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. Although not specifically historical in focus, the book offers some insight into 
the operation of the Exchange at the time. The purpose of the book was to “provide the South 
African public with an exposition of the somewhat intricate details of Stock Exchange 
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operations and financial practice”.121 The book briefly covers some aspects of the Exchange’s 
history, although most of it is devoted to the technical intricacies of business on the Exchange. 
Soon afterwards, E.R. Roper, K.C., considered the relationship between the broker and his 
client, as part of a volume on Stock Exchange Law in South Africa (1940).122 Here Roper 
highlighted that this principal-agent relationship, while subject to legal principles governing 
agency, “may be modified by agreement or by the rules or usages of the Stock Exchange”.123 
By this point in its development, although not explicitly legislated as such, the Exchange was 
recognised as an institution that effectively regulated share transactions. Roper continued to 
discuss the development of the relationship between broker and client in light of a number of 
prominent legal cases. The paper is therefore written mainly from a technical legal perspective.  
Richard Lurie returned to analysing the JSE quotations, building on the work of Richards, in 
1941, considering the company promotion boom of 1933-1938. Before the boom, as Lurie 
pointed out, Richards had warned of the dangers of a bull market where “all scrip, good, bad 
and indifferent” were absorbed.124 Lurie pointed out the shift in focus of the market, away from 
its primary focus on mining and exploration shares, to include industrial and commercial 
companies during this period, as well as the effect of the 1937 market collapse on new 
quotations.125 Lurie emphasised that the recent (1939) amendment of the Companies Act 
offered improved investor protection, arguing that before the amendment it “provided several 
loopholes for unscrupulous company promotors”.126 Lurie also argued that the listing 
requirements of the Exchange provided reasonable investor protection in that the Committee 
could go no further to determine the stability and status of the company applying for listing.127  
1.4.2 More comprehensive works 
The first somewhat comprehensive history of the Exchange came in the form of Harry Klein’s 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange: 1887 – 1947. The book was published by the Committee 
of the JSE, and therefore it is part history and part commemoration. Klein detailed the genesis 
of the Johannesburg share market, a failed rival exchange in Johannesburg, and the 
emergence of the JSE. The book also explored the subsequent development of the Exchange 
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in a somewhat anecdotal fashion, although it contains important information about the early 
days of the Exchange, the records of which no longer exist. In tracing the development of the 
Exchange, Klein made an important observation: “Until stabilised finance and control of the 
gold mining industry had been achieved by the great mining groups, then in the making, and 
until the leaders of the industry took an active part in the control of the Stock Exchange, it was 
an institution of dubious repute and the home of wild-cat company promotions and share 
speculation, and many speculative markets in the worthless stocks brought the Exchange into 
grave discredit”.128 The Exchange, like most others, started as a pariah and slowly evolved 
into the respectable institution it would become by the end of World War II. As an insider, Klein 
considers episodes in the market as well as internal developments in his assessment of the 
Exchange. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive historical account of early share dealing in South Africa can 
be found in Eric Rosenthal’s On ‘Change Through the Years: A History of Share Dealing in 
South Africa.129 Rosenthal traced the history of various share markets and exchanges from 
the first securities of the Cape, to the dominance of the JSE by the 20th century. In the process, 
Rosenthal examined not only various informal share markets, but also more formal markets 
where exchanges appeared. Thus, Rosenthal studied all the exchanges across the country, 
including those at Kimberley, Barberton, Potchefstroom, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, and Cape 
Town. Some consideration is also given to the JSE’s local competitor, the Rand Exchange. 
Rosenthal’s book may be thought of as part historical narrative and part reference book, 
because of the large volume of primary material (photographed or reproduced verbatim) that 
appears throughout the narrative. Rosenthal considered both the internal dynamics of the 
Exchange as an organisation, and the effect of market conditions (such as booms and political 
unrest) on the exchange.  
1.4.3 Commemorative publications 
After Rosenthal's account, several publications appeared in celebration of the Stock 
Exchange's centenary in 1987. The book Johannesburg Stock Exchange Centenary: 1987 
published by the Exchange itself contains relatively little historical information other than a list 
of companies that in 1987 had been listed for more than 50 years, and more than 90 years, 
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and a graph of industrial share prices between 1920 and 1986.130 The only contribution of this 
publication is the list of companies listed in 1987, showing the date of listing, directors at the 
time, and address. A similar publication appeared in the same year, edited by Hugh Murray, 
celebrating the first 100 years of the JSE.131 
Margot Bryant’s Taking Stock: Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the First 100 Years gives a 
more comprehensive account of the Exchange’s history, although again in a somewhat 
anecdotal fashion.132 Bryant’s history of the Exchange was commissioned by the JSE itself, 
with Bryant recollecting noteworthy episodes in the history of the Exchange in celebration of 
its centenary. Bryant’s history of the Exchange resembles that of Klein nearly 40 years earlier, 
considering episodes in the market and internal developments that affected the development 
of the Exchange. 
1.4.4 Modern academic inquiry 
Robin McGregor’s The Mechanics of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is a general guide to 
the JSE, commencing with a chapter on the history of the Exchange by Anthea Paton.133 
Despite the chapter’s title (‘The History of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’), it is more 
concerned with the early development of the Witwatersrand – the context within which the 
Exchange emerged – than with the Exchange itself. Paton highlights the capital-intensive 
nature of deep-level mining, the arrival of Standard Bank in Johannesburg, the importance of 
the McArthur-Forrest extraction process, various booms on the market, the Jameson Raid, 
and other episodes in the history of the Witwatersrand. The rest of the book is a guide to how 
the Exchange is constituted and how it operates.  
While considering the contemporary efficiency of the JSE in 1996, Eugene Snyman also briefly 
explores the historical development of the Exchange. Snyman ties the development of the 
Exchange to the broader economic development of South Africa. He argues that the skills and 
networks created in the Kimberley diamond industry constituted an essential part of the 
development of Johannesburg as a financial centre. Furthermore, the author highlights that 
subsequent development in industrial and financial companies drove its expansion after the 
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initial focus on mining companies, echoing the findings of Richard Lurie.134 Similarly to 
Snyman, in 2000 Kribashni Govender considered the globalisation of the JSE from a legal 
perspective. Govender briefly explores the historical development of the Exchange, focusing 
some attention on the rules and regulations governing the exchange internally and 
externally.135 
Renewed interest in the historical development of the JSE appeared after 2006. Certain 
authors adopted a narrow perspective, while others focused on the broader development of 
the Exchange. An article with a narrow focus, for instance, is that of Lyndon Moore and Steve 
Juh. In Derivative pricing 60 years before Black-Scholes: Evidence from the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, the authors examine warrant and call option price data from the first three 
decades of the 20th century to show that “long before the development of the formal theory, 
investors had an intuitive grasp of the determinants of derivative pricing”.136 Although not the 
main focus, the paper gives a surprisingly detailed overview of the network of exchanges 
operating in Johannesburg between 1897 and World War I, where the JSE occupied the 
dominant position. Furthermore, the authors consider the development of options and 
warrants on the Exchange before World War I. Even more recently, Jesse de Beer, Nico 
Keyser and Ivan van der Merwe have explored returns on the JSE in light of economic and 
political developments between 1900 and 1999.137 The authors show that broader economic 
developments over the century were generally reflected on the JSE, particularly during times 
of economic prosperity, although not as a rule. The paper makes no distinction between the 
stock market and the market operator (JSE), but the focus is generally on the stock market.  
Perhaps the most prominent contemporary research focusing specifically on the JSE as an 
organisation is that of Mariusz Lukasiewicz. In 2014, Lukasiewicz called for research on the 
historical development of Southern African stock markets, and particularly institutional 
histories of the JSE and other Southern African exchanges.138 Subsequently, Lukasiewicz 
heeded his own call. In From Diamonds to Gold: The Making of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, 1880-1890, Lukasiewicz traces the circumstances that allowed for the 
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development of the JSE, as well as its early organisational development.139 In Early regulation 
and social organisation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 1887-1892, Lukasiewicz 
explores the early development in the regulation and social organisation of the Exchange.140 
Here, the author highlights the difficulties the Exchange experienced in serving the needs of 
its various stakeholder groups during its early development, as well as challenges of 
organising the market in a frontier capitalist context. 
Despite prolific writings about stock exchanges in London and other financial centres, Ranald 
Michie’s work has had relatively little to say about the JSE. The JSE is mentioned in passing 
in a variety of instances, but mostly in a superficial fashion. In Different in name only? The 
London Stock Exchange and foreign bourses, c. 1850-1914, Michie hardly mentions the JSE, 
despite it having a close relationship with the LSE between 1889 and 1914, as is shown in this 
study. When considered from London's perspective, the omission is understandable, however. 
In 1910, the South African stock market (dominated by the JSE) issued securities to the value 
of approximately £5 million, or about 2.4% of that of the British Empire (excluding Canada and 
South Africa).141 As this study shows, however, the JSE took many cues from the LSE in terms 
of its rules and its overall operating procedures, and was in regular two-way communication 
with the LSE concerning defaulting members, share transactions between London and 
Johannesburg, and investor protection.  
1.4.5 Summary and research question 
The preceding discussion has shown the fragmented and episodic nature of the literature on 
the JSE. Although various aspects of the JSE’s history have been considered in the literature 
over more than a century, no comprehensive work supported by an explicit theoretical 
framework has been published. Earlier literature which considered the JSE highlighted the 
poor character of the Exchange (and the market), but little has been said about the Exchange’s 
subsequent legitimation and ultimate domination of the South African share market. The early 
history of the JSE has primarily been dealt with in general and commemorative histories. 
However, an in-depth investigation into the historical development of the Exchange as an 
institution remains wanting. An understanding of the interaction between the JSE, the state, 
investors, and companies also appears to be implicit, indirect and fragmented. Therefore, the 
long process of legitimation of the Exchange remains unexplored. As such, this study explores 
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the continuous legitimation processes of the JSE. The research will be guided by the following 
question: 
How did the Johannesburg Stock Exchange gain and maintain organisational 
legitimacy after its establishment? 
The study will explore the strategies the JSE adopted to gain legitimacy after its establishment, 
as well as the strategies employed to maintain, extend or defend its legitimacy in subsequent 
periods. The study contributes to the existing literature on the JSE as the first scholarly 
investigation of the history of the Exchange from the perspective of organisational legitimacy. 
The study furthermore contributes to the understanding of the legitimation processes of stock 
exchanges. The study will also contribute to the literature on the process of the formalisation 
and development of stock exchanges, and the interaction between society and the stock 
exchange, which is currently dominated by American and British perspectives. Finally, the 
study will contribute to the fields of business and financial history in South Africa by exploring 
the trajectory of development of South Africa’s financial infrastructure. Through the lack of 
literature on South Africa’s financial history, the Exchange’s long-term development and 
purpose within the broader economy remains mostly unexplored. Thus, the study may serve 
as a point of departure for further research into the business and financial history of South 
Africa, which could inform academic and public discourse to improve the general 
understanding of the South African financial system and its trajectory of development. The 
lessons on the importance of legitimacy, trust, investor protection, and professionalization 
could be applied by other stock exchanges and, in particular, the recently established stock 
exchanges in South Africa. 
This study shows how the Exchange related itself to the broader social system, and how this 
shaped the ability of the Exchange to serve its stakeholders. Ultimately, the stock exchange 
exists to serve its stakeholders, and if it serves them successfully, the result should be a 
contribution to the broader social and economic prosperity of the country. Therefore, the 
legitimation processes that ensured the continued functioning and existence of the stock 
exchange had important implications for the financial development and economic growth of 
the country.142  
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1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the research question, this study relied on the methodological framework 
developed by Kipping, Wadhwani and Bucheli (2014).143 This framework emphasises source 
criticism, triangulation, and hermeneutic interpretation in the construction of the historical 
narrative. This required an iterative engagement with primary and secondary material, to form 
a contextual understanding of how the JSE gained and maintained organisational legitimacy 
after its establishment. The analysis was guided by the concepts related to organisational 
legitimacy, which is discussed in Chapter 2. The details of the research design are discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
1.6 SOURCES OF DATA 
The study relied mainly on the Minute Books of the JSE General Committee, which managed 
the affairs of the Exchange for the period under consideration. These books are housed 
(uncatalogued) at the JSE Archive, at the offices of the Exchange in Johannesburg, South 
Africa. The material from the JSE Archive was supplemented by newspaper and other 
published sources.  
Since the material at the JSE Archive remains uncatalogued, all material from the archive will 
be referenced according to the General Committee Minute Book number. The Minute Books 
are sequentially numbered from Book 2 (commencing in 1889). The pages of the Minute 
Books are also numbered. Thus, for example, page 31 in General Committee Minute Book 12 
will be referenced as JSE/GC12:31, with “JSE” indicating the JSE Archive, “GC” indicating 
that the source is a General Committee Minute Book, “12” indicating the information was 
obtained from Book 12, and “31” indicating the relevant page number. 
1.7 OUTLINE OF STUDY 
The rest of the study will proceed as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of organisational legitimacy as a theoretical framework for the 
study. The vocabulary and concepts of organisational legitimacy have been applied to better 
understand the historical development of the JSE between 1887 and 1945. The research 
design is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, focusing on hermeneutic interpretation and narrative 
construction. The analysis is presented in Chapter 4 (The founding and formative years of the 
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Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 1886 – 1902), Chapter 5 (The Exchange from War to War, 
1902 – 1918) and Chapter 6 (The making of a national exchange, 1919 – 1945). Throughout 
the analysis, the Exchange’s development from a pariah to a national institution is explored. 
The study concludes with Chapter 7, which provides an overview of the legitimation of the JSE 
during its first six decades of existence.  
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Chapter 2 Organisational legitimacy: 
a theoretical framework 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of legitimacy is understood by many scholars to have been introduced by 
Max Weber.1 Weber argued that actions are legitimate only if they are “approximately or on 
the average oriented to certain determinate 'maxims' or rules.”2 Subsequent to Weber’s 
conception of legitimacy, eminent sociologist Talcott Parsons extrapolated the concept to the 
realm of organisations.3 Parsons viewed legitimacy as an alignment between the organisation 
and broader social norms.4 The organisation (in its broader social system) utilises resources 
that, Parsons argued, might be applied otherwise. Thus, the utilisation of such resources must 
be legitimate within the broader social system.5 Despite the work of these pioneers, the 
concept of legitimacy has no universal definition. This study will therefore make use of a variety 
of definitions, which will be explored in the next section.  
Some of the earliest arguments on the social nature of man’s economic behaviour emerged 
in late 19th century Germany and Austria. This newfound social focus was a by-product of the 
Methodenstreit, a disagreement in the academic community on the methodological 
approaches of the social sciences at the time. A group of economists contended that the over-
simplified economic laws and assumptions on the ‘economic man’ should make way for more 
realistic models of human behaviour. These scholars, led by Gustav Schmoller, insisted that 
the economy is a function of much broader and more complex social and historical forces.6 
Another influential scholar, Thorstein Veblen, ridiculed the over-simplified assumptions, 
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describing them as “the hedonistic conception of man [as] a lightning calculator of pleasures 
and pain”.7 Veblen insisted that significant portions of human behaviour are a product of habit, 
convention, and social context.8  
Subsequently, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber emerged at the centre of the interface 
between economics and sociology. Durkheim emphasised the importance of symbolic 
systems (of a religious, moral or spiritual character) underpinning solidarity and social order.9 
More recently, W. Richard Scott argued that Weber was concerned with how cultural rules 
influence social structure and economic behaviour.10 Weber proposed that action is social 
“when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour”.11 
Scott argued similarly that individuals do not simply respond to stimuli without first interpreting 
them and formulating their response (however quickly this may occur).12 Social context 
inevitably influences the meaning attached to action, and the interpretation of stimuli. It follows, 
therefore, that researchers cannot truly understand action without understanding the relevant, 
time-specific social context and social meanings that guide such individual action.  
If organisations are “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve 
objectives”,13 then the concept of legitimacy is appropriate to study the development of such 
organisations. The development of the organisation can be viewed as a chain of socially 
structured and contextual actions of the organisation and its agents. In considering the 
contextual actions of the organisation, this study considers how the JSE attempted to establish 
and shape its legitimacy at various levels, and towards whom the legitimation efforts were 
aimed. Moreover, the legitimation of the JSE is considered within the broader historical context 
that determined the conditions of legitimacy. As social norms determining legitimacy evolve 
continually, legitimacy is not necessarily a state an organisation reaches but rather an ongoing 
process.14 The contextual nature of organisational legitimacy makes it most suited to historical 
research, as applied in this study. 
This study is an in-depth historical case of how a stock exchange gains and maintains 
legitimacy after its establishment, in the context of changing societal norms and values. The 
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rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: first, the various definitions of organisational legitimacy 
are considered, followed by an overview of the subjects, sources, and types of legitimacy. The 
continuous nature of the legitimation process is then considered, followed by a brief overview 
of the difference between the concepts of legitimacy, status and reputation. An analytic 
framework is then proposed, based on the overlap between institutional and legitimacy 
concepts. The chapter concludes with a comparison between legitimacy theory and broader 
institutional theory literature, a discussion of stock exchange legitimacy, and a summary. 
2.2 ORGANISATIONAL LEGITIMACY DEFINED 
Depending on the field or context within which it is employed, the concept of legitimacy has 
been defined in a vast number of ways. Essentially, legitimacy theory is “a theory that gives 
explicit consideration to the expectations of society and whether an organisation appears to 
be complying with the expectations of the societies within which it operates”.15 Failure to 
comply with societal expectations may threaten the continued existence of the organisation. 
When societal expectations change, the organisation must adapt. Failure to comply results in 
difficulty in obtaining “capital, employees, customers”.16 In order to take the various 
perspectives on the concept of legitimacy into account, the most pertinent definitions are 
considered in Table 2.1.  
The central idea emerging from these definitions is that legitimacy depends on whether the 
actions of the organisation are congruent with the broader social system within which it exists. 
Alignment between organisational values and those of society represents legitimacy. This is 
characterised by a state where the organisation’s actions and right to exist are socially and 
culturally supported. A conflict between organisational and societal values represents a lack 
of legitimacy, where the actions (and existence) of the organisation are questioned or 
challenged. Some definitions conceive of legitimacy as the organisation’s socially justified 
existence, while others focus on the social acceptance of its actions. A common thread, 
however, that permeates throughout all the definitions is the idea of alignment, compliance, 
congruence, consonance. The firm’s legitimacy depends on its social context, which is 
particularly important to take cognisance of when adopting a historical perspective, as is the 
case with this study.  
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Table 2.1 | Definitions of organisational legitimacy 
Definition 
“[O]rganisations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or implied 
by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they 
are a part. Insofar as these two value systems are congruent we can speak of organisational 
legitimacy”.17 
“We take the view that organisational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an 
organisation – the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provides explanations 
for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives”.18 
“Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions”.19 
“Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural 
alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws”.20 
Legitimacy is a “process by which cultural accounts from a larger social framework in which a social 
entity is nested are construed to explain and support the existence of that social entity, whether that 
entity be a group, a structure of inequality, a position of authority, or a social practice”.21 
“Something is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures 
accepted by a group”.22 
Legitimacy is “indicated by actors’ compliance with a social order as either (a) a set of social 
obligations, or as (b) a desirable model of action”.23 
“Legitimacy is collective recognition of and orientation to binding rules”.24 
“A legitimate organisation acts in congruence with social expectations of acceptable behaviour and 
is socially supported”.25 
Source: Author’s construction. 
Organisations depend on their legitimacy within a particular social context, and the benefits of 
being legitimate include access to resources, markets, and ultimately, survival.26 As an 
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organisation, the JSE is a product of the norms and values of its members, but its legitimacy 
also depends on its alignment with broader society to ensure the stability and continued 
operation of the Exchange, and by extension, the stock market. A complicating factor, 
particularly in the early history of the JSE, is the disconnect between the values embodied by 
the membership of the Exchange (mostly of British descent) and the broader social system 
within which the Exchange was established (the ZAR). This study explores the misalignment 
as part of the analysis in Chapter 4, and this theme is revisited throughout the thesis.  
Legitimacy shields the organisation from external pressures – a legitimate organisation is 
protected from immediate sanction for “variations in technical performance”.27 In more recent 
literature, the concept of taken-for-grantedness is used to describe this high state of 
legitimacy, where the organisation enjoys unconditional acceptance.28 In order to reach or 
maintain a state of legitimacy, actions of the organisation need not necessarily be legal, only 
socially acceptable.29 Although there is some alignment between laws and social norms, this 
alignment is never perfect. The reason for this disconnect is that social change is dynamic and 
continuous, whereas legal change is reactive and episodic.30 With this in mind, it is possible 
to distinguish between three spheres of organisational behaviour: (i) economic viability, (ii) 
legality, and (iii) legitimacy.31 Organisations will ideally pursue activities where all three 
considerations are satisfied, but may be willing to subordinate economic viability or legality to 
legitimacy, depending on the purpose for which the organisation was created. Legitimacy, 
however, remains the overarching consideration, because the absence of legitimacy can 
threaten access to resources and even the continued existence of the organisation.32  
Legitimacy, therefore, does not merely equate to public perceptions of the organisation. It 
represents the cultural justification for its existence, autonomy, and access to resources, 
making it a vital concept to understand the behaviour of the organisation. Although relevant 
stakeholders tolerate short-term variations in the performance of the legitimate organisation, 
persistent or repeated variations without plausible reason will result in diminishing legitimacy.33 
An important distinction can be made here – there is a difference between the social values 
embodied by an organisation and the social values of that organisation as perceived by the 
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general public. Even though certain events or scandals may not represent the actual social 
values of the organisation, the perceived social values are what lead to the destruction of 
legitimacy.  
Essentially, legitimacy depends on whether the values embodied by the organisation 
(perceived or actual) are in agreement with those of the broader social system within which it 
exists. When the values embodied by the organisation are in accord with those of broader 
society, the organisation possesses social/cultural justification for its existence, functioning, 
activities, and access to resources. Discord between the values of the organisation and that 
of broader society leads to sanctions. This threatens the status quo, autonomy, access to 
resources, and continued existence of the organisation. Legitimacy is directional in as far as 
the organisation is a sub-group of broader society, and legitimation efforts need to be aimed 
at particular stakeholders. The norms and values upon which legitimacy depends are 
temporally and spatially dynamic. What might be considered socially acceptable in one place 
or at one time may not be socially acceptable in a different context, again highlighting the 
importance of context in understanding particular actions.  
2.3 SUBJECTS OF LEGITIMATION 
The subjects of legitimation represent the “entities, structures, actions, and ideas whose 
acceptability is being assessed”.34 Some scholars refer to these subjects as “levels”,35 
“focuses”,36 or “objects”.37 Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argue that “subjects” would be 
the most acceptable term, since legitimacy is socially constructed and depends on the relation 
of the subject to the broader social system.38 While an exhaustive list of subjects may not be 
practical, it includes the following: “an act, a rule, a procedure, a routine, a distribution, a 
position, a group or team, a group’s status structure, teamwork, a system of positions, an 
authority structure, an organisation, organisational symbols, an organisation’s form, practices, 
services, programs, a regime, a system of power, and a system of inequality (to name a 
few).”39 Legitimacy may be established and shaped at micro-level (a procedure), or at macro-
level (an organisation). Lower-level (procedures, teams, positions, etc.) subjects can be 
aggregated to assess the legitimacy of a higher-level subject (such as an organisation).40 This 
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study explores the legitimacy of the JSE from the micro-level towards the macro-level, by 
exploring the legitimacy of the internal groups, authority structures and, ultimately, the 
organisation and its symbols.  
2.4 SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY 
A central element of organisational legitimacy is to determine towards whom the organisation 
should legitimate itself. Sources of legitimacy are those internal and external stakeholders who 
make legitimacy assessments of an organisation.41 These stakeholders can also be referred 
to as “audiences” or “evaluators”.42 One of the key issues in legitimacy research is to identify 
those who have “collective authority over legitimation”, and this process of identification 
depends largely on the research question of the study.43 Organisational legitimacy is often 
dependent on visibility. Certain organisations are more visible to the public and require more 
social and political support than others. It follows, therefore, that organisations with high 
visibility and dependence on public support would engage more and avail more resources 
towards gaining and maintaining legitimacy.44  
There are four critical stakeholder groups in the legitimation of the organisation: the state, the 
public, the holders of capital, and the media.45 The state controls elements such as legislation, 
the tax environment, and the strength of contracts. The public (or society-at-large) provides 
patronage, support and labour, all of which could be withheld in instances where the legitimacy 
of an organisation is lost or damaged. The public is considered an important source of 
legitimacy, particularly over the long term.46 The holders of capital provide investment in the 
form of short- or long-term capital. Finally, although the media does not influence the firm 
directly, it wields considerable influence over the other stakeholder groups, all of which have 
control over resources afforded to the organisation.47 The content of media articles not only 
represents the views of society, but also influences them,48 so that the media represents both 
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an indicator of an organisation’s legitimacy in society and a source of legitimacy itself.49 So-
called ‘prestige publications’ such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times are 
therefore good indicators of society-wide legitimacy.50 Each of these stakeholder groups 
influences the organisation either directly, or through the “communication of good will [sic]”.51 
Together, these four groups confer legitimacy through authorisation and endorsement.52  
If these four groups are applied to this study, the focus of the study becomes clear. This study 
offers a unique perspective of how an organisation depends on the state as a source of 
legitimacy. The JSE was established in the ZAR under Afrikaner rule.53 The ZAR became a 
British Colony in 1902, and later part of the self-governing Union of South Africa (1910). These 
changes to the state represented major shifts in the JSE’s legitimation. With each new phase 
of statehood, the context within which the JSE existed was fundamentally altered. Alongside 
the state, the public represents another important, and perhaps the central, source of 
legitimacy during the early history of the JSE. Initially, the Exchange was loathed as an 
immoral institution, comparable to a gambling house. As public perception and understanding 
evolved, so did the context which determined the legitimacy of the Exchange. The holders of 
capital represent another vital source of legitimacy. In the case of the JSE, the members of 
the Stock Exchange are viewed as the holders of capital. These members invested capital (in 
the form of proprietary rights, membership fees and sureties) into the JSE, voted for the 
General Committee, and thereby had significant influence over the actions (and therefore 
legitimacy) of the JSE. Lastly, the media is an important source of legitimacy in that it has both 
represented and shaped the public perceptions of the JSE. The local media is considered to 
be an important source of legitimacy for the JSE. While these four groups represent the most 
important sources of legitimacy, legitimacy can also be derived from inter-organisational 
relations.54 An organisation’s legitimacy is promoted “when it is connected to legitimate 
others”.55 Similarly, the co-option of respected and legitimate individuals into the organisation 
can contribute to its perceived legitimacy.56  
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While it is important to consider the sources of legitimacy when exploring the legitimacy of the 
JSE, it is essential to note that an organisation can still prosper in the absence of universal 
legitimacy.57 This is particularly evident in the early history of the JSE, since it was viewed with 
scepticism by the state and those unfamiliar with the practices of the Exchange. Despite this, 
it flourished and sustained exponential growth throughout its first few decades. Perhaps 
irrational greed and self-interest overshadowed considerations of legitimacy in the minds of 
market participants. If the stakes were high enough (as they were in the early days of the 
Exchange), this might have prompted market participants to ignore a perceived lack of 
legitimacy. Observers, on the other hand, made no secret of their view on the legitimacy of 
the stock market in Johannesburg. This is reflected in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 | Early sentiments about the stock market in Johannesburg 
Source: Pall Mall Gazette, London, 4 March 1889. 
Figure 2.1 is an example of how the public perceived the Exchange in its early history and is 
indicative of the Exchange’s general lack of legitimacy at the time. Despite such views, the 
Exchange flourished throughout its early existence. Alongside the sources of legitimacy, it is 
also necessary to consider the types of legitimacy that an organisation may pursue or possess. 
This is considered in the next section. 
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2.5 TYPES OF LEGITIMACY 
An organisation can be legitimate in many ways, whether it is legitimate simply because it is 
efficient and sensible, or legitimate on moral grounds. In his seminal treatment of legitimacy 
theory, Suchman (1995) argued that there are three broad types of legitimacy – (i) pragmatic, 
(ii) moral, and (iii) cognitive legitimacy.58 All three types of legitimacy rest on the fundamental 
assumption that an organisation’s actions are “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.59 Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) pre-empted some of the types of legitimacy proposed by Suchman, by stating that 
legitimacy could arise from “rational effectiveness” (which corresponds to pragmatic 
legitimacy), “legal mandates”, and “collectively valued purposes, means, goals” (which 
corresponds to moral legitimacy).60 Fundamentally, many modern typologies of legitimacy 
build on that of Weber – traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy.61 According to 
Weber, a subject is legitimate “if it possesses one of three key elements; if it has endured for 
a long time (traditional), if it derives from community trust (charismatic) or if it has been based 
on practical logic (rational-legal)”.62 Howard Aldrich and Marlene Fiol (1994) later distilled this 
into two broad types of legitimacy. First, socio-political legitimacy, which comes about when 
“key stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials accept a 
venture as appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws”. Second, cognitive legitimacy, 
which “refers to the spread of knowledge about a new venture”.63 Scott (1995) subdivided 
Aldrich and Fiol’s socio-political category into regulative and normative legitimacy.64 Suchman 
(1995) proposed broadly the same sub-categories, namely pragmatic (which Scott called 
regulative), moral (which Scott called normative) and cognitive legitimacy.65 This study will use 
Suchman’s typology of legitimacy, as discussed below, because it is a widely accepted and 
influential typology.66 
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2.5.1 Pragmatic legitimacy 
Pragmatic legitimacy rests on an organisation’s ability to achieve “practical outcomes in its 
immediate environment”.67 Due to its practical nature, pragmatic legitimacy relates to the 
organisation’s most immediate audiences. These audiences tend to form constituent groups 
that examine the actions of the organisation to determine the practical implications thereof.68 
Value exchange and influence lie at the heart of pragmatic legitimacy – constituent groups will 
support a particular action or policy if it holds some value to them, or their broader interests.69 
The organisation can bolster its level of pragmatic legitimacy by incorporating constituent 
groups into its policy-making structures or by adopting standards of performance as 
determined by the constituent groups.70  
2.5.2 Moral legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy depends on the acceptability of the organisation and its actions on a 
normative level.71 As such, it rests less on benefits to a particular audience, and more on 
evaluations of ‘what is right’.72 Such evaluations depend on the value system of the particular 
audience, and their beliefs about what constitutes morally acceptable action.73 Evaluations of 
an organisation’s moral legitimacy may take on one of four different forms. Audiences may 
evaluate (1) outputs and consequences of organisational action (consequential legitimacy), or 
(2) the techniques and procedures by which organisational action takes place (procedural 
legitimacy). Audiences may also scrutinise (3) the categories and structures (structural 
legitimacy), as well as (4) the leaders and representatives of the organisation (personal 
legitimacy).74  
Consequential legitimacy depends on whether the organisation accomplishes “socially 
valued consequences”75 – whether the organisation produces products or services of good 
quality and value to relevant audiences. The definitions of good quality and value are socially 
constructed, and therefore this type of legitimacy is often difficult to define or measure.76 
Procedural legitimacy depends on whether the organisation operates using “socially 
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accepted techniques and procedures”.77 This type of legitimacy is particularly important where 
the consequences of organisational conduct are less tangible or visible, which makes it 
necessary for the organisation to derive legitimacy from “the way they do things”, rather than 
from what they do.78 Structural legitimacy depends on whether the structure of the 
organisation is seen to be appropriate for the activities in which the organisation will engage.79 
While Suchman argues that structures and procedures are not perfectly distinguishable, he 
argues that procedural legitimacy asks whether an organisation performs quality inspections, 
and structural legitimacy asks whether an organisation has a quality control department.80 
Finally, personal legitimacy depends on the “charisma of individual organisational leaders”.81 
While Suchman highlights the idiosyncratic nature of personal legitimacy, it might explain why 
organisations often hire well-known, respected and trustworthy individuals to serve in highly 
visible executive positions.82 
When considering the literature on legitimacy, two contesting conceptions of moral legitimacy 
emerge. From the perspective of the early institutional sociologists, such as Weber and 
Parsons, the normative aspect of moral legitimacy rests on shared values that underpin 
collective evaluations of right and wrong.83 The congruence with social norms is the essence 
of normative legitimacy in this interpretation. However, in contemporary organisational 
institutionalism, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argue that normative legitimacy is often 
equated to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of normative isomorphism,84 which 
emphasises congruence with the ethics and norms of a particular profession, rather than with 
those of society at large.85 Deephouse and Suchman (2008) propose that the Weberian 
concept of moral legitimacy be rephrased as normative legitimacy, whereas that of DiMaggio 
and Powell should be rephrased as professional legitimacy, in order to avoid confusion.86 
Both conceptions of moral legitimacy are explored in this study, since the body of stock 
exchange members represented the social values of their profession (stockbroking), 
particularly as it manifested in London, as well as the broader social norms of the time and 
place where the Exchange was established.  
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2.5.3 Cognitive legitimacy 
When the organisation is accepted as necessary or inevitable, it possesses cognitive 
legitimacy.87 This happens when the organisation aligns with the normative expectations of its 
social environment to such an extent that it becomes taken-for-granted.88 This taken-for-
grantedness, however, is problematic when the evaluation of cognitive legitimacy is 
considered. An organisation may be subject to positive or negative evaluations, or even 
indifference, and still be taken-for-granted.89 The strength of legitimacy based on taken-for-
grantedness lies in the difficulty of audiences to conceive of another way – “If alternatives 
become unthinkable, challenges become impossible, and the legitimated entity becomes 
unassailable by construction”.90 In other words, if an organisation is taken-for-granted, it may 
be subject to criticism, but audiences still struggle to imagine any other way. However, 
because of the nature of market economies and political environments, this high level of 
legitimacy is relatively rare, since audiences rarely accept that only one organisation could 
deliver a particular outcome.91  
Suchman (1995) also highlights a second school of thought, which argues that considerations 
of cognitive legitimacy move beyond taken-for-grantedness, by focusing on 
comprehensibility.92 When approaching cognitive legitimacy as comprehensibility, legitimacy 
relies on plausible cultural explanations for the organisation’s existence and actions.93 
Comprehensibility can further be divided into two sub-categories: predictability, which is the 
comprehensibility of actions, and plausibility, which is the comprehensibility of “essences”.94 
The essences here refer to what the organisation embodies on a symbolic level, as opposed 
to what it actually does (its actions).  
Since the standards by which legitimacy is measured are constantly in flux, the legitimacy of 
an organisation persists through continuous engagement. Legitimation may be thought of as 
a process, as opposed to a state the organisation attains. 
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2.6 THE CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION 
Legitimation can be defined in a variety of ways. Maurer (1971), for instance, defined 
legitimation as “the process whereby an organisation justifies to a peer or superordinate 
system its right to exist”,95 whereas Kaplan and Ruland (1991) viewed it as a process “by 
which an organisation seeks approval (or avoidance of sanction) from groups in society”.96 For 
others, legitimation simply represents the change in legitimacy over time,97 or the process of 
becoming socially accepted.98 In this study, the process of legitimation is taken to be the 
organisation’s engagements with its various audiences, in order to ensure approval, 
acceptance and justification for its existence and actions. The dynamic nature of 
organisational legitimacy necessitates the conception of legitimation as a process, rather than 
a characteristic. The norms and values determining the organisation's legitimacy are 
constantly evolving, hence the conception of legitimation as a process. Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of the organisation depends not only on the actions of the focal organisation, but 
also on those of other groups and organisations which may affect the relevant norms and 
values.99  
The literature identifies four phases in the process of legitimation: establishing, maintaining, 
extending, and defending legitimacy. The process is non-linear – the organisation will start by 
establishing its legitimacy, and it will move on to maintaining its legitimacy, but extending and 
defending legitimacy is episodic, as deemed necessary.  
2.6.1 Establishing legitimacy 
An organisation first needs to establish its legitimacy (or “gain legitimacy”, as Suchman terms 
it),100 in order to garner social acceptance. This is important during the early development of 
the organisation, as emergent organisations do not possess any legitimacy at the outset.101 
During this phase, the focus is generally on competence.102 When new operations are not well 
institutionalised and accepted as common practice, early entrants must often convince 
audiences of not only their own legitimacy, but also that of the sector (known as sector 
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building).103 This initial effort to convince audiences may be approached in three ways: First, 
the organisation can align its “output, goals, and methods” with prevailing views of what 
legitimacy constitutes in a particular context. Second, it could seek to influence what its 
stakeholders consider legitimate. Third, the organisation can attempt to create an association 
between itself and “symbols, values, or institutions” with well-established legitimacy.104 The 
first and third strategies mentioned above are considered more common, since it is difficult to 
change what is considered legitimate by society.105 The central challenge during this phase is 
the creation of “allegiant constituencies” and gaining the support of legitimate entities.106 Once 
the organisation has attained some level of legitimacy, it must engage with its various 
audiences in order to maintain its legitimacy. 
2.6.2 Maintaining legitimacy 
This phase of the legitimation process is where most organisations operate. Maintaining 
legitimacy includes the organisation’s constant engagement with its audiences to assure them 
that “all is well”, as well as preventing any decline in legitimacy.107 This phase is particularly 
problematic if one approaches legitimacy as something that arises from harmony between 
organisational practices and the normative expectations of audiences. These expectations are 
constantly in flux, therefore maintaining legitimacy requires the organisation to hit a moving 
target.108 Nonetheless, if the organisation maintains a keen sense of what its audiences 
expect, it can engage at a pragmatic or symbolic level to maintain its legitimacy. Along with 
efforts to maintain legitimacy, organisations may also engage in activities to extend legitimacy.  
2.6.3 Extending legitimacy 
When an organisation needs to communicate its legitimacy to a new stakeholder or group of 
stakeholders, it seeks to extend its legitimacy.109 There are different ways in which an 
organisation may attempt to maintain or extend its legitimacy. The organisation may engage 
in corporate social responsibility campaigns,110 or may pursue “charitable donations, 
                                                 
 
103 Suchman, Managing legitimacy, 586. 
104 Dowling and Pfeffer, Organizational legitimacy, 127. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Suchman, Managing legitimacy, 587; cf. Dowling and Pfeffer, Organizational legitimacy. 
107 Blake Ashforth and Barrie Gibbs. "The double-edge of organizational legitimation." Organization Science 1, 
no. 2 (1990): 183. 
108 Craig Deegan, Michaela Rankin, and John Tobin. "An examination of the corporate social and environmental 
disclosures of BHP from 1983‐1997." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 15, no. 3 (2002): 312-
343. 
109 Ashforth and Gibbs, The double-edge of organizational legitimation, 180. 
110 Dow Votaw and S. Prakash Sethi. "Do we need a new corporate response to a changing social environment?" 
California Management Review 12, no. 1 (1969): 3-16; Malcolm Schlusberg. "Corporate legitimacy and social 
responsibility: The role of law." California Management Review 12, no. 1 (1969): 65-76. 
46 
interlocking directorships, and strategic alliances with prestigious partners”.111 Throughout the 
analysis, the efforts of the Stock Exchange to gain and maintain legitimacy will be explored, 
in order to gain a better understanding of how a stock exchange engages in the legitimation 
process. 
2.6.4 Defending legitimacy 
On occasion, the organisation may need to defend its legitimacy in the eyes of particular 
audiences. Legitimacy may be threatened by some internal or external development, which 
would necessitate its defence.112 The satisfaction of one stakeholder often comes at the 
expense of another stakeholder, making the defence of legitimacy a difficult but necessary 
process for the average organisation.113 Challenges to the legitimacy of the organisation may 
result in a decline in legitimacy and reputational damage. At this point, it is useful to consider 
the difference between the legitimacy, status, and reputation of the organisation. 
2.7 LEGITIMACY AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
Research on legitimacy has overlapped with research on similar concepts, such as status and 
reputation. Deephouse and Suchman (2008) note that the definitions of reputation and status 
are as varied and diverse as those of legitimacy, but offer the following definitions.114 Status 
is “a socially constructed, intersubjectively agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking” of 
social actors,115 “based on the esteem or deference that each actor can claim by virtue of the 
actor's membership in a group or groups with distinctive practices, values, traits, capacities or 
inherent worth”.116 Reputation is an expectation about the future performance of the firm based 
on its past behaviour.117 Status, therefore, is a measure of the organisation’s position relative 
to others in a particular social hierarchy, unlike legitimacy, which considers the social 
acceptance of the organisation in itself. Reputation can be seen as a consequence of 
legitimacy – a legitimate organisation that has proven itself to be worthy of social acceptance 
will have high expectations of future performance from a variety of audiences, which may be 
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likened to a good reputation. Other authors have also highlighted the relative focus of 
reputation, as opposed to the absolute focus of legitimacy.118 In this study, the analysis will 
focus primarily on legitimacy, because the JSE operated as the dominant (or only) stock 
exchange in South Africa for most of its history, making relative considerations of reputation 
less applicable. 
2.8 OVERLAPPING INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGITIMACY CONCEPTS 
Legitimacy depends on whether the values embodied by an organisation (perceived or actual) 
are in accord with those of its broader social system. This broader social system can be 
thought of as a set of institutions, which can be defined as “stable, valued, recurring patterns 
of behaviour”,119 or, “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.120 Earlier 
scholars approached institutions as ideas embodied by structures: an idea, notion, doctrine or 
interest that materialises through an individual or organisation.121 More recently, Scott (2014) 
considered institutions to be “regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to life”.122 
Approaching individual and organisational behaviour from an institutional perspective offers a 
useful alternative to the rational “standard economic and realist accounts” of socio-economic 
life.123 The usefulness of this approach lies in its focus on how human behaviour rests on 
historical forces and societal structures.124 One of the central tenets of institutionalism (in its 
various forms) is that behaviour is often dictated by social context rather than by the rational 
action of the individual. In other words, an institutional approach discards the presupposition 
of “an unchangeable actor with given preferences and functions”, instead approaching the 
individual as “interactive, mouldable” and “embedded in a net of institutions”.125 The concept 
of legitimacy is an ideal linkage between the organisation and its broader environment – norms 
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and values of broader society determine the conditions of an organisation's legitimacy, but at 
the same time, the organisation may influence norms and values in its pursuit of legitimacy.126 
Therefore, the organisation is not only “embedded in a net of institutions” but may also engage 
with and alter the institutional environment within which it operates. Whenever organisations 
engage in legitimating activities that change social norms and values, they are engaging with 
their institutional environment.127 In the legitimation process, an organisation will try to 
incorporate its “goals and procedures directly into society as institutional rules”.128 
The organisation exists relative to its institutional environment in several ways. First, an 
organisation employs “external criteria of worth” dictated by the social context within which it 
exists. This includes ceremonial awards, endorsements, industry standards, and prestige.129 
Second, the institutional environment can be a source of stability for the organisation, when 
the organisation harmonises itself with the broader social system. Thus, it derives support not 
only from its performance but also from its conformance to the broader social system.130 The 
legitimacy of the organisation, therefore, depends on its operational efficiency, as well as how 
well it can relate itself to the various levels of its institutional environment.131 
The types of legitimacy discussed earlier correspond with Scott’s (2014) analytic framework 
of three pillars of institutions.132 Scott (2014) argues that the social framework rests on 
regulative systems, normative systems, and cultural-cognitive systems, which fall on a 
continuum ranging from legally enforced to taken-for-granted.133 The legitimacy of an 
organisation (as defined earlier) rests on the alignment between the organisation and these 
three systems. Each of the systems is briefly considered in the following sections.  
2.8.1 The regulative system 
Certain institutions take on the nature of a regulative system. From this perspective, 
institutions “constrain and regularise behaviour”, which involves rule-making, monitoring and 
sanctioning.134 The main concern of the regulative system is expedience.135 Many institutional 
economists consider the regulative system as the central component of the institutional 
environment. Nobel laureate Douglass North considered institutions to be the rules, and 
                                                 
 
126 Dowling and Pfeffer, Organizational legitimacy, 131.  
127 Meyer and Rowan, Institutionalized organizations; cf. Dowling and Pfeffer, Organizational legitimacy. 
128 Meyer and Rowan, Institutionalized organizations, 348. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., 351. 
131 Ibid., 352. 
132 Scott, Institutions and organizations.  
133 Ibid., 59. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 60.  
49 
organisations as the players.136 In Scott's conception of institutions, however, the regulative 
system is seen as only one part of a broader institutional framework that includes the 
normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of behaviour. If legitimacy is considered from a 
regulative perspective, then the organisation gains legitimacy by adhering to and engaging 
with the rules.137 As discussed earlier, the organisation can improve its legitimacy by 
incorporating constituent groups into its policy-making structures or by adopting standards of 
performance as determined by the constituent groups.138 These standards and policies, in 
Suchman’s conception of pragmatic legitimacy,139 can be likened to the rules and prescriptions 
of the regulative system, as Scott (2014) proposed.140 
2.8.2 The normative system 
Other institutions may depend more on the normative system than the regulative system. The 
normative system consists of values and norms, which bring a “prescriptive, evaluative, and 
obligatory dimension into social life”.141 The main concern of the normative system is social 
obligation.142 Values can be thought of as a preferred ideal against which behaviour can be 
measured, whereas norms determine “how things should be done” in a legitimate fashion.143 
This provides a framework for action that is governed by what is just and socially expected of 
an organisation. If legitimacy is considered from the normative perspective, then legitimacy is 
gained by a “positive normative evaluation” of the organisation’s outputs, procedures, 
structures, and representatives.144 Though some overlap exists between the regulative and 
normative systems when laws reflect norms and values, this overlap is typically not perfect.145 
The reason for this gap between what is legal and what is just is that social change is dynamic 
and continuous, whereas legal change is reactive and episodic.146 For this reason, the 
normative system falls in the middle between legally enforceable and taken-for-granted. 
2.8.3 The cultural-cognitive system 
Moving further along the continuum towards taken-for-grantedness, the cultural-cognitive 
system relies on “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and create 
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the frames through which meaning is made”.147 The main concern of the cultural-cognitive 
system is shared understanding and taken-for-grantedness.148 The shared symbols and 
meanings that underpin this system necessitate the analyst to consider both the conditions 
and the actor’s interpretation of them.149 Therefore, legitimacy within the cultural-cognitive 
system relies on cultural justification for the organisation’s existence and actions based on 
some shared conception of social reality.150 As discussed earlier, the taken-for-grantedness 
associated with cognitive legitimacy is relatively rare, since no organisation is entirely 
unquestioned and taken-for-granted. Therefore, this analysis will focus more on the pragmatic 
(regulative) and moral (normative) aspects of organisational legitimacy in the case of the JSE. 
2.8.4 A system of systems 
While particular academic fields tend to focus on one of the three systems as the fundamental 
basis of the social framework, Scott (2014) argued that the interaction and interdependencies 
between these systems are what indeed constitutes the social framework.151 In other words, 
the social framework rests simultaneously on the three systems, since any of these systems 
in isolation cannot fully explain social action. This is important to keep in mind when analysing 
the organisation in its broader environment, as the analysis needs to pay attention to the 
different systems at play, and the implications of each system for the legitimacy of the 
organisation. This interaction, as well as the corresponding type of legitimacy for each system, 
is shown in Figure 2.2. 
As discussed earlier, legitimacy can be defined as “a generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.152 The “socially constructed 
system” is the institutional environment of the organisation. The structure and procedures of 
the organisation are not merely products of its relational networks, but are often underpinned 
or reinforced by public opinion, the education system, legal practices, and other elements of 
the institutional environment. In this way, the institutional environment sets the criteria for 
organisational legitimacy.153 Furthermore, a shift in the institutional environment (i.e. a change 
in what is legal, socially acceptable, and natural) results in new organisations that find the 
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justification for their existence and actions in the new order, or in existing organisations that 








Figure 2.2 | Reconciling the Suchman and Scott typologies 
Source: Adapted from Scott (2014) and Suchman (1995). 
In short, when a particular activity becomes socially acceptable, new organisations will form 
to perform such an activity. When changing social norms affect the activities of existing 
organisations, these organisations will adapt to reflect new social norms. The legitimating force 
of alignment between the organisation and its institutional environment is clear. Essentially, 
organisations are a product of a “socially constructed reality”.155 Unfortunately, the alignment 
of the organisation with its broader institutional environment, for the sake of legitimacy, often 
results in inefficiencies.156 In this context, two challenges arise. First, there is friction between 
technical activities, the pursuit of efficiency, and ceremonial conformance to institutional 
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elements. Second, these institutional elements are often in conflict with one another since they 
arise from a heterogeneous institutional context. The activities of the organisation often have 
“ritual significance” in that they send the desired signals to particular audiences, regardless of 
whether those activities contribute to (or sometimes detract from) the technical efficiency of 
the organisation.157  
2.9 LEGITIMACY AND THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
To understand the development of an organisation, it is essential to consider its legitimation 
within broader society. As crucial as legitimacy is for the average organisation, over the long 
run it may be even more critical for stock exchanges, as facilitators of the market and a highly 
visible institutions. The global spread of stock exchanges during the 20th century implies an 
alignment between the values embodied by the stock exchange (in general terms) and those 
of society.158 In fact, the contemporary public acceptance of stock exchanges represents an 
integral part of the social order of capitalism.159 Despite the ubiquity and contemporary 
acceptance of the stock exchange, very little research has attempted to explain how the stock 
exchange reached this state of broad acceptance, or legitimacy.160 The legitimacy and 
reputation of publicly traded firms have received some scholarly attention.161 Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of financial markets has received some attention, from a sociological perspective.162 
Unfortunately, research into the broad legitimation efforts of the stock exchange is almost non-
existent. The unique constitution of the stock exchange, which differs greatly from those of 
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ordinary organisations upon which legitimacy theory was modelled, mandates more focus on 
matters of stock exchange legitimacy. 
One of the earliest allusions to stock exchange legitimacy can be found in Die Börse (1894) 
by Max Weber. Weber emphasised the need for a homogeneous class of traders, with similar 
“preparatory training, (...) practical education, and (...) position”.163 The emergence of such a 
homogeneous class would enable the formation of a “tribunal” to educate and regulate traders, 
and bring about a “unified concept of honour”.164 In these early observations of the stock 
exchange, Weber pre-empted some of the more formal contemporary work on financial market 
legitimacy. Along the same lines as Weber, Alex Preda has argued that financial markets 
“should be analysed as uncertainty-processing social networks and intermediary groups”.165 
This is particularly appropriate for historical studies of stock exchanges, since the interactions 
on the trading floor assumed high levels of social information and were, in fact, a function of 
the underlying social network.166 Such transactions were effected within a particular social 
structure through which uncertainties are processed, and relevant information created and 
distributed.167 One of the earliest direct references to stock exchange legitimacy came from 
Kenneth Boulding (1967). When exploring the legitimacy of economics as both a discipline 
and profession, Boulding mentioned (in passing) that “[a]n institution like the stock exchange, 
for instance, can survive in the United States because it is fairly widely regarded as legitimate. 
In the Soviet Union it cannot survive because it is regarded as illegitimate”.168  
It is important to note that many stock exchanges flourished (somewhat paradoxically) after 
their establishment, despite having little or no legitimacy, as is also shown in this study.169 
While this is not addressed directly in research about organisational legitimacy, research on 
stock exchange history has, in some instances, implied the initial lack of legitimacy. The JSE 
did not possess legitimacy immediately after its establishment. The early JSE was thought of 
as “the worst in the world, with the exception of one [unnamed] institution abroad”.170 Its early 
records are awash with violent disputes and claims between members, and it attracted men 
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from all stations, including storekeepers, farmers, ostrich feather dealers, and a few defaulting 
brokers who had fled London.171 Early observers described it as “an institution of dubious 
repute and the home of wild-cat company promotions and share speculation”172 and a “squalid 
sort of Monte Carlo”.173 Despite having little or no legitimacy, however, the JSE flourished 
during its early years, as is shown in Chapter 4. The same is true for other exchanges after 
their formation.174 The LSE, for instance, was thought of as an immoral public evil, and was 
the target of legislation as early as 1697, due to its association with gambling, market 
manipulations, and transactions with “sinister design”.175 This legislation was aimed at the 
“nefarious practices of the tatterdemalion vagabond element” present at the exchange. Their 
gambling at the exchange was seen to undermine national morals, and their presence was 
described as “a pollution”.176 In those early days, anyone could enter the House and trade for 
themselves upon payment of a sixpence.177 Many of the traders did not have the acumen to 
execute bargains reliably, and there were no barriers to entry. This impaired the legitimacy of 
the early LSE. Similarly, the NYSE was said to stand, at least in the view of the general public, 
“for all that is sinister in American politics, all that is reprehensible in American business, all 
that is vast and hazardous, all that is covetous and unscrupulous in high or low finance”.178 As 
for Amsterdam, the lack of a single trading location and the inability to exclude unscrupulous 
traders inhibited the development of formal regulation necessary for the market to prosper.179 
Much of the lack of initial legitimacy resulted from broader society’s failure to understand the 
operation of time bargains and speculation. The time bargain, which was “the habit of buying 
and selling stock without delivery” or “dealing for differences”, was particularly derided by 
commentators due to its perceived dishonesty and lack of physical exchange.180 The 
speculator entering into a time bargain undertook to pay for an instrument after a certain 
period, with no intention of ever receiving or paying for the instrument. If the price of the 
instrument had declined by the end of the period, the speculator paid the difference to the 
seller. If the price increased, the seller paid the difference to the speculator.181 While this 
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remained common practice for most of the history of stock exchanges, the general lack of 
understanding of such transactions meant that they did not gain social sanction, or 
legitimation, until much later. 
2.10 SUMMARY 
An exchange does not simply match buyers and sellers or act as a price discovery mechanism. 
Besides its intermediary role, it can also be seen as an embodiment of “the logic of investment 
and speculation”.182 In other words, the exchange represents not only the basic function it 
fulfils in an economic sense, but also the underlying cognitive processes. In this way, it can 
be thought of as a social structure, where routines and habits bring stability and help to process 
uncertainty.183 The exchange is the key actor, representing the collective of brokers, in 
maintaining the system of exchange and managing social relationships, routines and habits. 
The exchange can be seen as the structural embodiment of market organisation and 
regulation.184 When this is considered from a legitimacy perspective, it may be argued that the 
intermediary role of the exchange is only the first layer of its legitimacy. This represents its 
ability to deliver practical outcomes to its most immediate audiences (pragmatic legitimacy). 
Besides its ability to deliver such pragmatic outcomes, its legitimacy may also rest on whether 
the exchange delivers socially valued consequences (consequential legitimacy), by 
appropriate procedures (procedural legitimacy) and structures (structural legitimacy), in a 
comprehensible way (cognitive legitimacy).  
The growth of 19th-century capitalism is inextricably linked to the trading of equity (as facilitated 
by the stock exchange) and the legitimation of such practices in society. The spread of stock 
exchanges contributed significantly to the increased economic activity observed over the last 
two centuries because it offered access to more capital than individuals and businesses could 
mobilise from their own resources. The secondary market also offered a platform for investors 
to withdraw their capital, which contributed to the success of the primary market. In order to 
understand this broader process, it is vital to explore the legitimation of stock exchanges, 
which, up until now, has received limited scholarly attention. This study explores the 
legitimation efforts of the JSE as an organisation broadly at two levels: (1) internal legitimation, 
which focuses on the legitimation of the exchange towards its members, and (2) external 
legitimation, which refers to the legitimacy of the organisation towards external stakeholders, 
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and its efforts to shape perceptions about its conformance to social values and expected 
performance. In each of these spheres, the analysis focuses on how the Exchange first 
gained, and then maintained, its legitimacy. Some attention is also devoted to episodes where 
the Exchange needed to defend its legitimacy, as well as shifts in societal norms and values 
that brought about the need to extend its legitimation efforts to new audiences. The duality 
within the analysis is motivated by the fact that the Exchange was a product of the norms and 
values of its members, but its legitimacy also depended on its alignment with the norms and 
values of broader society. What makes the case of the JSE particularly relevant is the 
disconnect between the values of members and those of the broader society, especially during 
the early history of the Exchange.  
Throughout the first six decades of the Exchange’s existence, it evolved from being an object 
of disapproval and scepticism to approach the high state of taken-for-grantedness. Although 
the perceptions of the public and other stakeholders are central to the analysis, the exploration 
of the JSE’s legitimation extends to a deeper level of legitimacy. The analysis considers not 
only the pragmatic legitimacy of the Exchange, as it related to the most immediate audiences 
of the Exchange, but also its moral and cognitive legitimacy. In considering the moral 
legitimacy of the Exchange, this study also considers its consequential legitimacy (whether it 
brings about socially valued consequences), procedural legitimacy (whether its techniques 
and procedures are socially acceptable), structural legitimacy (whether its structure is seen as 
appropriate for its activities), and personal legitimacy (whether it derives legitimacy from 
influential individuals). Furthermore, some consideration is also given to the legitimacy that 
the Exchange derived from inter-organisational relations. The next chapter will turn the 




Chapter 3 Research design 
“It is worth noticing that the word history at the same time denotes the narrative, the 
knowledge about what happened as well as what happened in itself. That both scientific 
discipline as well as its subject are denoted by the same term is unique, but is related to 
the fact that history only exists because of historians. Trees and flowers we could see even 
if there were no botanists; thunderstorms rage whether there are physicists or not. But 
without historians to retell and narrate the past and get the few dead and silent sources to 
talk, the past would not exist for us. The ambiguity of the term history leads us into the 
essences of history as academic discipline.” 
 
Kristian Erslev (1911)1 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study examines how the JSE first gained and then maintained legitimacy within a highly 
dynamic environment throughout its first six decades of existence between 1887 and 1945. 
The study is motivated by the relative lack of formal historical work on the JSE, as well as the 
lack of research into the drivers of stock exchange legitimacy, given its importance in 
understanding stock exchange development. During the period of study, the JSE endured 
periods of significant political instability and social change. The contextual nature of 
organisational legitimacy,2 as well as changes in the social order determining the conditions 
of legitimacy, require a long-term historical focus. To understand the broad legitimation of the 
Exchange as an organisation, this study uses primary archival sources (to explore the internal 
dynamics of legitimacy) as well as newspaper and other secondary sources (to explore the 
external perceptions of legitimacy).  
3.2 HISTORY AND ORGANISATIONAL RESEARCH 
Organisational scholars of late have increasingly recognised the value of history to bring new 
perspectives to a predominantly a-historical body of research.3 Calls to adopt a more historical 
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perspective in organisational research arose from the largely a-historical nature of 
organisational scholarship during the latter half of the 20th century.4 This a-historical character 
can be attributed to “an unreflexive espousal of a specific view on history”, namely the view 
that history and science are “incommensurable”, or not judged by the same epistemological 
standards.5 More recently, organisational scholars have responded to calls for adopting a 
more historical approach. Thus, history has been increasingly employed, in varying ways. This 
persistent trend is now referred to in the literature as the “historic turn” in Management and 
Organisation Studies.6 As part of the historic turn (or return, as some scholars argue),7 a 
growing appreciation of the historical perspective has made its way into organisational 
research, moving away from the social scientific and perhaps anti-historical character of 
organisational research during preceding decades.8 
Given the historic turn, there are three positions that history might occupy within organisational 
studies.9 First, the supplementarist position approaches organisational research as theory-
driven, where history might be employed to confirm or refine theories.10 When history occupies 
this position, it is relegated (as the name implies) to a supplementary, secondary position to 
theory, which remains the primary consideration of the research. Second, the integrationist 
position approaches organisational studies by placing historical analysis on an equal footing 
with considerations of “organisational forms and processes.”11 This position combines 
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theoretical pursuits with “the enriching possibilities of the humanities”,12 and integrates aspects 
of generalisation and interpretation of specific actions in historical context.13 As such, 
organisational studies in the integrationist tradition incorporate explanation and description 
concurrently,14 by employing both the “concepts and methods of history and of organisational 
theory”.15 This position rests on the assertion that “organisation theory needs historical 
analyses”16 and “history needs organisational analyses”.17 Third, the reorientationist position 
is critical of the other positions discussed above, and emphasises the importance of 
reorienting organisational studies away from its scientific aspirations, towards a more 
naturalistic, historical perspective.18 This position prioritises “narrative” arguments in 
organisation studies, in a way disregarding the pre-occupation of the supplementarist and 
integrationist positions with theoretical pursuits.  
Based on the three positions discussed above, this study adopts the integrationist position 
with regard to history and theory. In this way, the study aims to reconstruct the development 
of the JSE over time, using the concepts of organisational legitimacy discussed in the 
preceding chapters.  
3.3 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The problematic reluctance of business historians to discuss their sources, methods, and 
practices has recently come into focus in debates concerning the development of the field.19 
For this reason, the detailed methodological aspects of the study are discussed in this chapter, 
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starting from the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the study. The 
perceived disconnect between history and organisational research can be attributed to 
researchers from different backgrounds having different conceptions of scientific reality.20 This 
is the main reason for considering the philosophy behind the research project – to define the 
assumptions about reality and perception on which the research is predicated.  
The ontological dimension of the study (the researcher’s assumptions about reality)21 will 
inform the epistemological dimension of the study (assumptions about how knowledge is 
created), and this, in turn, will inform the choice of method.22 For this study, reality is assumed 
to be socially constructed.23 The legitimacy of an organisation depends on whether its actions 
are “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions”.24 Therefore, the acceptance of an organisation as legitimate 
within a broader social system depends on the way the norms, values, beliefs and definitions 
are socially constructed within that system. These norms, values, beliefs and definitions, 
therefore, do not represent an independent reality but a socially constructed one to which the 
organisation is subject.25 
The epistemological dimension of the study depends on assumptions about how knowledge 
is created, which in turn depends on the ontological assumption of the study.26 If reality is 
approached as external, or independent of the observer, knowledge is assumed to be 
universal, and objective. However, when reality is thought of as a social construction, 
knowledge is assumed to be subjective and based on interpretation.27 Therefore, the study 
adopts an interpretivist epistemological dimension to guide the construction of the historical 
narrative.28 Given that organisational scholars often view historical scholarship as a “repository 
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of facts”, it should be emphasised that such historical scholarship represents interpretations, 
rather than “neutral evidence”.29 This reaffirms the interpretivist nature of historical narrative 
construction, and the importance of explicit procedures for the interpretation it requires. In the 
pursuit of the “empathetic understanding” of historical action, this study takes an interpretive 
approach, and will approach the research problem qualitatively.30 
3.4 HISTORICAL METHOD 
At its core, historical research relies on the historical method. This method is generally held to 
consist of three broad steps, namely (1) the collection of data, (2) the critical assessment of 
data, and (3) the summarization of facts and interpretations.31 Besides the broad steps of the 
historical method (all of which are discussed below), this study relies on the methodological 
framework developed by Kipping, Wadhwani and Bucheli (2014) as a point of departure.32 
This framework was developed in response to the lack of methodological transparency in 
business history research, in order to facilitate better interdisciplinary discourse between 
history and management/organisation studies.33 
The difficulty of relying on historical sources is that, in contrast to the systematic observations 
made by organisational scholars, historical material is often fragmented and unstructured. The 
methodological framework emphasises source criticism to engage with internal and external 
validity of texts, triangulation in order to improve robustness of interpretation, and an iterative 
hermeneutic interpretation “which situates texts within their historical contexts and in 
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relation to other texts”.34 These are not sequential phases in the research, however. The 
authors emphasise the iterative nature of the process.35 
3.5 SOURCE CRITICISM AND DATA SOURCES 
The reliability of data sources represents a key consideration in historical research. Such 
reliability may be approached from three different perspectives – external criticism, internal 
criticism, and verifiability.36 External criticism requires ascertaining the trustworthiness of a 
particular document based on its origins and preservation.37 This may be thought of as the 
validity of sources.38 Validity of a source can be determined by considering “the provenance 
of a source, (…) its intended audience and purpose; and (…) the context under which it was 
written”.39 This study relies mainly on primary documents in the form of original Minute Books 
housed at the JSE Archive in Johannesburg. As such, the provenance of the material is clear. 
The complete collection of General Committee Minute Books has been well preserved, and 
there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The purpose of the Minute Books was to record the 
decisions of the General Committee in its capacity as the management and regulator of the 
Stock Exchange. The books were updated weekly for the period under consideration by the 
Secretary of the JSE, who was present at all meetings of the Committee. The intended 
audience was Committee members exclusively, and the confidential nature of the proceedings 
was often reaffirmed during Committee meetings.40 This was done to enable “matters under 
consideration to be freely discussed”.41 This allowed for detailed records to be kept, and for 
important and noteworthy letters to be copied verbatim in the Minute Books, which greatly 
contributes to the richness of the sources.42 Internal criticism requires determining the 
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trustworthiness of particular statements or information contained in a document.43 This may 
be viewed as the credibility of sources.44 The trustworthiness of the individual statements 
within these documents is consistently confronted within the narrative,45 through hermeneutic 
interpretation (discussed below) and the triangulation of different perspectives where 
possible.46 This is done by triangulating a particular decision in one meeting with the 
subsequent confirmation of such decisions in other meetings (or contexts), as well as by 
triangulating the information in the archival documents with information from other sources 
(such as newspaper sources, academic articles, and books) where possible. While the 
confidentiality of Committee proceedings contributes to the trustworthiness of information 
contained in the material (since Committee members could freely express their views without 
fear of reproach), triangulation is impaired to a certain extent by such confidentiality. This is 
discussed in the next section. The verifiability of historical sources is another important 
component of source criticism. Verifiability is underpinned by source transparency – by linking 
claims to particular instances in the archival material.47 In this study, claims are linked back to 
the particular Minute Book, date and page number when a resolution was passed.  
Source criticism is important because of the problems associated with historical sources – 
such sources are not direct observations of the subject, which are controlled by the researcher. 
These sources are often incomplete, and the cultural and social context within which they were 
created might not be readily apparent, and is often alien to the author.48 Organisational 
records, in particular, are products of the structure and culture of the organisation, as well as 
the interests and perspectives of individuals involved in their production.49 When investigating 
the history of a particular organisation, the sources produced by individuals directly involved 
with the organisation are typically prioritised.50 Although a new General Committee was 
elected on an annual basis, the minutes provided significant continuity to the functioning of 
the Committee. The Committee saw the minutes as akin to legal precedent, and closely 
followed customs and decisions made by previous committees. The Secretary of the 
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Exchange also provided a degree of continuity, through longer tenure than the Committee, 
and valuable insight into the decisions and deliberations of previous committees.  
Primary sources are “those texts and objects that come to us from the time period of interest, 
ideally from actors involved in the events and incidents under study”.51 Secondary sources 
“are commentaries and writings on the past from a later date”.52 In historical studies, 
understanding of a text in context arises through the interpretation of primary sources in 
relation to other, contextual sources.53 In other words, “history is as much about using sources 
to uncover the codes by which people understand, represent, and shape their world as it is 
about finding data that can be said to represent that world”.54 Secondary sources enable the 
researcher to understand the context within which a particular source is located.55 
Unfortunately, in the case of the JSE, limited secondary literature exists (as shown in Chapter 
1). There are only three histories of the Exchange,56 most of which take on a commemorative 
character, rather than an academic, historical perspective. Fortunately, there is a wealth of 
literature on the broader context within which the Exchange existed, particularly during its early 
history, on the newly-founded goldfields of the Witwatersrand. 
With respect to primary sources, the very first Minute Book, which covered the period from the 
establishment of the Exchange in 1887 to October 1889, is missing from the Archive. The 
history of the Exchange’s establishment is, however, documented in the three books written 
on its history.57 The Minute Books preserved in the JSE Archive commence on 29 October 
1889, and contain summaries of weekly discussions of a variety of committees. The most 
important source is the discussions of the General Committee, which managed the strategic 
and operational affairs of the Exchange and approved all recommendations and decisions of 
other sub-committees. These sub-committees include the Finance Committee, the Listing 
Committee, the House Committee and the Membership Committee. An example of a Minute 
Book and the structure of the minutes are presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
  
                                                 
 
51 Lipartito, Historical Sources and Data, 285; Witkowski and Jones, Qualitative historical research in 
marketing, 72. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Kipping, Wadwhani, and Bucheli, Analyzing and Interpreting Historical Sources, 321; cf. Decker, The silence 
of the archives. 
54 Lipartito, Historical Sources and Data, 285. 
55 Kipping, Wadwhani, and Bucheli, Analyzing and Interpreting Historical Sources, 321. 




Figure 3.1 | An example of a Minute Book in the JSE Archive 
Source: Author photograph. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 | An example of the structure of General Committee Minutes 
Source: Author photograph. 
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Table 3.1 | JSE General Committee Minute Books used as primary source 
Book number From (year) To (year) Pages 
2 1889 1891 380 
3 1891 1894 432 
4 1894 1896 454 
5 1896 1898 523 
6 1898 1902 500 
7 1902 1904 497 
8 1904 1905 502 
9 1905 1907 495 
10 1907 1909 500 
11 1909 1913 502 
12 1913 1917 504 
13 1917 1923 503 
14 1923 1927 502 
15 1927 1931 501 
16 1931 1934 501 
17 1934 1936 500 
18 1936 1938 500 
19 1938 1941 500 
20 1941 1943 499 
21 1943 1944 498 
22 1944 1945 505 
23 1945 1946 55 
TOTAL 10 353 
Source: Constructed by author. 
For this study, the minutes of the General Committee, including a rich correspondence 
between the Committee and various external parties (which appear verbatim in the minutes), 
have been used as the primary source. Unfortunately, no surviving personal papers of JSE 
members could be located for inclusion in the study. The minutes were analysed 
chronologically and iteratively throughout the research process, in order to gain an 
understanding of the internal processes and decisions related to the legitimation of the 
Exchange. No sampling strategy was adopted – the entire set of records was considered for 
the period under review.58 This is shown in Table 3.1. Hermeneutic interpretation was adopted 
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as the strategy for interpreting the primary sources in the construction of the historical 
narrative. This is discussed in more detail below. 
In order to enhance the reliability of the study, material from various local and international 
newspapers, and other publications, is also considered as secondary sources. Newspapers 
are generally good indicators of society-wide legitimacy and represent an important source for 
this study.59  
3.6 TRIANGULATION 
Triangulation is “a way to cross check and, ultimately, corroborate and validate results”.60 
While triangulation can be achieved in a variety of ways (multiple sources, multiple 
researchers, multiple theories and multiple methods),61 historians tend to focus on multiple 
sources.62 Investigation of a particular historical topic requires a variety of perspectives, as 
well as the corroboration of claims.63 Sources tend to be heterogeneous, and may include 
official internal records of the organisation, external communications created by the 
organisation, and secondary literature.64  
For this study, triangulation represents a challenge for three reasons. First, only the records 
of the General Committee have been retained by the Exchange, which means that all the 
records of the sub-committees no longer exist. This hinders the triangulation of General 
Committee decisions and actions with the more detailed deliberations of the various sub-
committees. Second, triangulation using secondary sources is also limited since only three 
books and a handful of papers have been produced that directly address the history of the 
Exchange. The limited body of research on the history of the Exchange can be attributed to 
the records of the Exchange not being organised in a freely accessible and systematically 
organised archive, but instead being kept uncatalogued in a storeroom at the Exchange. 
Inaccessibility has hindered inquiries into the history of the Exchange and has limited the 
available secondary literature that directly addresses the historical development of the 
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Exchange. Third, members of the General Committee were sworn to secrecy. Therefore, the 
decisions and actions taken by the General Committee in their efforts to legitimate the 
Exchange cannot be easily triangulated. Such confidentiality resulted in only 15 individuals 
out of the scores of Exchange Members having intimate knowledge of the decisions taken and 
the rationale behind such decisions. Furthermore, for most of its early history, the Exchange 
operated as a closed organisation in a somewhat secretive fashion. The outside public knew 
very little of what transpired in the House. This limited the opportunities for contemporaries to 
observe the operations of the Exchange. As such, there are minimal secondary accounts of 
the events and decisions that characterised the historical development of the Exchange. 
Particularly during its early history, when the Exchange considered its responsibility as being 
only towards its members, there was very little communication or disclosure to the public. The 
only pertinent communication with the public was the dissemination of price information. 
Newspapers tended to focus on market conditions and, on occasion, sought the views of the 
Exchange on national developments and the effects of political instability on the market. Very 
little information managed to seep out of the Exchange, as a closed organisation, into public 
discourse. Although such material, which was never intended for the public eye, takes 
precedence over material which was designed to convey a particular message to observers, 
the impaired triangulation is problematic.65 Despite this, the perceived effects of such 
decisions and actions can be triangulated in certain instances, from secondary sources which 
deal indirectly with the Exchange. When the problematic aspects of triangulation are related 
to considerations of organisational legitimacy, however, it becomes clear that the internal 
legitimation process of the Exchange cannot be easily triangulated. However, its external 
legitimacy can be easily observed through a variety of secondary sources (such as books and 
newspapers). The iterative engagement with primary and secondary sources, however, has 
enabled the interpretation of the actions of the General Committee, by using the principles of 
hermeneutic interpretation.  
3.7 HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION 
Historical research is fundamentally based on interpretation, but not all historians are equally 
transparent about the process that supports such interpretation.66 Hermeneutics offers a 
specific strategy or approach for interpretation which emphasises the contextual character of 
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historical action.67 When interpreting historical sources (which represent historical action), it is 
important to take account of the “social, cultural, and historical contexts” within which the 
sources were created.68 Failure to do so would result in the imposition of a contemporary 
perspective onto historical data, which would distort the interpretation of historical action.69 
The principles of hermeneutics may be applied to the interpretation of historical texts or, more 
broadly, historical action.70  
At its core, hermeneutic interpretation represents “the theory and practice of understanding 
and interpretation”.71 In historical research, it is the context-dependent interpretation of 
historical action, as represented by textual and other sources.72 There are three major 
hermeneutic traditions, or schools of thought. First, conservative (or classical) hermeneutics, 
which is concerned with discovering the true meaning as intended by the author of a particular 
text. Second, critical hermeneutics, which rejects the idea that such true meaning can be 
discovered, instead focusing on “the shaping presence of history, power, and ideology evident 
in the author’s expression as well as in the reader’s interpretation”. Third, philosophical 
hermeneutics, concerned with what constitutes interpretation at a philosophical level.73 This 
study is built on the assumption that the original intention of the authors of the textual sources 
can only be approximated, and therefore uses a critical hermeneutic approach to interpret 
such sources.74 
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Historical texts can only be understood in relation to their context, and interpretation arises 
from an iterative “back and forth” engagement with text and context, where understanding is 
developed continuously.75 This iterative process is referred to as the “hermeneutic circle”.76 
Besides conceiving of this iterative process as circular, it may also be understood as a back 
and forth between parts and the whole. As words are understood by considering their position 
in a sentence, and sentences are understood in relation to paragraphs, particular actions are 
understood as part of larger movements in the historical development of the organisation. The 
development of the organisation is understood as part of larger movements in the social 
order.77 This hermeneutic back and forth has also been considered to be a dialogue of sorts 
between the interpreter and the text. The interpreter puts certain questions to the text, and in 
answering these questions, further questions are raised, leading the interpreter to ask different 
questions, returning again to the text.78 Furthermore, the process is fundamentally circular in 
that there is no particular point of departure, again pointing to the iterative nature of 
interpretation.79 Hermeneutics does not represent a distinct method, separate from historical 
inquiry, but rather a strategy that may improve the interpretations upon which historical inquiry 
is built.80 As a strategy, it allows for the reconciliation of the interpreter’s own frame of 
understanding with that within which the text was created. This results in an authentic 
understanding of the text.81 This interpretation and understanding of the text enables and 
results from the construction of a historical narrative in an iterative fashion.82 
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While contemporary hermeneutics no longer strives for “rigid rules, methods, and techniques 
for textual interpretation” as classic hermeneutics did, there are certain guidelines that may be 
applied to organisational research.83 If the concept of the hermeneutic circle is applied in the 
context of an organisation (where the researcher engages iteratively with text and context), 
there are two methodological concerns. The first is that context is not a given but needs to be 
defined by the researcher; the second is that context can vary in terms of 
comprehensiveness.84 Thus, in the case of the JSE, considerations of its legitimacy may focus 
on the internal social order of the Exchange as its context, or it may take the social structure 
of the Witwatersrand as its context. Furthermore, its contextual focus may be broadened to 
include the ZAR, or later, the British Empire, and ultimately the increasingly globalised financial 
market environment. Hermeneutic interpretation can be implemented by engaging iteratively 
with each level of context, progressing from the narrow context (the internal social order) to 
the broadest context (the globalised financial market environment).85 The analysis in each of 
the subsequent chapters was conducted with this in mind – first considering the internal 
legitimacy of the exchange within its context (internal social order) and then progressing to the 
legitimacy of the exchange in its local, then national, then international context. The research 
question of the study determines which levels of context are prioritised and which are 
excluded,86 but since organisational legitimacy arises out of the legitimation of internal and 
external subjects, this study considers multiple levels of context. Besides the importance of 
iterative engagements with the text at multiple levels of context, hermeneutic interpretation 
also relies on “critical self-reflexivity” – the researcher’s active engagement with and 
suspension of his or her own “’assumptions’, ‘prejudices’ and ‘common-sense’” in order to 
understand the text in its true historical context.87  
This study focuses on the hermeneutic interpretation of text (as representations of action) in 
the form of the minutes of General Committee meetings, spanning the period 1889 to 1945. 
The original intention of the minutes was record-keeping and maintaining precedents in the 
governance of the exchange. As accepted in critical hermeneutic theory, the study does not 
strictly focus on the particular intended meaning of such text but rather a contextual 
understanding of the text “which is not delimited by authorial intentions”.88 This approach is 
well suited to the interpretation of organisational records, as they often have multiple, unknown 
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authors.89 If this is related to legitimacy theory, the actions of the General Committee directed 
at gaining, maintaining, extending or repairing the legitimacy of the Exchange (as embodied 
in the minutes) represent the text, whereas the criteria for legitimacy from the internal and 
external social structures represent the context. As such, the legitimation efforts of the 
exchange are considered at various contextual levels, starting from the criteria for internal 
legitimacy (dependent upon the internal social order), and progressing towards the broader 
criteria for external legitimacy (the views of the immediate public, national discourse, and the 
broader social order). 
3.8 NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION 
History refers to both the aggregate lived experiences of humanity and the narratives 
constructed to represent such experiences.90 It is therefore important to consider the nature 
of narrative construction as a vehicle for “the accumulation, ordering, and analysis of historical 
evidence”.91 Calls for more transparency about methods and other research decisions have 
been echoed by calls for transparency regarding the role of the historian in the construction of 
historical narratives.92 Transparency about the process of narrative construction augments the 
focus from what is produced, towards how it is produced.93 The use of the narrative as a form 
of inquiry bridges the gap between approaches frequently seen as dichotomous, such as 
scientific and naturalistic research.94 It is also a common element between certain schools of 
organisation studies and historical studies, and opens up the possibility for interdisciplinary 
discourse incorporating the strengths of both fields.95 Transparency about methods and other 
research decisions allows readers to understand the thought process underpinning the 
interpretation of historical material, and construction of the narrative. This prevents “the 
researcher presuming or claiming authority”.96 Ultimately, it is only by approaching a particular 
issue from a variety of interpretive perspectives that historical reality can be truly 
approximated.97 
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Broadly, this study manifests as the construction of a historical narrative by the hermeneutic 
interpretation of the relevant primary and secondary material.98 In order to understand how 
the JSE gained and maintained legitimacy between 1887 and 1945, the analysis takes place 
in the form of a historical narrative, supplemented, wherever possible, with datasets 
constructed from the archival material. By constructing the narrative, “temporally ordered 
events” are analysed to understand the Exchange’s legitimation during its first six decades of 
existence.99 While there is little consensus as to what constitutes a narrative,100 it may be 
defined as “the organisation of material in a chronologically sequential order and the focusing 
of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with sub-plots”.101 In constructing the 
narrative, the researcher must also “devise a vocabulary” with which the historical 
development can be reconstructed, and understand the “relationships of historical actors, the 
public and cultural narratives that inform their lives”.102 The construction of a narrative can be 
seen as a sense-making process where significant patterns and developments are identified 
and explored.103 The product that emerges from the process of narrative construction is “a 
history”.104  
In the chronological organisation and hermeneutic interpretation of the material, the narrative 
analysis focuses on events as causes and effects within the broader historical process, as 
well as the meaning of these events.105 This process of narrative construction is complicated, 
however, since real events are represented in fragmented historical records, which do not 
present such events as stories.106 Despite the difficulty of constructing a narrative with archival 
data that is not presented in narrative form (instead, in shorthand summaries of managerial 
decisions, in the case of the Exchange), this study attempts to maintain a balance between 
the historical narrative and the analysis of historical processes.107 In essence, a hybrid 
approach is taken between narrative history and analytical history. The study is structured as 
a chronological historical narrative, mainly because of the focus of the study on the long-term 
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legitimation processes of the stock exchange in its broader social context. The analysis and 
sense-making are guided by the theories and sub-theories of organisational legitimacy. The 
theoretical framework, therefore, becomes the sense-making mechanism and provides the 
necessary vocabulary within the narrative, by which the relationships of historical actors can 
be understood in context. The narrative does not merely focus on chronicling the development 
of the JSE, but is interwoven with theory and interpretation, so that the narrative becomes a 
vehicle for reasoning and sense-making based on natural language arguments.108 These 
arguments are based on the inherent logic that is contained within the structure of natural 
language arguments using the vocabulary provided by the theoretical framework. The need 
for both theory and description is captured by an early scholar of institutional theory, Ronald 
Coase, in describing the older school of institutional economics: “Without a theory they had 
nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire.”109 The 
balance between narrative and analytic elements of the study is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 | Narrative vs. analytical focus of the study 
Source: Author’s construction. 
The aim of the analysis is to effect a synthesis between a narrative, idiographic approach 
which focuses on the unique and circumstantial, and an analytical, nomothetic approach which 
focuses on the more generalisable aspects of the JSE’s historical development.110 The 
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application of organisational legitimacy to the analysis lends a more generalisable character 
to the findings, and may inform further research into the drivers of stock exchange legitimacy. 
3.9 INDUCTIVE APPROACH 
In the process of constructing a narrative, “propositions and arguments" emerge inductively 
from the material.111 The inductive approach to reasoning is used when the researcher aims 
to first “explore” the data and “develop theories from them that you will subsequently relate to 
the literature”.112 In approaching the study inductively, the primary sources were explored first 
and then related to secondary sources, as well as to organisational legitimacy literature.113 
The inductive approach generally results in “generalised propositions, hypotheses, and theory 
from empirical observations”.114 While the intention is not necessarily to develop generalisable 
findings, the application of organisational legitimacy to the analysis lends a more generalisable 
character to the findings, and may inform further research into the drivers of stock exchange 
legitimacy. The inductive approach was motivated by the lack of information regarding the 
content of the archival material, and the fact that it is an extensive, unstructured and 
uncatalogued body of information.  
If the inductive approach is applied to historical research, it can be argued that induction is the 
primary approach, but that deduction is also necessary. When formulating questions of 
historical significance, the historian often develops some expectations, or provisional 
hypotheses, before examining the primary sources. These expectations are revisited and 
revised before returning to the sources once more, reaffirming the iterative nature of narrative 
construction, as discussed earlier.115 While some preliminary expectations guided the 
exploration of the sources at an early stage, the overarching approach of this study is inductive 
since the data was first explored without any formal theoretical hypotheses. 
Contextualisation may be used as a strategy for implementing an inductive approach.116 
Contextualisation views reasoning as context-dependent, “focused on arriving at what the 
researcher and the audience judge to be the best explanation for the data in light of the 
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epistemic virtues embraced”.117 The epistemic virtues in the case of the contextualisation 
strategy are simplicity, plausibility, interestingness, and novelty, all of which take precedence 
over absolute truth which, as mentioned before, can only be approximated through an iterative 
interpretation of historical sources.118 Contextualisation in inductive research may be 
approached in three ways – subjective contextualisation, empirical contextualisation, or 
theoretical contextualisation.119 Subjective contextualisation emphasises reasoning based 
on the assumption that “all researchers have idiosyncratic backgrounds and knowledge bases, 
which are reflected in their reasoning style”.120 Empirical contextualisation emphasises 
reasoning based on “providing the reader with maximal access to the empirical context” in 
order to justify theoretical conclusions.121 Theoretical contextualisation emphasises 
reasoning based on seeking “warrants through establishing the relevance of claims with 
respect to a particular theory”.122 Theory plays a central role in the reasoning process. This 
study adopts an inductive strategy of theoretical contextualisation, in that legitimacy theory is 
used as a mechanism for reasoning, contextualisation and interpretation.  
3.10 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS AND PERIODISATION 
The analysis will focus on the legitimation processes of the JSE, and thus considers archival 
material and other sources relating to the JSE between 1887 and 1945. The analysis focuses 
on the institutional context upon which the legitimacy of the JSE depended. The institutional 
context may be considered as three overlapping systems – the regulative system, the 
normative system and the cultural cognitive system (as discussed in Chapter 2). In the 
regulatory system, institutions “constrain and regularise behaviour”, and involve rule-making, 
monitoring and sanctioning.123 The normative system consists of values and norms, which 
bring a “prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life”.124 The cultural-
cognitive system relies on “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality 
and create the frames through which meaning is made”.125 This study focuses mainly on the 
Exchange as an organisation, along with its subsystems, in its regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive contexts. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 | The scope of the analysis 
Source: Adapted from Scott (2014:106) and Suchman (1995). 
In terms of contextualisation, the analysis focuses on the regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive systems that determined the conditions of legitimacy for the organisation and its 
subsystems. In this way, the pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy of the Exchange as an 
organisation is explored.  
Since an inductive approach is followed, the periodisation of the study was determined after 
the conclusion of the analysis, when several distinct phases in the long-term legitimation of 
the JSE emerged from the analysis. These periods represent different phases in the internal 
development of the JSE as an organisation, which often coincide with periods of significant 
external change (such as war) but are not necessarily determined by external socio-political 
periods. Williamson (2000) has proposed the following periods associated with the various 
levels of change relevant to the study of organisations.126 
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Figure 3.5 | Different levels and periods of change in the institutional environment 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (2000). 
From Figure 3.5 it can be seen that the nature of institutions, and the frequency of change, 
ranges from the very short-term, continuous nature of everyday resource allocations (Level 
4), to the informal institutions, customs and traditions that take between a century and a 
millennium to change. Since this study examines the legitimacy of the JSE during its first six 
decades of existence, it mostly considers changes in the institutional environment (Level 2), 
changes in governance structures as they relate to transactions and operations of the 
Exchange (Level 3). The micro-level analysis associated with Level 4, as well as the extreme 
macro-level focus of Level 1, is of less importance to the analysis, although the customs, 
traditions, and norms embodied in Level 1 are considered as part of the normative system 
upon which the legitimacy of the Exchange depended. Although change is extremely slow at 
Level 1, the customs, traditions, and norms are not considered to be static for this study.  
3.11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Since the data collection and analysis required no human interaction, no explicit ethical 
dilemmas appear to have arisen from the study. To avoid any possible ethical considerations 
regarding the views and opinions of individuals mentioned in the Minute Books of the JSE, the 
names of individuals have mostly been removed, except when the identity of the individual is 
relevant to the argument. Where names were removed, the individuals are referred to by their 
position within the organisation that they represented (e.g. the Manager of Standard Bank 
Johannesburg). 
Level 4
Resource allocation and employment Continuous change
Level 3
Governance (play of the game) Changes take 1 to 10 years
Level 2
Institutional environment (rules of the game) Changes take 10 to 100 years
Level 1
Customs, traditions, norms, religion Changes take between 100 and 1000 years
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3.12 SUMMARY 
Investigating the legitimation of the JSE during its first six decades of existence has proved to 
be a complicated process, due to the fragmented nature of historical material, as well as the 
lack of research exploring the legitimation of stock exchanges in general. In order to address 
these difficulties, this study adopted a strategy of hermeneutic interpretation of the available 
primary and secondary sources, in order to construct a history of the Exchange’s legitimation, 
in the form of a narrative. The temporality of organisational legitimacy necessitated a long-
term focus, and the narrative form enabled the interpretation of historical action in context, to 
illuminate the dynamics of the Exchange’s legitimacy over time.  
While the concepts of organisational legitimacy are incorporated into the analysis, the study 
does not prioritise either generalisation or description, effectively adopting the integrationist 
position with regard to theory and history. Through the narrative, the unique conditions and 
decisions that affected the legitimacy of the JSE are explored. However, the vocabulary and 
concepts of organisational legitimacy enabled some degree of generalisation, which can be 
tested in subsequent research projects on stock exchange legitimacy. The study attempted to 
maintain a balance in the narrative between the idiographic (unique and circumstantial) and 
nomothetic (generalisable) aspects of the Exchange’s legitimation efforts.  
In constructing the narrative, the study relied on the historical method as a general approach, 
but in the spirit of transparency of research decisions, which has recently been called for, also 
explicitly made use of strategies for source criticism, triangulation, and hermeneutic 
interpretation. This study relied on a methodological framework proposed by Kipping, 
Wadhwani and Bucheli (2014) as a point of departure, augmented by a discussion of the 
nature of narratives and narrative construction. The construction of the narrative was driven 
by an iterative engagement with the primary and secondary material (through the principles of 
the hermeneutic circle). Each round resulted in the distillation of the narrative into a more 
focused and contextualised exposition of legitimacy during a particular period in the 
development of the Exchange. The first phase in the legitimation of the JSE is considered in 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 The founding and formative years 
of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, 1886-1902 
The exploitation of “wild cat” companies and gambling in shares form no solid basis for a 
city’s permanent prosperity. Men do not seem to realise that the chief source of wealth to 
the Rand has been, not the gold that has come out of it, but the gold which European 
speculators have poured into it. A city whose chief business house is the Stock Exchange, 
and whose greatest men are the manipulators of the money market, may well tremble for 
its future.1 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
For travellers passing through the Highveld2 during the mid-19th century, imagining a bustling 
city in the heart of the grasslands must have been nearly impossible. Before the discovery of 
significant gold reefs on the Witwatersrand in 1886, the land now occupied by South Africa’s 
financial centre was rural grasslands, sparsely populated and with little appeal.3 At this point, 
the land that would later form the heart of Johannesburg occupied a “triangular two-and-a-half 
square kilometre piece of ground […] left over from the three Boer farms (Braamfontein, 
Doornfontein and Turffontein)”.4 Within a decade after the discovery of gold, Johannesburg 
would develop into a hub of mining and financial activity, with banks, financing houses and 
mining headquarters scattered about the young town.5 The gold-fuelled development of the 
town was almost immediate. Indeed, one traveller who, in 1887, found himself “at a well-
appointed table in a pretentious hotel”, witnessing the “eager life of a large and energetic 
community”, noted that only a year before, one would have had to eat alone in the middle of 
nowhere.6 The JSE (established in 1887, only 16 months after the discovery of the main gold 
                                                 
 
1 “Tremble for our Future, Johannesburg Times, 13 December 1895.  
2 The Highveld is a region of grasslands at high altitude, found in parts of South Africa.  
3 Giliomee has argued that the Mfecane (widespread warfare between indigenous groups) meant that certain 
areas towards the interior appeared to be sparsely populated. See Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: 
Biography of a People (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 115. 
4 Luli Callinicos, Who built Jozi? Discovering Memory at Wits Junction (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 
2012), 21; Wessel Visser, “Die Minerale Revolusie” in Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika: Van Voortye tot Vandag, 
ed. Fransjohan Pretorius (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 2012), 189. 
5 Bremner, Reinventing the Johannesburg inner city; Clive Chipkin. Johannesburg Style: Architecture & 
Society, 1880s-1960s (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1993); Grietjie Verhoef, “’n Ekonomiese 
Geskiedenis van die 19de Eeu” in Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika: Van Voortye tot Vandag, ed. Fransjohan 
Pretorius (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 2012), 203; “Tremble for our Future”, Johannesburg Times, 13 
December 1895.  
6 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 139. The Cape Town Mercantile Advertiser stated in January 1888 that “Here is a 
marvel if we like, that a place, which was open veldt eighteen months ago, should now be the busy town soon to 
have a Rondebosch and Wynberg of its own” (“Suburbs Already”, Cape Town Mercantile Advertiser, 23 
January 1888). See also “The Gold Fields of South Africa”, Port Elizabeth Telegraph, 11 February 1888.  
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reef)7 played a central role in the development of Johannesburg from its humble grassland 
beginnings to its current state as the financial centre of South Africa, and (as some argue) of 
sub-Saharan Africa.8 
During the century preceding the discovery of gold, political turmoil in the Cape Colony set the 
process in motion for change that was to come. The disillusionment of many Afrikaans-
speaking settlers (or Boers) with life in the Cape Colony under British rule led to their mass 
migration northwards, into the interior, starting in the 1830s. Despite some historiographical 
debate, this migration (known as the Great Trek) is generally understood to have resulted from 
their feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement under British rule. Such feelings were 
compounded by the perceived lack of arable land, adequate labour, and safety.9 While the 
Great Trek had a complex and significant influence on the subsequent development of many 
regions in Southern Africa, it also led to the establishment of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek 
(the South African Republic, or ZAR). After the signing of the Sand River Convention treaty 
between Afrikaner leaders and British representatives in 1852, which recognised the 
independence of the Afrikaner people in the Transvaal region, the constitution of the ZAR was 
formalised in 1857.10  
Once its independence had been recognised and its constitution codified, the ZAR undertook 
the difficult task of state-building. The tension between Afrikaner political factions which had 
existed since the 1840s was still present. Despite some semblance of unity in 1857, the young 
state was marred by internal conflicts, which culminated in civil war during the early 1860s. It 
was only by 1864 that the ZAR enjoyed some stability and unity amongst its citizens.11 This 
stability was short-lived, however. Through the incessant conflict during its first two decades 
of existence, the ZAR had weakened to the point that it was unable to resist the British 
annexation of the ZAR in 1877.12 The annexation was motivated by several factors, including 
Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon’s, desire for a federation of South 
African territories and colonies, and the discovery of diamonds southwest of the ZAR in 1867.13  
                                                 
 
7 Although there were earlier discoveries of gold in the Johannesburg region, the main reef was discovered in 
July 1887, and the JSE was founded on 8 November 1887. 
8 Bremner, Reinventing the Johannesburg inner city, 185. 
9 Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 108-112; Jan Visagie, “Oorsake van die Groot Trek na die Binneland” in 
Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika: Van Voortye tot Vandag, ed. Fransjohan Pretorius (Cape Town: Tafelberg 
Publishers, 2012). 
10 Visagie, Oorsake van die Groot Trek; Jackie Grobler, “Staatsvorming en Stryd, 1850-1900” in Geskiedenis 
van Suid Afrika: Van Voortye tot Vandag, ed. Fransjohan Pretorius (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 2012), 
169-171. 
11 Grobler, Staatsvorming en Stryd, 169.  
12 Ibid., 172. 
13 Ibid. See also Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 230. 
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The hunt for diamonds had brought scores of diggers and prospectors to the region that would 
later be named Kimberley.14 As the private diamond companies and smallholdings evolved 
into joint-stock companies, an active market in shares quickly developed. The need for a 
central meeting place to trade these shares brought about the establishment of the Kimberley 
Share Exchange in November 1880.15 Through the development of the diamond mining 
industry around Kimberley, capital and expertise accumulated which would later find its way 
to Johannesburg.16 Unfortunately, a lack of confidence in diamond shares, as well as the ability 
of prominent diamond mining companies to secure capital in international markets (such as 
London or Paris), meant that the Kimberley exchange never reached maturity.17  
Deputations to Britain during 1877 and 1878, led by Paul Kruger, failed to have the British 
annexation of the ZAR withdrawn.18 Finally, in December 1880, war broke out, although war 
was never officially declared.19 After heavy British losses in several skirmishes, most notably 
at Majuba, the Pretoria Convention of 3 August 1881 brought the war to an end.20 Despite the 
Pretoria Convention, the independence of the ZAR was not immediately restored. The self-
government of the ZAR was agreed upon under the condition of suzerainty. After extensive 
negotiations, the full independence of the ZAR was restored through the London Convention 
of 1884.21 At more or less the same time, the discovery of gold in Barberton and an increase 
in share trading activity saw the establishment of the Barberton Stock Exchange. By 1885, 
over 100 shares were quoted by the exchange.22 While it represented the first organised share 
market within the boundaries of the ZAR, the comparatively low yields of the Barberton mines, 
and the dubious character of the Barberton exchange, meant that when the Witwatersrand 
reefs were discovered, the focus quickly shifted away from Barberton towards 
Johannesburg.23 Poor telegraphic and postal links with the Kimberley and Pietermaritzburg 
exchanges also pointed to the desirability of a stock exchange in Johannesburg.24  
                                                 
 
14 Grobler, Staatsvorming en Stryd, 176. 
15 Lukasiewicz, From diamonds to gold, 721. See also Michie, The Global Securities Market. 
16 Visser, Die Minerale Revolusie, 192. 
17 Lukasiewicz, From diamonds to gold, 721. 
18 Bridget Theron. "Theophilus Shepstone and the Transvaal Colony, 1877–1879." African Historical Review 
34, no. 1 (2002): 104-127. See also “Two of the Boer Leaders”, Dundee Courier, 5 March 1881. Kruger would 
later be the President of the ZAR, from 1883 until 1900. 
19 Grobler, Staatsvorming en Stryd, 172-174. This is now referred to as the First Boer War, or the Transvaal 
War. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 174-175. 
22 Lukasiewicz, From diamonds to gold, 721. 
23 Ibid., 721-722. 
24 Klein, The Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 13-16; Lukasiewicz, From diamonds to gold, 725. 
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The meagre ZAR economy during the second half of the 19th century revolved mainly around 
agricultural activities.25 Isolated as it was, the young state was not affected by shifts in the 
British and European economies as much as the British colonies towards the south.26 As 
railways from the Cape Colony and Durban continued to reach into the interior throughout the 
late 19th century, they brought goods and people to the ZAR and its neighbouring Boer 
republic, the Orange Free State (OFS).27 Sporadic discoveries of gold throughout the ZAR 
occurred as early as 1869, which hinted towards the yet-undiscovered mineral riches.28 The 
discovery of significant gold reefs on the Witwatersrand, less than two years after the London 
Convention, stimulated renewed British interest in the ZAR. By September 1886, the ZAR 
government had declared public diggings on many farms, and appointed vice president 
Christiaan Johannes Joubert and land surveyor Johann Rissik to lay out the burgeoning town. 
Johannesburg derives its name from the first names of both of these two men.29 It was only 
after the discovery of gold that the ZAR could boast its own bank, having been served by 
branches of colonial banks before 1888.30  
Thus, when gold was discovered, the development of institutions and infrastructure was thrust 
upon the young ZAR at an immense rate. The emergence of the JSE was part of the wave of 
gold-fuelled development, but one that would persist when gold occasionally lost its charm, 
and one that would transcend the city’s dependence on gold, to oversee its development into 
the industrial (and financial) fulcrum of South Africa. This chapter explores how the JSE 
emerged from its complete lack of legitimacy to become an important part of the financial 
infrastructure of South Africa, particularly from the perspective of Exchange members. It 
furthermore explores how the Exchange emerged in the context of the ZAR, and how the path 
of this initial legitimation was disrupted and altered by the South African War (1899 – 1902). 
4.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JSE 
The JSE was not the first stock exchange in what is now South Africa, nor was it the first 
attempt at an exchange on the Witwatersrand. Before the establishment of the JSE, stock 
exchanges were operating in several mining towns, most notably Kimberley and Barberton. In 
its very first issue, on 24 February 1887, the Diggers’ News and Witwatersrand Advertiser 
notified the public, on its front page, of the establishment of the Witwatersrand Club and 
                                                 
 
25 Lukasiewicz, From diamonds to gold, 719; Verhoef, ’n Ekonomiese Geskiedenis, 210. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Verhoef, ’n Ekonomiese Geskiedenis, 207. 
28 Visser, Die Minerale Revolusie, 187-189. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Verhoef, ’n Ekonomiese Geskiedenis, 212. 
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Exchange Company Limited, with Joseph B. (later Sir) Robinson as Chairman, and the 
following founding members – “The Honourable Cecil Rhodes M.L.A., J.G. Maynard Esq., A.C. 
Baillie Esq. F.R.G.S., Dr Hans Sauer, J. Spranger Harrison Esq., Dr J.D. Bird”.31 The proposed 
Exchange immediately positioned itself as a purveyor of trust, highlighting in the advertisement 
that these individuals, all of high esteem, were involved in its establishment. The gentlemen 
in town would undoubtedly have recognised many of these names. Furthermore, the proposed 
Exchange claimed that it would “act as a guarantee to the outside public of the bona fides of 
all mining transactions. What the Exchange said or did will be quoted as authority.”32 In the 
uncertain atmosphere of the early goldfields, the time was right for the emergence of some 
vehicle to facilitate trust and certainty. Unfortunately, nothing came of Robinson’s efforts, 
although the circumstances surrounding the failure are unclear as few records remain.33  
Despite the apparent failure of the Witwatersrand Club and Exchange Company, the 
Johannesburg Exchange and Chambers Company Limited emerged at more or less the same 
time, in February 1887, with London-born Benjamin Minors Woollan at the helm.34 The 
Company was formed with a capital of £5 000 in £1 shares.35 The first directors of the 
Company were Benjamin Woollan, Dr T.G. Lawrence, James Lang, Frederick Gray, James B. 
Taylor, J.L. Bussey, and T.P. O’Meara, many of whom would remain involved in the affairs of 
the Exchange for many years.36 Unfortunately, very limited records of the establishment of the 
JSE exist today. In 1912 it was reported by Col. Rowland Bettington, a prominent early 
member of the Exchange, that no records earlier than those of 1888 could be found, other 
than old ledgers naming the 122 original members of the Exchange.37 After some 
investigation, however, the original Minute Book was rediscovered in 1912, the contents of 
which are detailed by Bettington. The first meeting of the Johannesburg Exchange and 
Chambers Company took place on 18 August 1887,38 and on 8 November 1887, it was 
resolved, on the proposition of Henri Bettelheim, that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange be 
established.39 Shortly afterwards, the Company advertised in search of a Secretary, who 
                                                 
 
31 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 140. See also “The Diggers’ News”, Rand Daily Mail, 22 September 1906; “Printing 
Oddities of the Early Days”, Rand Daily Mail, 22 September 1936.  
32 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 140. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Rowland A. Bettington, “The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange”, in South African Mining Journal 
Twenty-first Anniversary Number, ed. S.R. Potter (Johannesburg: Thomson Publications, 1912), 71; Rosenthal, 
On 'Change; “Prospectus of the Rand Engineering & Foundry Company, Limited”, Diggers’ News and 
Witwatersrand Advertiser, 13 March 1888; “The Great Laxey, Black Reef, Gold Mining Company, Ltd.”, 
Diggers’ News and Witwatersrand Advertiser, 10 November 1888.  
35 Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 71. 
36 Ibid. See also Rosenthal, On 'Change. 
37 Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
38 Ibid., 85. 
39 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 142-143. 
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would also be the Secretary of the new exchange.40 The first constitution and rules of the 
Exchange were formulated by J.B. Taylor and J.L. Bussey, who relied heavily on the existing 
rules of the Transvaal Share and Claim Exchange, located in Barberton. These rules would 
only be aligned with practice and with London by 1890.41 The Stock Exchange was officially 
opened on 16 January 1888 by the Honourable Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, member of the 
Legislative Assembly in the Cape Colony. Sauer was in Johannesburg at the time, primarily 
to visit his brother, Dr Hans Sauer, the Johannesburg District Surgeon, who was a founding 
member of the failed rival exchange mentioned earlier.42 After Sauer had addressed the 
members of the Exchange, declaring the Exchange open with a rather lengthy speech, 
Benjamin Woollan (pictured below) proceeded to address the members, making the following 
statement which captures the early character of the Exchange: 
Paramount among the permanent landmarks of a new town I regard a Stock Exchange 
(Cheers). Non-speculators are perhaps prone to consider the institution as one large 
gambling establishment but, although there are many phases of hazard daily passing 
before us, I ask non-speculators what would be the position all over the world today if 
investors and speculators were not always turning over, investing and re-investing their 
capital? The very key-note of investments in shares is the gathering together of small sums 
of money for a huge undertaking, which would be all but impossible for any single capitalist 
or investor. Splendid bridges, railways, palatial steamboats, ventures too numerous to 
mention, and last, but by no means least, our own local Gold Fields, have all been 
developed by companies and shares (Cheers).43 
Woollan then continued with the following words, which capture the trust that would be of 
cardinal importance to the future success of the Exchange: 
Finally to all I would say: 
This above all, to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man.44 
The festivities were concluded by Mining Commissioner Carl von Brandis, remarking that he 
initially feared coming to Johannesburg, having heard of the murder and disorder in the Gold 
                                                 
 
40 “Secretary Wanted”, Cape Times, 17 November 1887.  
41 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 144; Lukasiewicz, From diamonds to gold, 725. Taylor operated as a broker in 
Barberton before making his way to Johannesburg, which explains his familiarity with the Barberton rules 
(Rosenthal, On 'Change, 75). 
42 Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 85; Rosenthal, On 'Change, 145. 
43 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 148-149. See also “Stock Exchange Gambling”, Cape Town Mercantile Advertiser, 
10 January 1887. 
44 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 149. 
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Fields, but that it was a town in the fullest sense, with churches, bars, hotels and boarding 
houses, clubs, chambers, and now, a stock exchange.45 
 
Figure 4.1 | Benjamin Minors Woollan, founder of the JSE 
Source: Henry Longland, The Golden Transvaal (London: Simpkin, 
Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Company, 1893), 59. 
At its opening, the Exchange already boasted more than 100 members.46 By the end of 1888, 
the membership had risen to 250 members, and groups of brokers and clients could be seen 
blocking the streets around the Exchange.47 The membership of the Exchange multiplied 
during its first years, to the extent that share trading spilt onto the streets outside the Exchange 
building,48 now fondly remembered as “Between the Chains” – a section of the street cordoned 
off with chains to host share trading and other auctions. Despite the fanfare and celebrations 
of its opening, the Exchange did not come into existence as a trusted and socially accepted 
institution. A lack of legitimacy characterised its early history. 
4.3 THE INITIAL LACK OF LEGITIMACY 
When the Exchange was established by Woollan and his colleagues in November 1887, it 
must have dawned on them that a trustworthy market would be central to the success of the 
                                                 
 
45 Ibid., 150. 
46 Ibid., 147.  
47 Ibid., 151; “Local and General”, Diggers’ News and Witwatersrand Advertiser, 8 March 1888.  
48 Rosenthal, On 'Change, 155; “Local and General”, Diggers’ News and Witwatersrand Advertiser, 8 March 
1888. 
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Exchange, particularly when considering the character of early Johannesburg.49 
A contemporary described Woollan as “evidently anxious to safeguard a somewhat – even in 
those early days – gullible public, who might be deluded into entering upon unsound 
investments on the strength of alluring prospectuses”.50 In Woollan’s own words: “With a view 
to check as much as necessary undue inflation or depression in the share market, we venture 
to give an instance of actual values, and, to prevent unpleasantness, forbear to mention any 
particular company from which such is taken.”51 Sound operating procedures supporting the 
functioning of the market formed the foundation of the Exchange’s legitimacy, and it was the 
singular fact that the Exchange needed to convey to its stakeholders at this point in its 
development. Establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of the market proved, however, to 
be a difficult task. The market was reported to be “highly buoyant” in November 1888, with 
prices increasing between one hundred and three hundred per cent in the preceding month, 
some for “no apparent reason”.52 The same article claims that “the Committee of the Stock 
Exchange has never been regarded as a proper one” since it consisted of men with “little or 
no knowledge of Stock Exchange business”.53 By December 1888, there were reports of stock 
trading at “fictitious value”, which was attributed to “a certain few persons having oversold, 
and were unable, when the time arrived for delivery, to complete their contracts”.54 A few 
months later, it was reported that a handful of brokers were manipulating share prices, “and 
their lead is eagerly followed by a crowd not in the know”.55 Offering a low price for a particular 
share implied that something, not yet known to the crowd, was wrong with the company, and 
this would drive down the price on the floor. Conversely, asking an extremely high price implied 
that there was some good news unknown on the floor, which drove prices up.56 Brokers were 
also known to alter the terms of their sales, or cancel them altogether, by blaming it on some 
fictitious principal.57 While journalists bemoaned the character of the Exchange, it was also 
suggested that “many brokers would not obtain a living if we imported all at once the full 
etiquette of Capel Court”.58  
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Before the establishment of the JSE, the informal market for shares and other instruments had 
existed in “tents, saloons and hotel bars” in the young Johannesburg.59 As such, the early 
Exchange faced the challenge of clearly delineating the market and its constituent instruments 
and agents in the already existing informal market. In March 1889, for instance, an anonymous 
individual wrote to the Diggers’ News and Witwatersrand Advertiser, under the pseudonym 
“Speculator”, suggesting that the Committee supply each member with a ticket or ivory button 
of membership. At this point, the membership of the Exchange had grown to the point where 
the writer argued it to be impossible that the Doorkeeper knew each member, and expressed 
his frustration towards “those who have hitherto taken advantage of the doorkeeper’s back 
being turned”.60 By March 1891, the Committee posted a framed list of all registered and 
licenced brokers in the Exchange, in order to distinguish them from unaffiliated stock brokers.61 
Despite its earlier indifference towards unofficial shares being called at High ‘Change,62 by 
1895 the Chairman of the Exchange reminded members from the rostrum that only officially 
listed stocks shall be traded during High ‘Change.63 Nonetheless, a lively market remained 
between the chains when the Exchange was closed.64 When it came to light in July of 1898 
that many independent brokers (unaffiliated with the Exchange) were taking orders using 
Exchange price lists,65 the Committee sent out 250 copies of the broker list, accompanied by 
a notice on the matter, to Mine Managers along the Main Reef “…for the protection of all 
employees dealing in Stocks and Shares”.66  
The young Exchange did not inspire great reverence from the moment it came into existence 
– “until the leaders of the industry took an active part in the control of the Stock Exchange, it 
was an institution of dubious repute and the home of wild-cat company promotions and share 
speculation, and many speculative markets in the worthless stocks brought the Exchange into 
grave discredit”.67 Despite the “dubious” company promotions and rogue brokers, one of the 
biggest challenges to the legitimacy of the early Exchange remained its association with 
gambling in the eyes of the public. Well aware of the perceived similarities between gambling 
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and speculation, its founder, Benjamin Woollan, remarked at the opening of the Exchange that 
outsiders were prone to see the Exchange as a gambling house.68 The Diggers’ News and 
Witwatersrand Advertiser of 2 March 1888 stated that the “energies of the Stock Exchange 
gamblers are directed at present to South African gold mines”, and highlighted that many of 
these mines were “yet unproven and have never paid a dividend”.69 Realising that its 
association with gambling was damaging its reputation, the Committee acted on numerous 
occasions to break the association. In July 1891, for instance, members were prohibited from 
gambling with dices in the Exchange.70 By 1893, the internal nuisance had evolved into a 
spectacle, threatening the legitimacy of the Exchange in the public realm. Incessant betting 
and gambling between the chains had the Committee petitioning the Sanitary Board as well 
as their landlord, the Johannesburg Estate Company, to “assist in putting a stop to the 
nuisance”.71 Scenes between the chains after the exchange closes were described as 
“sometimes amusing, but oftimes of a most scandalous and disgraceful character”.72  
The Exchange was, in the eyes of the public, a place where one could go to bet on stocks, 
and make other wagers as well. A contemporary observer explained: “A multitude of 
speculators in shares may be observed to hang all day around the Stock Exchange. Betting 
on the races is a favourite diversion; horses contend for the sweepstakes monthly; tickets are 
offered for sale; the losses and gains on a race may amount to a total of £100,000”.73 Lottery 
draws were sometimes held in the Exchange Hall, drawing large crowds of participants and 
speculators.74 An article in the Johannesburg Times, dated 10 July 1895, bemoaned the 
influence of the Exchange on society. It was, according to the writer, a “sign of the times” that 
another paper, The Sportsman, now also offered its readers stock tips and reports on the stock 
market.75 A crusade of sorts by the local clergymen against the gambling and “speculative 
spirit” in September 1895 did little other than “to excite amusement”; one particular reverend 
aimed his scathing remarks at “the wickedness of the people ‘between chains’”.76 “Stock 
Exchange gamblers” were to be found in every corner of South Africa.77 So strong was the 
gambling culture at the Exchange that the Committee postponed High ‘Change and altered 
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delivery times on various occasions between 1892 and 1898 to allow members to attend the 
horse races in town.78 Despite the strong gambling culture, the Stock Exchange increasingly 
did not want to be associated with gambling or any activity that could reflect negatively upon 
it. Despite this, the Exchange retained its unfortunate association, with suggestions made in 
the press in 1898 that the following inscription be placed above the entrance of the Exchange 
(albeit by a non-member): “All hope abandon, ye who enter here”.79 
4.4 THE STRUGGLE FOR OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
Soon after its establishment, the earning potential of the young Exchange attracted the 
attention of Barney Barnato and his Johannesburg Estate Company.80 In order to gain control 
of the Exchange, Barnato slowly purchased shares in the Johannesburg Exchange and 
Chambers Company (the owners of the JSE) from founding members, and subsequently 
called a meeting to announce the new order.81 Despite the protest of a minority, Barnato 
managed to take over the Exchange through his voting power in March 1889.82 Revenue from 
entrance fees, subscriptions, company listing fees, and charges for hearing disputes for 
approximately 600 Exchange members drove the company to acquire share control of the 
Exchange and Chambers Company, making Barnato the de facto owner of the JSE.83 Despite 
this, Barnato was very much absent from subsequent interactions between the Estate 
Company and the Exchange, instead having the board of the Estate Company correspond 
with the Exchange regularly.  
Soon after the takeover, the relationship between the Estate Company and the Exchange 
proved to be volatile. In particular, the General Committee of the Exchange (comprised of 
Exchange members elected annually to manage the Exchange) was at constant loggerheads 
with the board of the Estate Company over fees and other issues that would influence revenue. 
This tension between ownership (by the Estate Company) and control (by the General 
Committee of the Exchange) manifested mainly as a conflict between the Exchange as a place 
of business for its members, and a source of revenue for its owners. This tension first became 
apparent in April 1889, when a “collision” between Exchange members and the Estate 
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Company regarding the internal management of the Exchange brought the market to a 
standstill.84 Tension reappeared in July of 1890 when a dispute about the removal of certain 
companies from the official list of the Exchange arose. In a letter to the Estate Company, the 
General Committee emphasised that it “...will not lose sight of the desirability of taking such 
steps as will tend to facilitate an increase in the business of the Exchange, but have to point 
out that in terms of the agreement with the Estate Co., the sole management of the internal 
affairs of the Exchange rests with the Committee without reference to that Co.”85 Exchange 
members were also greatly frustrated by Barnato’s decision to double subscription fees in 
order to fund the building of a new Exchange Hall. A second, independent committee was 
formed to challenge the incumbent committee, which forced the Estate Company to hold 
elections by ballot, electing James Hay as the first independent Chairman of the Exchange. 
After the elections, the Estate Company left the control of the Exchange in the hands of the 
Committee for the first time.86  
Despite some minor meddling by the Estate Company after the election, the autonomy of the 
General Committee was strengthened by late 1892. At this time, a new rule was instituted, 
whereby directors of the Estate Company could become members of the Stock Exchange 
“...subject to the approval of the Committee, upon their making the usual application signifying 
their willingness to conform to the Rules and Regulations which are now, or may hereafter be 
in force".87 This new rule signified the critical mass that the Exchange had reached by then, in 
so far as the owners of the Exchange were now subject to its regulations. The Committee was 
aware of its newfound leverage and adopted a rather stern approach towards their owners, 
the Estate Company, who were requested to comply with the new rule “without delay".88 
Furthermore, the Committee pointed out that the draft of the new rule had only been sent to 
the Estate Company “as a matter of courtesy”.89 Whenever matters arose that would influence 
profit (such as membership fees in arrears, or fines) the Estate Company was consulted. 
However, on matters pertaining to the affairs of the Exchange, the Committee fiercely 
protected its autonomy.90 
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The relationship between the Estate Company and the Exchange started shifting slowly when, 
in 1893, the two companies entered into negotiations for the use of the Exchange Buildings 
on the basis that it would henceforth be an ordinary rental contract.91 This is particularly telling 
since the relationship was redefined by the Committee as one between landlord and tenant, 
instead of between owner and firm. When the Estate Company objected, the Committee 
decided to find alternative accommodation for the Exchange as soon as the existing 
agreement expired.92 Despite considering offers from three potential landlords, none of these 
offers came to fruition.93 Still unable to find alternative accommodation for the Exchange, the 
Committee again approached the Estate Company in late 1893, this time armed with a signed 
petition from members of the Exchange that a landlord-tenant agreement be pursued.94 
Unfortunately, the Estate Company would still not entertain the idea of an agreement between 
landlord and tenant. Without any alternative, the Committee renewed the agreement for a 
further six months.95 When negotiations reopened after the expiry of this temporary 
arrangement, months of negotiations showed no sign of progress. Fears of a breakaway group 
of members forming a rival exchange forced the Committee to settle the matter with the Estate 
Company hastily, and a new agreement was signed in July 1894.96 The new agreement 
provided the Committee with an allowance of £1 500 per annum for operating the Exchange, 
which was soon found to be insufficient.97 After more negotiations, the Estate Company 
agreed to increase the annual allowance to £2 600, with a further £200 “to meet special 
contingencies and a present deficit”.98 Unknowingly, the Estate Company put the Exchange in 
a position to accumulate funds, which would later enable the Exchange to sever its ties with 
the Estate Company and build its own Exchange Hall. This is shown in Figure 4.2. 




93 JSE/GC3:359, 365. 
94 JSE/GC3:370. 
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Figure 4.2 | Fixed Deposit holdings of the JSE, 1896-1898 
Source: Reconstructed from JSE/GC5. 
The Jameson Raid (which is discussed in Section 1.8) halted the Exchange’s pursuit of 
independence for some time. When the dust had settled after the Raid, the final shift towards 
independence came in the form of an informal conversation between the Chairman and a 
director of the Estate Company in April of 1897. The Chairman reported that he had informally 
met with the director, to discuss the possibility of a landlord-tenant agreement.99 The director 
thought that the Estate Company would welcome this, but also revealed that the Estate 
Company proposed “a most extortionate sum, viz. £5000 per annum” in rent.100 Again, the 
Exchange was in a dire position. Members of the Exchange soon voted in favour of a 
proposition that no more than £2 500 be paid in rent, but an interdict granted by the Special 
Judicial Commission of the Witwatersrand Gold Fields restrained the Committee from further 
action or dealing in any funds.101 The sound financial position of the Exchange allowed the 
Committee to secure the “best counsel obtainable”,102 and the interdict was soon dismissed 
because “it ought never to have been granted” and “the internal affairs of the Stock Exchange 
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ought to be entirely controlled by the Committee”.103 The autonomy of the Exchange was now 
reaffirmed by the Court. 
At the most inopportune of times, the Committee received the news on 15 June 1897 that 
Barney Barnato, the owner of the Johannesburg Estate Company, had died. It was 
immediately resolved that business be suspended for the rest of the day, as a mark of 
respect.104 However, Barnato’s death did not hinder the negotiations between the Exchange 
and the Estate Company. After the interdict had been dismissed, negotiations resumed in 
earnest. After some disagreement as to the proprietary role of the Estate Company, an 
agreement was reached, on 1 July 1897, for rent of £3 000 per year on a landlord-tenant 
basis.105 At last, the Committee and Exchange Members were free to manage the Exchange 
as they saw fit, and to also receive the profits generated by the Exchange.  
The natural next phase in the ownership and control of the Exchange was to establish new 
proprietary rights associated with membership of the Exchange. In November 1897, the 
Committee agreed on the introduction of proprietary membership to the Exchange. Proprietary 
rights were first sold at £20 each, but quickly appreciated.106 By that time, the Exchange had 
invested £11 000 in fixed deposit, with only 471 members, making the new proprietary rights 
potentially quite valuable.107 While the new proprietary rights were generally well-received, 
members of the Exchange disagreed about the maximum number of members. The rules at 
that point limited the Exchange to 750 members. Some members argued that a limit of 500 
members would increase the value of proprietary rights. However, other members argued that 
this created the risk of a rival exchange forming, since the Exchange membership regularly 
surged to over 500 during boom periods.108 Ultimately, the original limit of 750 members was 
retained.109 Alongside these arrangements, a new scale for entrance fees was introduced.  
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Table 4.1 | Entrance fees and membership levels, 1897 
From (members) To (members) Entrance fee (guineas) 
Present number (approx. 471) 500 150 
500 550 200 
550 600 250 
600 650 300 
650 700 400 
700 750 500 
Source: JSE Archive, General Committee Minute Book No. 5, p. 286. 
The proposed scale of entrance fees increased exponentially as the Exchange approached 
its capacity membership of 750 men. The Committee had to strike a delicate balance between 
allowing sufficient membership for good market liquidity and participation, without diluting the 
profits of the current proprietary members too much. The interests of proprietary rights holders 
needed to be protected, and as such the finances of the Exchange were subject to external 
scrutiny. The records show that the financial statements of the Exchange were audited as 
early as 1890, and were “open to the inspection of members”.110 The Exchange had compiled 
a full annual report since 1899 for the benefit of members, in particular the proprietary 
members, of the Exchange. This included “the usual financial statement, table of number of 
attendances of Members of Committee, and a statement of number of Proprietary and Non-
Proprietary Members”.111  
As shown in Table 4.2, the profitability and the resulting financial benefit to proprietary 
members increased notably. Considering that independence from the Johannesburg Estate 
Company was gained on 1 July 1897, and that proprietary membership was introduced on 
9 November 1897, the change in the profit accruing to Exchange members was dramatic, 
increasing from a mere £806 for the 1896 financial year to £7 895 for the 1898 financial year 
– the first year after independence. The total assets of the Exchange also increased drastically 
during this period, creating a capital base that would prove useful to the future expansion of 
the Exchange. 
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1 April 1894 – 31 March 1895  1 003 N/A JSE/GC4:141 
1 April 1895 – 31 March 1896  4 294 N/A JSE/GC 4:402 
1 April 1896 – 31 March 1897  806  5 806 JSE/GC5:99 
1 April 1897 – 31 March 1898  7 895  13 702 JSE/GC5:461 
1 April 1898 – 31 March 1899  5 671  19 374 JSE/GC6:173 
1 April 1899 – 31 March 1902  6 582  25 956 JSE/GC6:377 
Source: Compiled by author. 
The shift towards proprietary ownership of the Exchange aligned the interests of proprietary 
members with those of the organisation. If the Exchange had a poor reputation or poor quality 
of operations, the value of proprietary rights would decline, as would the profit share accruing 
to each proprietary member. Therefore, instituting proprietary rights represented a significant 
development in the legitimation of the Exchange. Ultimately, the departure of the Exchange 
from the control of the Estate Company meant that it now had full autonomy to develop the 
Exchange. Until its independence, the Exchange “partook of the somewhat unsatisfactory 
nature of a private venture of the Estate Company”, and was described as having “no 
corporate existence” before its independence in 1897.112 Its independence created an 
opportunity to take unrestricted control of the Exchange, which manifested first and foremost 
in matters pertaining to the governance of the Exchange. 
4.5 GOVERNANCE OF THE EXCHANGE 
Having secured a growing membership and autonomy, the General Committee had to 
strengthen its authority over the members of the Exchange. By ensuring that sound rules and 
procedures existed for every transaction, the Exchange facilitated trust and reduced friction 
between its members. It garnered the trust of the investing public as it grew in stature within 
the financial infrastructure of the country. National statutes directly governing the Stock 
Exchange did not exist for much of its early history. The Exchange, therefore, remained self-
regulated for some time. As such, an important function performed by the Committee was that 
of a judicial body within the Exchange. Many parallels can be drawn between the judicial 
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function of the General Committee and that of the courts of law. Whereas the Courts interpret 
and apply the law of a country, the Committee created, interpreted, and applied the rules of 
the Stock Exchange, essentially administering justice within the Exchange membership. The 
Committee fiercely protected this function, and sought to resolve stock exchange conflicts 
internally. Therefore, members of the Exchange had to apply for permission to “proceed at 
law” externally against other members.113 The Committee also heard testimony, considered 
evidence and delivered rulings or verdicts on various occasions.114 Earlier rulings of the 
Committee were also taken as ‘legal’ precedents.115 Unfortunately, the Committee was initially 
not seen as “a fit tribunal to adjudicate upon brokers’ disputes”.116 
During the early history of the Exchange, the Rules and Regulations of the Exchange were 
moulded and continuously reshaped, sometimes by cautious foresight and sometimes by 
regretful hindsight. As the operations of the Exchange expanded, the rules governing the 
Exchange were extended to meet the increasingly complex trading conditions. J.B. Taylor and 
J.L. Bussey formulated the first constitution and rules of the Exchange, relying heavily on the 
existing rules of the Transvaal Share and Claim Exchange, located in Barberton.117 The first 
set of rules consisted of 69 rules, signed by the founder and first Chairman of the Exchange, 
Benjamin Woollan. Crafting the rules, and reconciling them with the practices of several other 
Exchanges, placed a significant burden on the Committee. For this reason, the Committee 
instructed the Exchange Secretary in December 1889 to write to the Committees of the various 
stock exchanges in South Africa at the time, in order to pursue the standardisation of stock 
exchange rules into a uniform set of rules and regulations for all South African exchanges. A 
conference was also proposed for February 1890, to discuss matters surrounding this 
standardisation of rules.118 The Committee received a variety of suggestions on possible 
amendments to the Exchange rules, after allowing a notice period within which members could 
submit such suggestions.119 After several drafts, the new regulations were accepted on 
31 January 1890 and sent out to other South African exchanges.120 With regard to the 
conference, the Exchange took a firm position on the location of the conference. Requests 
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from the Cape Town and Kimberley exchanges to hold the conference in Kimberley were met 
with little compromise. The conference appears to have taken place on 24 February 1890, 
following which the new rules and regulations were finalised.121 These new rules came into 
effect on 1 May 1890.122 The Exchange was serious about adopting a pro-active leadership 
position in the formulation of the new uniform rules and regulations of South African stock 
exchanges. This pro-active (and perhaps competitive) behaviour on the part of the Exchange 
may have been a contributing factor to the fact that merely three decades later it was the only 
surviving stock exchange in the country.  
After the standardisation of rules, the Exchange also appears to have been a leader in 
sustaining such rules. In July 1890, for instance, the Committee resolved to accept a new rule 
regarding the notice period on the resignation of stock exchange members. The Exchange did 
not consult any of the other Exchanges on this matter, instead deciding merely to “inform” the 
other Exchanges of the new rule.123 During this period, the use of solicitors for legal advice on 
complex governance matters appears to have become increasingly common. Where the 
committee could clearly implement the rules of the Exchange, and where they had the power 
to do so, they acted without assistance. In instances where the interpretation of the rules was 
unclear, or where the complexity of the situation at hand warranted special consideration, the 
Committee procured the services of a solicitor.124 The role of the Committee as the regulator 
of the Exchange, however, remained clear, as did its sovereignty – all broker notes had to 
bear the endorsement “Issued subject to the Rules & Regulations of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange”, emphasising the source of legitimacy of such transactions.125 Later, during the 
1890s, the Exchange gradually aligned its rules with international practices. Throughout the 
1890s, when the Exchange revised its rules, the Committee consulted the rules of the LSE.126 
The rules of the Exchange also made special provision for shares bought and sold in 
London.127 The formulation of rules explicitly linking the operations of the JSE to the LSE 
highlights this relationship. In essence, no other stock exchange occupies such a central role 
in the operations and governance of the Exchange. From July 1897 onwards, the Committee 
regularly exchanged information with the LSE regarding the status of members, notifying each 
other of any individuals who had been declared defaulters, or who had ceased to be 
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members.128 The JSE also regularly closed whenever the LSE was closed.129 Evidence also 
suggests that regular trading took place between Johannesburg and Paris as early as 1895.130 
By mid-1896, the French Government even requested a set of Exchange rules, via the French 
Consul stationed in Johannesburg.131 
The rules of the Exchange, as they emerged in the founding years, represent an essential 
component of the legitimisation of the young exchange. Without the rules, the exchange would 
merely be a group of people that seem to have common goals, but where the friction of 
exchange outweighs the will to cooperate. The rules reduced friction to the extent that 
transactions could take place in a fair, transparent, and pragmatic fashion – the exchange 
manifested as a functioning organisation as a result of these rules. It was, however, crucial 
that the Committee could enforce the rules of the Exchange. The Committee went to great 
lengths to ensure that trading occurred under its control and jurisdiction. After a long tradition 
of after-hours dealing between the chains, the calling out of prices outside the Exchange Hall 
after official hours was prohibited in 1899, and contravention of the new rule would result in 
expulsion or suspension.132 The most likely reason for this new rule was to protect the interests 
of the Exchange. After all, the auctions on the trading floor generated market prices, but if 
these market prices were simply shared with passers-by, shares could be traded informally 
without the need for the Exchange. Furthermore, any such transactions would threaten the 
stability of the market if a dispute arose, and such transactions remained open. Having not 
taken place through the official channels of the Exchange, the Committee had no power to 
adjudicate such disputes, and this would increase the likelihood of defaults in the market. The 
Committee was so adamant about putting an end to this practice, that it enlisted the help of 
the Police Commissioner to provide officers on Sundays, the cost of which the Exchange 
would bear.133 Unfortunately, street dealing remained a nuisance for the Committee.134 As 
unofficial dealing became more frowned upon by the Exchange, the official list became an 
increasingly important vehicle to protect investors against “unsound investments on the 
strength of alluring prospectuses”.135  
The Committee fiercely protected its authority over Exchange members. If members did not 
comply with the judicial decisions of the Committee, they were called before the Committee to 
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explain why they should not be declared defaulters, which would effectively destroy such 
members’ credibility in both Johannesburg and London.136 In extreme cases, however, the 
Committee usually referred cases to an actual Court of Law, most likely due to limited capacity 
to consider all evidence in complex cases.137 Ultimately, the Committee, in its role as a judicial 
body, developed within the broader organisation to facilitate the cooperation of Exchange 
members – to reduce the friction of interaction, to act as an independent adjudicator between 
individuals who were in disagreement. The Committee, in this role, facilitated structured 
interactions which reduced uncertainty in everyday business for Exchange members and the 
investing public. As such, the Exchange derived legitimacy from its structure, as a member-
based organisation with a strong judiciary function which upheld the rules and general order. 
This function of the Committee contributed to reducing the friction of trade and ensuring that 
the market gained and maintained legitimacy. In the absence of such a judicial function, the 
market could rapidly wither into a state of disarray. This is particularly important to observe in 
light of the fact that the vast majority of discussions in the Committee meetings during the 
early history of the Exchange revolved around conflict resolution and adjudication of 
disputes.138  
For all its rules, regulations, and practices, the lifeblood of the Exchange remained its 
members. This highly influential group of individuals changed the South African business 
landscape, the effects of which can still be witnessed in modern times. The Johannesburg 
stockbroker’s evolution from his humble, rather colourful origins into a highly organised and 
specialised vocation represents another critical theme in the long-term process of 
legitimisation of the JSE.  
4.6 EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIP 
Before becoming a highly specialised vocation, stock trading was done by men from all walks 
of life. Doctors, storekeepers, police officers, ostrich feather dealers, carpenters, musicians, 
actors and farmers all toiled on the trading floor, in pursuit of the great wealth that the early 
Exchange promised.139 As one observer noted: “At all times this lurking place of the bull and 
the bear is frequented by a mingled throng, whose component parts are drawn from all ranks 
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of society”.140 This contributed to the tumultuous character of the early Exchange. The early 
records of the Exchange are awash with formal complaints and trading disputes.141 In fact, 
during 1890 alone, the Committee heard 36 official cases, over and above a large number of 
complaints. Keeping in mind that the average membership for the year 1890 was 
193 members, it means that nearly one-fifth of members had disputes so serious that a formal 
case was necessary.142 The conflict arising from heated dealing on the Exchange floor was 
sometimes punctuated by acts of levity. At various times in its early history, the Committee 
censured members for disorderly conduct (1890), defacing the walls of the Exchange (1890), 
bringing dogs into the Exchange (1890, 1897), playing piano on the trading floor (1891), using 
unbecoming language on the floor (1893), playing games in the Exchange Hall (1895), and 
playing football on the trading floor (1897).143 When the pressure of business was high, the 
level of conflict increased, but in quieter times, boredom encouraged a variety of amusing 
schemes. In December 1889, for instance, the market was so poor that the “indigent and 
starving brokers” passed time by singing songs in the Exchange Hall.144 
Although no membership rolls remain intact at the JSE Archive, the General Committee 
balloted for all new members, and this was recorded in the Minute Books. This allowed the 
reconstruction of the membership figures from 1889 onwards. When the Exchange was 
established, it could already boast 122 members.145 The reconstruction of the membership 
figures was somewhat problematic since the exact number of members in 1889 was not 
known. The General Committee noted, however, on 3 August 1897 that membership of the 
Exchange stood at 471 men,146 allowing the reconstruction of the membership figures by 
working backwards. This reconstruction resulted in Figure 4.3 as shown below. Overall, the 
membership of the Exchange grew from 122 members in February 1888 to 464 in December 
1902, an increase of 280%.  
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Figure 4.3 | Membership figures of the JSE, 1888-1902 
Source: Reconstructed from JSE/GC2 – JSE/GC7.  
By October 1888, the Exchange had decided to admit clerks to the Exchange to assist 
members with their duties, although clerks initially could not transact business on the floor.147 
As early as September 1892, the membership of the Exchange had grown sufficiently large to 
necessitate a list of members and authorised clerks, printed at the beginning of each quarter, 
and placed in the Committee room,148 as well as given to the Doorkeepers and posted in the 
Exchange Hall.149 By August of 1897, the Exchange advertised twice a week in local papers 
that “the only Brokers authorized to deal on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, are those 
whose names are on the Official List, copies of which can be obtained from the Secretary”.150 
Furthermore, in a definite move towards its legitimation, notice was given to the public that 
persons who advertised their services as brokers were not members of the JSE, and thus not 
under the control of the Committee.151  
In order to become a member of the Exchange, individuals had to prove their social and 
financial standing to the General Committee. Applicants had to be proposed and seconded by 
members of the Exchange who were in good standing and who had been members of the 
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Exchange for more than twelve months.152 After application, the names of the applicants were 
posted in the Exchange, for the information of the existing Members. This also allowed 
members to raise any objections against the applicant’s prospective membership.153 
Ultimately, the Committee members voted in favour of, or against, the admission of the 
applicant.154 The ballot had to show a clear three-fourths majority in favour of the applicant.155 
In this way, the Committee was using the social information contained within its membership 
as a barrier to entry – if an applicant had a bad reputation, an unresolved disagreement with 
an Exchange member, or anything that might indicate that the individual was not fit for 
membership, the application would be denied. 
Good financial standing was equally important. While founding members of the Exchange only 
had to pay an entrance fee of £10, all subsequent new members paid an entrance fee of a 
little over £52 on admission to membership.156 This represented a sizeable investment 
(approximately £6 400 at 2018 values).157 The entrance fee was increased to £105-10-0 in 
September 1895 (approximately £13 000 at 2018 values).158 Besides the entrance fee, 
members also had to provide sureties, which could be called upon in the case of default. 
Founding members were required to provide sureties of £500.159 By early 1892, it was ruled 
that the proposer and seconder of a candidate would have to provide a maximum of £500 in 
sureties for six months after admission into membership.160 Following a number of declines in 
the market, and accompanying defaults, by mid-1893 the Committee had increased the 
maximum securities to £1 000 for 12 months. It was stated, however, that this would only be 
necessary in exceptional circumstances where the Committee viewed the candidate as having 
a higher than normal likelihood of default.161 In 1895, the values of surety bonds were 
increased to a minimum of £1 000 and a maximum at the discretion of the Committee,162 and 
surety bonds had to be posted for two years, instead of one year.163 This was most likely in 
response to a wave of defaults that threatened the stability of the market during the mid-
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1890s.164 By 1899 the high values of transactions on the market necessitated even larger 
sureties, which could be as high as £2 000.165  
Once admitted as a member, individuals were bound by the rules and the decisions of the 
Committee. In order to strengthen the Committee’s power over members, resignations had to 
be submitted with seven days’ notice, to allow any member to object to such resignation. This 
was done to increase the accountability of members, so that a member could not simply resign 
when in trouble. Members with pending cases against them could also not resign until the 
cases had been resolved.166 By restricting the membership of the Exchange to a closed, 
regulated group, the Committee protected its jurisdiction, and thus its ability to maintain order 
at the Exchange.167 This enhanced the legitimacy of the early Exchange considerably, since 
it soon became known that members of the JSE were bound by its rules, and rogue brokers, 
unaffiliated with the JSE, were not. The closed system of regulated brokers represented an 
important development in the legitimation of the Exchange, which helped the inexperienced 
band of founding members to mature into professionals, respected and accepted by broader 
society. 
4.7 SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THE EXCHANGE 
During its early years, the Exchange exhibited a particularly British character, despite finding 
itself in the independent, sovereign state of the ZAR. The ZAR would only be absorbed into 
the British Empire as a result of the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902, yet activities at the 
Exchange during its first sixteen years revealed its British undertones. In fact, the Exchange, 
in a certain sense, functioned much akin to a gentlemen’s club, which was a significant 
component of elite British, in particular English, social life at the time. Membership of a club 
signified high social status, and frequenting the club allowed members to advance professional 
relationships.168 Members of the Exchange could enjoy the use of a number of recreational 
facilities that included a writing room, a reading room with various newspapers and magazines, 
as well as chess and draughts sets.169 Club life certainly played a role in the establishment of 
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the Exchange – of the twenty founding Committee members of the Wanderers Club, in 1888 
and 1889, more than half were also founding or early members of the JSE.170  
The British character of the Exchange by the early 1890s is further borne out by the fact that 
members at times engaged in cricket matches with each other, and that High ‘Change was 
held earlier on days when the English cricket team was playing in Johannesburg. The English 
rugby team was received in the Exchange Hall in August 1891, as well as the English cricket 
team in 1889 and 1892.171 The most telling sign of its British character, however, was the 
reverence shown by the Exchange towards the British Royalty and aristocracy. On 
19 January 1892, for instance, High ‘Change was suspended on account of the funeral of the 
Duke of Clarence, and an official cable was sent by the Committee to the Prince and Princess 
of Wales to express sympathy. The cost of sending the cable, just over £13, was paid from 
the Committee's funds.172 In June 1893, the Exchange was closed because the High 
Commissioner for Southern Africa, Sir Henry Loch, was in Johannesburg. Loch was received 
in the Exchange Hall on two occasions, “the Hall being decorated on the occasion”.173 The 
Exchange furthermore closed on 6 July 1893, in honour of the marriage of the Duke of York, 
who would later become King George V, to Princess Mary of Teck.174 When Prince Henry of 
Battenberg died in January 1896, the Exchange once more sent a cable to Queen Victoria to 
express their condolences.175 The Exchange Hall was also used for public meetings by the 
Victoria Commemoration Committee in 1897, and closed on 22 June 1897 in celebration of 
Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee.176 Throughout its early history, the Exchange also closed in 
celebration of Queen Victoria’s birthday.177 Thus, the Exchange celebrated a monarch who 
had no dominion over the land where the Exchange was located, in some way suggesting the 
cultural sentiments of the Exchange membership at the time. The coronation of Queen 
Wilhelmina on 31 August 1898 is the only other celebration of a monarch by the Exchange.178 
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Despite the dominant British character, other groups were also represented in the membership 
of the Exchange. In particular, the body of members included a significant German and Jewish 
presence, as well as a small number of Afrikaner members. Evidence in the Exchange records 
suggests that trading between German speakers was often conducted in German.179 In other 
instances, the desire of German members to integrate into the predominantly English body of 
members is borne out by the fact that these members often anglicised their names. Member 
Abraham Lichtheim, for example, changed his name to Abraham Wilk, and Hugo 
Goldschneider changed his name to Hugo Goldie.180 The Exchange also kept German papers 
in the reading room.181 Amongst German speakers at the Exchange there was also a 
significant number of gentlemen of German Jewish descent. In fact, many prominent early 
figures in the history of the Exchange and of Johannesburg were German Jews, and Jews in 
general occupied a “very strong position on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange”.182  
Throughout its early history, Jewish holidays were observed as Exchange Holidays. The 
Exchange closed every year except 1894, for Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year.183 In 
general, the Exchange also closed on the Jewish Day of Atonement.184 Alongside the 
recognition of Jewish religious days, the Exchange also observed Christian holidays. The 
Exchange closed in observance of Good Friday and Easter Monday throughout its early 
existence.185 Besides Christmas, Ascension Day and Whit Monday were also often observed 
as Exchange Holidays.186 Members of Afrikaner descent were relatively few (estimated at 27 
during the period 1888 to 1902), considering that the Exchange found itself in a country 
dominated politically and otherwise by Afrikaners. Since Afrikaners were not excluded from 
joining the Exchange, the most likely explanation is that relatively few Afrikaners were involved 
in mining companies and related enterprises. This also reflected in the membership of the 
Exchange. Normally, the Exchange closed on days proclaimed as public holidays by the 
Kruger government. By 1894, however, it was decided not to close for Dingaan’s Day.187 In 
1896, although the Exchange was closed on Dingaan’s Day, the Exchange Hall remained 
open for the use of members.188 In later years, the Exchange closed on ZAR public holidays 
                                                 
 
179 JSE/GC3:69. 
180 JSE/GC4:282; JSE/GC7:135. 
181 JSE/GC3:416. 
182 Arthur Ruppin, The Jewish Fate and Future (London: MacMillan & Company, 1940), 142.  
183 JSE/GC3:144; JSE/GC3:343; JSE/GC4:66; JSE/GC4:229; JSE/GC4:424; JSE/GC5:324; JSE/GC6:256 
184 JSE/GC5:328; JSE/GC6:11; JSE/GC6:256. 
185 JSE/GC3:84; JSE/GC3:244; JSE/GC4:324; JSE/GC5:98; JSE/GC5:473; JSE/GC6:159; JSE/GC6:350. 





such as Dingaan’s Day and Amajuba Day, most likely because banks closed on these days 
and remaining open would be futile.189  
4.8 DAILY TRADING ON THE EXCHANGE 
Trading on the Exchange occurred through the open-outcry system, more commonly known 
as floor trading. This means that traders met in the Exchange Hall to buy and sell stocks by 
shouting out their orders (hence the name), which would be recorded by administrative officers 
on a chalkboard, as well as on paper cards called broker’s notes.190 The Exchange used the 
(rather uncommon) system of High ‘Change, which was the “time in the middle of the morning 
when the entire official share list was read out on the floor of the JSE and both bid and ask 
quotes were given by open outcry”.191 This meant that deals in a particular share could only 
be executed once the name of the share was called out by the Secretary – a considerable 
disadvantage to shares with names further down the alphabet, considering that by 1902 there 
were approximately 440 shares listed on the Exchange.192 The number of listings is not 
necessarily an accurate representation of the shares actually traded, since the Committee 
only erased liquidated companies a handful of times per year, ostensibly to save printing 
costs.193 Furthermore, even though the Exchange had 300 listed companies in January 1890, 
over 150 other shares could be traded “between the Chains”.194 Nonetheless, High ‘Change 
appeared to have been a tedious way of trading in shares, which brought about periodic calls 
for its discontinuation, starting as early as February 1890.195 In this instance, however, 
members voted to resolve the matter, with 271 members voting for the continuation of High 
‘Change and 97 voting against, thus continuing the practice of High ‘Change at the JSE.196  
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Figure 4.4 | The Second Exchange Building 
Source: “When the Stock Exchange Walked to Pretoria”, Sunday Times, 21 November 1937. 
Despite the clumsy nature of High ‘Change, one feature of the Exchange’s trading method 
made it rather nimble – negotiable broker’s notes.197 The fact that these notes were negotiable 
suggests the Exchange's pursuit of quick liquidity in the market. A negotiable broker’s note 
would hasten the pace of transacting on the Exchange, since members could deal in these 
notes rather than the underlying shares. This means that the note could be bought and sold 
without the need to conclude the transfer of shares from one to another and yet another, 
significantly increasing the share turnover in the market and thus the liquidity of the market.198 
Where share certificates were issued, they were often issued “to bearer” which also made 
them negotiable. 
The general pressure of business at times during the 1890s brought about regular calls for 
establishing a clearing house to serve the Exchange.199 In December 1891, for instance, a 
sub-committee was formed to report on the advisability of a clearing house to relieve “the 
present unsatisfactory mode of settlement”.200 Although nothing materialised from the sub-
committee, talk of a clearing house resurfaced in 1893, when another sub-committee was 
formed to investigate the matter. The sub-committee reported that “at present the Committee 
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do not see their way to introduce any such system”.201 This does, however, suggest that 
pressures were mounting on the Committee to facilitate more rapid clearing of trades due to 
the sheer volume of market activity. By 1897, the Committee was again considering 
establishing a clearing house, this time making contact with the LSE “with a view of obtaining 
full particulars [...] as to the system, and the working of the Clearing House on the London 
Stock Exchange”.202 During discussions, a member of the Committee argued that the great 
number of defaults experienced by the Exchange during that time would be “best met by the 
adoption of a Clearing House”.203 A sub-committee was again formed to consider the matter, 
and documents containing the full details of the London Clearing House system were received 
from the manager of the London Clearing House in February of 1898.204 Unfortunately, it does 
not appear as if the matter was given any further attention before the South African War broke 
out in 1899. Nonetheless, despite being reluctant to change certain practices, it does appear 
as if the Committee was eager to find ways in which to make the daily trading of shares 
quicker, more liquid, and less risky. The Exchange needed a stable and efficient way of settling 
transactions, because business was generally booming throughout its early history, and the 
official list was bursting at the seams. 
4.9 THE OFFICIAL LIST OF THE EXCHANGE 
Unlike the LSE of the day, which permitted its members to buy or sell “whatever securities 
attracted them”,205 the Committee of the JSE ruled in December of 1895 that only “officially 
listed stocks” shall be dealt with during High ‘Change.206 This is quite possibly because, by 
1895, over 350 different shares were quoted on the JSE, each of which had to be read out in 
alphabetical order during High ‘Change.207 While more than 150 unlisted shares were traded 
“between the Chains”,208 the shares on the official list carried the stamp of approval of the 
General Committee, thus gaining a certain level of credibility through its listing, whether 
intended by the Committee or not. Newspapers sometimes reported that a particular share 
had received the “stamp of approval” of the Committee, making it appear as an 
endorsement.209 An official quotation meant that a share would be called during High ‘Change, 
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implying that it could more easily be bought or sold than unlisted shares.210 Furthermore, the 
price information captured during High ‘Change meant that more reliable price information was 
available for listed shares. Thus, securities listed on the Official List, “could influence the 
behaviour of investors and the access to finance of borrowers”.211 The number of shares on 
the Official List of the JSE grew steadily throughout its early existence, only halting for the 
South African War. Figure 4.5 shows the number of listed companies between 1890 and 1902. 
Despite a slowdown in listings in 1892, which encouraged the Exchange to quote non-mining 
shares, the number of listed shares continued to grow, reaching an average of 411 listed 
shares in 1899, and 433 listed shares in 1902.212 
 
Figure 4.5 | Average number of JSE listed shares, 1890-1902 
Source: Calculated from JSE/GC2 – JSE/GC7; Klein (1947). 
(Note: The Exchange was closed from 3 October 1899 to 24 December 1901).213 
In order to ensure that officially listed shares were not of dubious character, companies 
applying for official quotation were required to submit “their Legal Adviser’s opinion to the 
satisfaction of the Committee that the [Company’s] titles are in order”.214 Companies applying 
for a quotation not only needed to prove their legal status, but also their financial standing. 
Even rumours of financial instability brought the continued quotation of companies into 
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question. The quotation of the Cordova Gold Mining Company, for instance, was temporarily 
suspended in November of 1889, until it could be proven that the company possessed 
sufficient working capital to continue its operations.215 The events that transpired surrounding 
the Cordova Company had a significant effect on the listing requirements of the Exchange. As 
a result of its instability, the Committee ruled that no new companies be listed on the Exchange 
until proof of working capital had been produced and approved by the Committee.216 Shortly 
afterwards, the Committee also decided that each company applying for quotation must submit 
copies of all prospectuses, alongside the trust deed or articles of association, the certificate of 
registration, and “such other documents as the Committee may require to establish the bona 
fide character of each company.”217  
For mining companies, additional measures were adopted with respect to working capital – 
those with a nominal capital under £100 000 needed to have at least 10% of their nominal 
capital available as working capital, and those with a nominal capital of more than £100 000 
needed at least £10 000 in working capital.218 In certain cases, the Committee also wanted 
more information on machinery and equipment in order to ensure the going concern of the 
company in question.219 The Committee sometimes forced companies to remove unwanted 
clauses in their trust deeds, such as those allowing the company to charge fees for the transfer 
of shares (which was not allowed by the Exchange Rules).220 By 1895, the Committee required 
companies applying for listing to submit an auditor’s report showing that the company was in 
good standing, and declined the quotations of companies that were not of “sufficient 
magnitude [and] importance to entitle them to an official quotation”.221 Furthermore, in 
September of 1895, the Committee increased the quotation application fee from £5.5.0 to 
£26.5.0, most likely to deter smaller, less prominent companies from applying.222 Clearly, the 
Committee began to realise by 1895 that the market was maturing in size and that the 
Exchange needed to focus their efforts on larger, more substantial companies. The clumsy 
nature of the High ‘Change system most likely also contributed to the Committee’s decision, 
as such shares would only clutter the official list and further extend the time needed to 
complete the daily High ‘Change. As the gatekeeper to the market, the Exchange at this point 
already wielded considerable power over the companies that listed on the Exchange.  
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Overall, the new listings on the JSE between 1890 and 1902 were dominated by mines 
(representing 87% of all new listings during this period).223 Over the same period, other 
sectors, such as financial and investment companies (6%), property companies (4%), food 
and beverages (1%), industrial companies (1%), and government instruments (1%), were not 
significant.224 As could be expected, gold mining shares represented the single most important 
category on the Official List, to the extent that the Committee made arrangements in 
September of 1891 for monthly gold output statistics to be provided to the Exchange.225 The 
gold mines remained the singular focus of the Exchange until May of 1892, when a sub-
committee was formed to consider the “... quoting Companies other than Gold Mining 
[Companies] on the Official list [and] calling them in the afternoon”.226 It had been rumoured 
earlier, in December 1889, that the Exchange would widen its scope beyond Rand gold stocks 
from January 1890 onwards.227 At this point, the Official List contained a handful of non-mining 
companies (such as the Standard Buildings Company, Johannesburg City and Suburban 
Tramway Company, and the Pretoria Waterworks Company), but not to such an extent that 
the Committee diverted its attention away from the gold mining sector. In March 1893, 
however, the Secretary of the Exchange sent out a letter inviting non-mining companies to 
also list on the Exchange. In response to this, it was recorded in May 1893 that a number of 
non-gold mining companies, including Standard Bank and De Beers Consolidated Mines, had 
applied for listings, and an invitation was extended to institutions in the Cape Colony, OFS 
and Natal, in search of “Colonial Companies, Government, and Municipal debentures for 
quotation”.228 By August of 1893, the Estate Company (the owners of the Exchange at the 
time) agreed to the listing of the De Beers Consolidated Mines and Standard Bank stocks on 
the official list “without payment of the quotation fee”.229 After the earlier non-mining listings, 
the Estate Company also agreed, in September of 1893, to the listing of other non-mining 
stocks, which included the British South Africa Company, National Bank Z.A.R. Ltd., New 
Jagersfontein Mining and Exploration Company Ltd., and Transvaal Five per Cent 
Government Bonds, without charging the normal quotation fee.230 The Exchange was 
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maturing into a well-rounded stock exchange, moving away from its concentrated focus on the 
gold mining industry.  
Despite the slight shift in focus, the Exchange remained firmly in the service of the mining 
industry, and in particular, of the gold mines. In July of 1897, approximately 162 members of 
the Exchange signed a requisition requesting the Committee to have various deep-level 
mining firms and other “prominent stocks” that were not officially quoted at the time added to 
the official list of the Exchange. They argued that the stock was already in demand and that 
“it would greatly improve and facilitate business if officially dealt with on the Exchange”.231 
After some investigation by a sub-committee, and consultation with various deep-level firms, 
it was found that the Rules of the Exchange were prohibitive to their listings.232 The report of 
the sub-committee elaborated: “...the present stringent regulations were embodied to check 
the flotation of bogus companies in times past, but should not be applied to bona fide 
propositions, even where the appropriation of working capital may not meet the requirements 
of the Rules”.233 In order to accommodate these companies, the Exchange had to relax its 
working capital requirements. In a way, this concession represented a reversal of damage 
done in 1894, when the Committee had refused the quotation of Rand Mines Ltd. on the 
grounds of insufficient working capital. This decision forced Rand Mines, a “leading gold 
stock”, to list on the LSE, which had “a most detrimental influence on local business”.234 
Nonetheless, Rand Mines obtained a secondary listing on the JSE on 17 August 1897, as a 
result of the request, along with at least 20 other prominent mining companies.235 Clearly, the 
rules were instituted in order to ensure that the primary market was one of integrity, where 
capital was not raised by nefarious means. These companies had already raised capital in 
their own capacity, therefore the need to protect against the so-called “bogus” listings 
disappeared. These were well-known companies on the Rand, and the investors near and far 
wanted in. Their shares could be traded outside of the Exchange, therefore a lively informal 
market for such shares would probably have existed. This illustrates the position of the 
Exchange as a trusted market facilitator. Investors were not compelled to deal via the 
Exchange, but the Exchange provided some level of certainty in terms of procedure, delivery 
of scrip, and liquidity. Furthermore, the Exchange acted, through its judiciary processes, as 
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an ombudsman of sorts, ensuring that its members abided by the rules of the Exchange – the 
very rules that were formulated and sanctioned to ensure market integrity. 
4.10 MEMBERS IN DEFAULT 
Part of protecting the integrity of the market was to limit member defaults on Exchange 
transactions, and to ensure that specific procedures were in place to deal with default when it 
(inevitably) happened. Since trading took place on the floor, face to face, the social information 
contained in the interactions between members played an important role in the functioning of 
the Exchange.236 The greatest threat to any member of the Exchange was the dishonour 
associated with being declared a defaulter, and being shunned by the other members of the 
Exchange. The status of defaulter was not only accompanied by a great deal of humiliation, 
but also by expulsion from the Exchange.237 In a small market such as the early JSE, the risk 
of systematic failure of the market was significant, particularly because the market consisted 
of relatively few participants with concentrated holdings, compared to the vast markets of 
London and New York. As can be seen in many cases, the simple default of one broker often 
created a knock-on effect, resulting in the subsequent default of many others and a general 
destabilisation of the market.238 In certain instances, the market was also subject to undue 
influence threatening its integrity and ability to provide fair prices that at least approximated 
underlying value. The Exchange had to go to great lengths to protect the integrity of the 
market, to maintain stability and liquidity that otherwise might destroy the market in its entirety. 
A member of the Exchange could be declared a defaulter for many reasons – most obviously, 
for defaulting on an Exchange transaction, but also for failing to comply with a judicial decision 
of the Committee, or being declared a defaulter on an associated Exchange, such as the Cape 
Town Stock Exchange.239 A list of defaulters was maintained and could be viewed in the 
Secretary’s Office.240 The Exchange also informed associated Exchanges (such as those in 
London, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town and, later, Bulawayo) if a member had been 
declared a defaulter or ceased to be a member for any other reason. Similarly, the Exchange 
also received notifications of such changes in status from other exchanges.241 Between 1897 
and 1902, the Exchange received no fewer than 69 letters from other exchanges, mostly from 
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London, about defaulting members of said exchanges.242 The number of letters received from 
London far outweighs that from other Exchanges, most likely because the LSE was 
exponentially larger than any of the other Exchanges. Nonetheless, being declared a defaulter 
left the individual stripped of his membership, and deprived of his honour, not only at his home 
Exchange but also at other Exchanges. Presumably, this was done to ensure that the 
individual did not simply transfer to another Exchange and continue business there after 
defaulting. After all, the Exchange was home to no less than two London defaulters in its early 
existence.243  
Having sufficient sureties available in case a member could not fulfil a transaction meant that 
the market was protected from the widespread default. The Committee considered the matter 
of guarantees so important that if guarantors reneged on their promise to provide guarantee, 
they would be declared defaulters and expelled from the Exchange.244 Members were also 
required to inform the Committee of the death of a guarantor and to provide new sureties 
within one month.245 As will be demonstrated below, large defaults by irresponsible members 
often resulted in a wave of subsequent defaults. As soon as one member defaulted, the other 
members depending on the funds from that transaction to fulfil their Exchange obligations 
were forced to default as well. This is a common occurrence in the early history of the 
Exchange, and the Committee of the Exchange went to great lengths to protect the market 
from this threat.246 
Several cases of default during the late 1890s demonstrates the detrimental effect that default 
can have within the Exchange. In October of 1896, for instance, a prominent member of the 
Exchange (and of the General Committee), C. van Beek, defaulted on a transaction with 
eleven Exchange members.247 By December of 1896, claims had been received by the 
Secretary against Van Beek’s insolvent estate, showing the magnitude of the default. The total 
claim against Van Beek’s estate, resulting from Exchange transactions, amounted to £35 073 
(or £4.4 million in 2018 values).248 In the same month, the suicide of a member, S. Judel, 
resulted in another significant default.249 Claims against Judel totalled over £9 000, while only 
£2 000 in sureties were available at the time of Judel’s death. The Stock Exchange Solicitor 
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(Thomson) informed the Committee that Judel’s sureties could be distributed amongst 
Exchange creditors without the approval of the Trustee of Judel’s estate.250 The sureties were, 
in effect, ring-fenced to only apply to Exchange transactions. Despite the sureties, however, 
the magnitude of the default resulted in major losses for all parties, with only £2 000 distributed 
to cover claims of over £9 000.  
In May of 1897 the Exchange saw a wave of defaults, in close succession, demonstrating the 
knock-on effect that a single default may have in the market. In a single month, no fewer than 
13 Exchange members defaulted on open transactions.251 The pressure of business was too 
much to bear for some, who saw suicide as the only way out.252 Some of the gentlemen 
avoided being declared defaulters after promising to pay their Exchange creditors in full, either 
by obtaining a loan, or by paying from their own fortunes.253 In order to minimise the 
destabilisation of the market, the Committee offered a number of arrangements – the 
appointment of a sub-committee for each estate in default, winding up transactions in each 
estate as quickly as possible in order to minimise the knock-on effect, and valuing the assets 
(which included furniture and property stands) in the possession of each defaulter to establish 
what potential distributions could be made to creditors.254 One defaulter, Mr. Crampton, 
indicated to the Committee that his default was entirely attributable to the default of other 
members.255 Clearly the knock-on effect of the defaults was a threat to the stability of the 
market. On this matter, the Exchange Solicitors delivered legal opinion to the effect that “It is 
an obligation under Rule 141 upon any member who becomes aware that another cannot 
meet his engagements, to give notice of that fact to the Secretary, so as to prevent such 
member incurring further liabilities”.256 Accountability was effected amongst members through 
the social system underlying the Exchange. 
Eventually, six of the gentlemen were declared defaulters and expelled from the Exchange, 
the rest having been able to make arrangements to cover their liabilities.257 The wave of 
defaults brought about closer scrutiny of the Committee’s legal rights to realise and distribute 
the assets of a member. In May 1897, the Stock Exchange Solicitors, Solomon and Thomson, 
advised the Committee that “the prevailing custom” of realising and distributing a defaulter’s 
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assets was not explicitly supported by any Exchange rule, leaving the Committee open to legal 
liability if a case were to be made against them. The Solicitors advised that defaulters should 
sign a letter authorising the Committee to redistribute assets amongst Exchange creditors.258  
In rare cases, defaulters could be rehabilitated and reinstated into membership. The rules of 
the Exchange provided that a defaulter could only be readmitted once he had paid “at least 
one third of his transactions whether on his own account or that of his principals”, but that the 
Committee had the right to exercise their discretion in times of “extraordinary hardship”.259 The 
fact that the rule made provision for exceptions under “extraordinary hardship” also suggests 
the social nature that the regulation of the Exchange took on at the time. The Committee were 
(or could easily become) familiar with the personal circumstances of members, such that they 
could make exceptions to the rules based on the specifics of each case. Despite the potentially 
calamitous effects of default, they were relatively uncommon. The greatest threat to the 
Exchange during its early history was the shifts in its political environment, which first 
manifested through the Jameson Raid.  
4.11 THE JAMESON RAID 
The gold rush and the subsequent development of the mining industry attracted scores of 
people from outside the ZAR to the Rand. The presence of thousands of so-called Uitlanders 
(foreigners), particularly British subjects, represented a threat to the power of the ZAR 
Government.260 Throughout the first half of the 1890s, many of the foreigners increasingly 
complained that they were disenfranchised, paying too much tax, and that English was not an 
official language.261 They felt that they were mistreated by the ZAR Government, despite 
contributing a significant part of state revenue and economic activity to the ZAR. Many also 
considered the Afrikaners a backward, inferior people, and saw the Kruger Government as 
inept and detrimental to the development of the mining industry.262 In June 1888, for instance, 
a nameless author wrote a scathing (although somewhat humorous) letter to the Diggers’ 
News and Witwatersrand Advertiser. The letter criticised the Volksraad,263 and in particular a 
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Volksraad member, one Mr. Taljaard, who appeared to have been a fervent supporter of Dutch 
as the only official language in the ZAR.264 The writer pointed out that the population of the 
Transvaal was “composed principally of English speaking people who have brought here 
treasure, enterprise and experience”.265 The letter further recommended (satirically) that all 
horses must be bred by Dutchmen, and have Dutch names, that the business of the JSE 
should be conducted in Dutch, and that the Exchange Secretary, Sir Drummond Dunbar, 
should be replaced by “Mr. Taljaard’s uncle’s nephew’s godfather’s second cousin”, amongst 
other suggestions.266 
By 1894, the ZAR population included approximately 150 000 citizens and 75 000 foreigners, 
and calls for reform were frequently heard.267 Mid-1895 saw increased agitation among 
Uitlanders for change, and plans were set in motion to dislodge the ZAR government by an 
armed insurgence from outside the ZAR.268 Driven by Cecil John Rhodes, Premier of the Cape 
Colony, and mining magnate Alfred Beit, the uprising was assisted by Leander Starr Jameson, 
a close friend of Rhodes, with the assistance of a number of influential Uitlanders in 
Johannesburg.269 These included Lionel Phillips270 (Chairman of the Chamber of Mines), John 
Hays Hammond (an American engineer associated with Rhodes), Charles Leonard (an 
advocate, and Chairman of the Uitlander organisation, the Transvaal National Union),271 
George Farrar (managing director of Anglo-French Exploration), and Rhodes’ brother, Colonel 
Francis Rhodes.272 This band of men, 64 in total, was later known as the Johannesburg 
Reform Committee.273 The Raid was intricately connected to the JSE. Alfred Beit’s brother, 
Otto, had been a member of the Exchange since 1894, a member of the General Committee 
since February 1895, and was the Acting Chairman of the Exchange shortly after the Raid.274 
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Alfred Beit’s business associate, Hermann Eckstein, and his brother Frederich Eckstein were 
also members of the Exchange.275 Hermann Eckstein and Charles Leonard were also directors 
of the Exchange’s owners, the Johannesburg Estate Company.276 Of the 24 managing 
committee members of Leonard’s Transvaal National Union (a political organisation formed to 
further the Uitlander political cause in the Transvaal), at least 13 were also members of the 
Exchange, many of whom were members of the Exchange’s General Committee.277 A further 
two of the 24 men also acted as regular legal advisers to the Exchange.278 Of the 64 Reform 
Committee members, 27 were members of the JSE around the time of the Raid.279  
As 1895 drew to a close, tension came to a head at the Exchange. The great majority of the 
Exchange members were Uitlanders (mostly of British descent), and many were anxious that 
political unrest would destroy the newfound wealth they had accumulated in Johannesburg.280 
On 24 December 1895, the Chairman of the Exchange informed the Committee of the “political 
harangue” of Julius Berlein and George Albu delivered in the Exchange Hall after High 
‘Change.281 The Committee objected to this action, ruling that “the Hall cannot be used for 
meetings of any kind without the consent of the Committee”.282 Although the essence of their 
address was not recorded, the Cape Times reported that Berlein “mounted the rostrum and 
made an impassioned and eloquent oration, calling upon all who heard him to bear testimony 
to the fact that Government had good friends, and deprecating any agitation whatever”.283 It 
was also reported that Albu “spoke in the same strain”, highlighting the potential destruction 
that the revolution would bring, and that the “Boers would not give up their country without a 
struggle”.284 It was also reported that Berlein assured the Pretoria Government of “countless 
friends and sympathisers in Johannesburg should the worst come to the worst”.285 Clearly, the 
intention of the “harangue” was to discourage action against the ZAR government, seeing that 
so many of the brokers had so much to lose in case of major political instability.286 The 
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Johannesburg Times reported that “the majority of the uitlanders are averse to being dragged 
into the horrors of war until they are quite convinced that there is absolutely no alternative”, 
and that Berlein and Albu had amassed a considerable following.287 In fact, it was reported 
that Albu’s speech contributed to “strengthen the market”.288  
On 29 December 1895, a few days after Berlein and Albu’s address, however, Jameson and 
his armed forces crossed over into the ZAR from neighbouring Bechuanaland, “to come to the 
aid of my fellow men in their extremity”.289 Despite warnings by his fellows to postpone 
“flotation” (the telegrams used stock exchange jargon to disguise their true meaning),290 and 
a stern instruction to desist by the High Commissioner for Southern Africa (Sir Hercules 
Robinson), Jameson proceeded with the action.291 By 2 January 1896, Jameson and his forces 
surrendered to the forces under Commandant Cronje in the region of Krugersdorp.292 Well- 
known Exchange member D.C. Greig and mine manager George Angus made their way 
towards Krugersdorp and arrived on the battlefield shortly after Jameson had been defeated, 
to witness the bodies of the “misguided Bechuanaland boys” strewn about.293 The Raid had 
failed in its attempt to incite the toppling of the ZAR Government. Many of the leaders of the 
Raid were arrested. Lionel Phillips, George Farrar, Francis Rhodes, and John Hays Hammond 
were sentenced to death, although their sentences were later commuted.294 
The next meeting of the Committee was on 2 January 1896, where it was decided that the 
Exchange should remain closed, due to “the present condition of public affairs”.295 High 
‘Change was suspended indefinitely on 6 January 1896, but the Exchange remained open.296 
The next day, the Committee received a petition, signed by more than 50 members, requesting 
the resumption of ordinary business. High ‘Change was reinstated on 8 January 1896.297 By 
the end of January, some unease remained in the town. When a group of 2 000 men, who had 
helped defeat Jameson’s raiders, entered the town in what the newspaper described as a 
“Conquerors Parade”, a crowd that had gathered at the Exchange “began hooting the 
                                                 
 
287 “The Cry of the Moderates”, Johannesburg Times, 31 December 1895; “The Question Put”, Johannesburg 
Times, 27 December 1895. 
288 “The Cape Times”, Cape Times, 30 December 1895. 
289 Webber, The State v. Phillips, Rhodes, and others, 217, 226. The Johannesburg Times challenged the notion 
that Jameson came to the salvation of his countrymen who were being “seriously threatened by the Boers” 
(“Jameson’s Raid”, Johannesburg Times, 4 April 1896). 
290 Webber, The State v. Phillips, Rhodes, and others, 222. 
291 Ibid., 224-225. 
292 Ibid., 243; “On ‘Change”, Cape Times, 1 June 1896. 
293 “Details from the Front”, Johannesburg Times, 3 January 1896.  
294 Webber, The State v. Phillips, Rhodes, and others, 243; “On ‘Change”, Cape Times, 1 June 1896.  




burghers”.298 Although the Raid did not result in an extended closure of the Exchange, the 
political turmoil resulting from the Raid did have a significant impact on the Exchange in two 
ways: the Government interdicted any scrip in the name of Reform Committee members, and 
a number of Exchange members were arrested in connection with the Raid.299  
The interdiction of scrip added a degree of instability to the market, because the interdict 
prevented the transfer of shares, which made it impossible to conclude transactions involving 
such shares. The Committee feared a wave of defaults as a result of the interdiction, 
suggesting to members “that before accepting delivery of stock or shares, they satisfy 
themselves that such stock or shares are transferrable”.300 The Committee also informed the 
LSE of the interdiction, as certain international transactions could also not be concluded, 
affecting members of that Exchange.301 The consequences of the Raid were dire for the 
Exchange, as the minutes of the Committee recorded: “The [...] Raid and the arrest of so many 
financiers and dealers, with the interdiction of scrip and banking accounts, raised unexpected 
difficulties, and the Chairman had to proceed to Pretoria to interview the State Attorney in 
regard to the interdicted scrip”.302 Although certain shares may have been registered in the 
name of Reform Committee members, it was possible for shares to have changed hands many 
times before the shares were ultimately transferred to their new owners. Shares were often 
traded by speculators without effecting transfer. After failing to compel a number of companies 
to transfer shares based on affidavits that the shares had changed hands prior to the interdict, 
the Committee declined to further intervene, recommending that further steps be taken by 
individual stock holders.303 Luckily, by May 1896, the interdicts were removed, except in the 
case of Dr. H. Wolff and Charles Leonard, who were still fugitive at that stage.304  
Ultimately, despite initial fears, it seems that the interdiction had no significant effect on the 
Exchange – no defaults were recorded between January and May 1896, and the membership 
of the Exchange actually grew by 20 during this period.305 Despite this, the Exchange was left 
without clear leadership in the aftermath of the Raid. Three Committee members were held in 
Pretoria on charges relating to the Raid,306 and another four members of the Committee, 
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including the Chairman, Matthew Dold, resigned and left for Europe between February and 
April 1896.307 In fact, of these 64 men charged with high treason, more than a third were 
members of the JSE at the time of the Jameson Raid.308 As a result, after the annual 
Committee elections of April 1896, the Committee of the Exchange for 1896/1897 retained 
only five of its former members, with ten new elected individuals, representing a significant 
shift in the leadership of the Exchange.309 The vote for Chairman was split equally between 
Andrew Mackie Niven and Solomon Barnato Joel, both of whom were held in Pretoria on 
charges relating to the Raid. Ultimately, Joel was elected as the Chairman of the Exchange, 
and Otto Beit was elected Deputy Chairman.310 The newly elected committee granted leave 
to Joel, Niven, Bettington, Mosenthal and Goddard, as they were being held in Pretoria.311 For 
the time being, therefore, Otto Beit was the acting chairman of the Exchange. While the men 
were held in Pretoria, the Exchange sought to express its support – the House was closed on 
29 April 1896 in sympathy with the Reform Committee, in lieu of the “heavy sentences” of the 
Reform Committee leaders.312 The LSE was also asked by cablegram “to plead for mitigation 
of the sentences”.313 During the time the Reformers were held in Pretoria, as Bettington 
recounted, the members of the Exchange showed great support towards them, visiting them 
regularly and comforting their families. Barnato reportedly had a long coat made with “over 
twenty pockets” in which he could smuggle flasks, cigarettes and cigars to the prisoners. 
“[T]his”, Bettington remarked, “...for the sake of men with whom the majority had no political 
sympathy, and whose conduct had cost every member of the Exchange, together with their 
clients, enormous losses”.314 After most of the prisoners were released in May 1896, the 
Exchange sent the following telegram to President Paul Kruger: 
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Figure 4.6 | Transcript of telegram sent to President Paul Kruger 
Source: JSE/GC4:361. 
At an enthusiastic meeting of the Members of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange held 
immediately on receipt of the announcement of the decision of the Honourable the 
Executive Council, it was unanimously resolved to convey to your Honour and the 
Honourable the Executive Council their warmest and heartiest expression of thanks for 
your magnanimous and generous decision in regard to the release of the Reform Prisoners. 
Your decision cannot but have the most beneficial and far reaching effects upon the whole 
of South Africa; and the members feel sure that the same magnanimity which prompted 
your action will be extended to those still under sentence.315 
It was reported that the market rallied at the news, with prices rising an average of 20 per cent 
after the release of the Reformers had been announced in the Exchange Hall. Three cheers 
for the President were heard in the Exchange.316 It was rumoured that certain people made 
“hundreds of thousands of pounds” on the Exchange in the wake of the Raid.317 Ultimately, 
the Raid had little lasting effect on the Exchange, and most of those arrested emerged 
unscathed from prison. When the Reformers returned to the Exchange, they were met with 
cheers and “carried round the place on enthusiastic friends’ shoulders”.318 By November 1896, 
however, some rumours surfaced in the press that prices were being held artificially low by 
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certain mining magnates, “with a view to freezing out the public, and eventually buying up 
shares far below their intrinsic worth”.319 The market did not recover for the rest of 1896.320 By 
January 1897, however, Johannesburg had moved on from the Raid, and “when it is 
occasionally revived, it is so evidently brought back to life merely for the purposes of stock 
exchange speculation that it is treated with deserved ridicule”.321 It was only after June 1897 
that the market improved.322 The episode surrounding the Raid did, however, signal the 
emerging alignment between the Exchange and its broader environment. The Exchange was 
already a British satellite in a foreign territory, and the Raid set the process in motion which 
would have them find themselves in British territory within a handful of years. 
4.12 SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 
After the Jameson Raid, Kruger’s clemency towards the reformers and promises of reform 
made for improved relations between the Uitlanders and the ZAR Government. By early 1897, 
however, reports of an interview between J.B. Robinson (an early member of the JSE) and 
Kruger to discuss new reforms signalled renewed dissatisfaction in some quarters. Reports of 
the interview were well received on the Exchange, although not without some cynicism and 
“forecasts of trouble for the Transvaal”.323 The discussion, which tended to matters such as 
railway rates, the price of dynamite, and English education in the Transvaal, were met with 
Kruger’s “accustomed courtesy, and calm and keen criticism” and seemed to reassure most 
observers. The newspaper furthermore highlighted that few would want a repetition of the 
Raid, and called for the “calmness and patience”, as well as the use of “every constitutional 
method” to encourage reform and the improvement in “the status of the law-abiding 
uitlander”.324 Despite wanting to avoid further conflict, the Uitlanders remained dissatisfied with 
their position in the ZAR. The establishment of the Second Volksraad in 1890, which gave 
representation to the Uitlanders to some extent, had no original legislative powers, but by 
1899, the British Government undertook “an endeavour to secure for the Uitlanders a redress 
of their grievances and for its loyal subjects their rights”.325 
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In early July 1899, the Committee seemed to anticipate the coming conflict. It was decided to 
remove the fixed deposits of the Exchange from Johannesburg “for the present”.326 By mid-
July, arrangements were made with the African Banking Corporation, where most of the 
Exchange’s fixed deposits were being held, to transfer them to Cape Town, effectively moving 
the Exchange’s money into British territory.327 Despite the depression in the market, a high 
rate of member resignation, the departure of key Committee members, and the mounting 
threat of political instability, the Committee proceeded throughout 1898 and 1899 in 
aggressively building up capital to finance a new Exchange building. By August 1898, the 
Exchange had already invested a sizeable £13 000 into fixed deposit, and through the course 
of the following 12 months proceeded to increase this to £18 500.328 Plans for a new premises 
proceeded at a steady pace, but would soon grind to a halt. On the 1st of September 1899, 
the Committee's anticipation of the impending situation became clear. A special meeting of 
the Committee was called to discuss the political situation: 
The Chairman explained that the Meeting had been called in consequence of the gravity 
of the Political Situation, Members being anxious that due provision should be made for 
procedure in the closing of time bargains, options etc. should hostilities commence, or a 
moratorium be declared. In case of a sudden crisis it would also be as well to make 
arrangements re Exchange Minute Books, Surety Bonds, Fixed Deposits, and also the 
closing of the Exchange should such a course become necessary.329 
The Committee decided to close the Exchange in the event that the banks closed, and made 
arrangements for the safekeeping of the Exchange Minute Books with the Safe Deposit 
Company.330 With the approaching hostilities, the Committee realised that any proclamation 
or moratorium would leave them powerless in that no new rules could be passed.331 The rules 
of the Exchange did not contain any provisions for the conclusion of open transactions in the 
event of war. This was, after all, the Exchange’s first acquaintance with major political 
instability, considering that it had only been closed briefly after the Jameson Raid. Days later, 
with Solomon and Thomson (the Stock Exchange Solicitors) having left town, another legal 
expert, one Dickenson, advised that although a moratorium or Martial Law would not affect 
the due dates of transactions, their fulfilment would not be possible until business resumed.332 
Further advice was sought from Dr. M.J. Farrelly, Advocate of the Supreme Court of the Cape 










Colony, and Barrister, and according to one Committee member, “a great authority on 
international law”.333 Farrelly advised that time bargains and options would be interrupted, 
should government make a proclamation suspending business, and that such transactions 
would only resume once a cessation of hostilities had been officially proclaimed. He 
furthermore advised that the Exchange would have to be closed if Martial Law or a moratorium 
were proclaimed, and that business would be suspended until notice was given by the 
Committee.334 In a letter to the Committee, Farrelly also highlighted that “contracts made 
during war between residents (not merely subjects) in one hostile territory with residents in 
another [were] all void - with a few trivial exceptions”.335 Seeing that a significant portion of the 
business transacted on the Exchange was with the London, Cape Town and Maritzburg 
Exchanges, all of which were located in British territory, the war indeed threatened the integrity 
of the market. In fact, a moratorium suspended “the existence of ordinary contracts” and 
threatened the Committee’s ability to exercise their power over the Members of the Exchange, 
seriously threatening the legitimacy of the Exchange and thus of the market.336 After 
discussing the advice from Dr. Farrelly, the Committee made the following announcement to 
members: 
That the Stock Exchange be closed immediately on Martial Law coming into force, but that 
all current bargains be carried out as usual until the proclamation of a Moratory Law 
suspending transactions, which will then become subject to the special Laws of the State, 
and have to be completed accordingly. Any bargains entered into while the Stock Exchange 
is closed will not be recognised by the Committee.337 
By 20 September 1899, the Committee delegated its full powers to a Sub-Committee of “such 
Members as may be left in Johannesburg”, with four members constituting a quorum for 
special business.338 As the gravity of the situation became clear, the Committee received 
telegrams from Maritzburg and Cape Town Exchanges “stating that in view of crisis and 
possibility of closing Exchange they would only be too glad to offer every facility for carrying 
on business”.339 The Cape Town Share Brokers Association also offered JSE Members 
Honorary Visiting Membership.340 Finally, the inevitable dawned upon the Committee on 3 
October 1899: “[T]he tram cars had ceased running, all the principal buildings had been closed 
                                                 
 






339 Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 81; JSE/GC6:267. 
340 JSE/GC6:279; “Stock Exchange”, Cape Daily Telegraph, 23 September 1899; “Cape Colony”, Cape Daily 
Telegraph, 25 September 1899.  
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[and] barricaded, and […] a general cessation of business had taken place throughout 
Johannesburg”.341 Ultimately, the Exchange was closed at 6pm on 3 October 1899.342 The 
war commenced officially on 11 October 1899. The Exchange remained closed for more than 
two years. 343  
The war had a peculiar effect on the Exchange. Although it still occupied the same building as 
before the war, the Exchange now found itself in a completely new political regime, as part of 
the British Empire. After reopening the Exchange, the Committee (or what was left of it) 
needed to resume the normal activities of the Exchange. On 14 December 1901, 
approximately 100 members and four Committee members met in the Exchange Hall for the 
first time after the war to decide the way forward. 344 In June 1901, the Exchange (as 
represented by Mr Berlandina) informed the press that Kitchener did not think the time was 
right to reopen the Exchange.345 The Exchange reopened on 17 December 1901, after “the 
Authorities […] granted the Johannesburg Stock Exchange permission to open for 
business”.346 At this point, the new High Commission had removed the veto on share dealing, 
paving the way for the resumption of normal trading on the Exchange.347 In terms of open 
transactions, it was discovered shortly after the war that no moratorium had been proclaimed 
which suspended open transactions. All time bargains, options, and other transactions 
effected before the closing of the Exchange in October 1899 were “taken to have terminated 
on the respective due dates, and differences paid as on those dates”.348 The assistance of 
other Exchanges, as well as the fact that no moratorium was proclaimed, facilitated the 
Exchange’s return to its ordinary business. On 24 December 1901 it was recorded that the 
High ‘Change was held at the Exchange, but no sales were recorded owing to the complete 
absence of any scrip in Johannesburg at the time.349 During the war, the Exchange was well 
represented in a variety of “irregular corps”, but those members paid a dear price for patriotism 
– they either lost their lives or their livelihoods.350 Those who continued their stockbroking 
business through other exchanges, at Cape Town and Maritzburg, returned to Johannesburg 
after the war and continued their business more or less uninterrupted.351 
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The most detrimental impact of the war was the poor communication infrastructure. After the 
war, the Exchange experienced difficulty getting its telegraphs through the Censor’s office 
within reasonable time.352 The Censor’s office only accepted Stock Exchange messages at 
certain times of the day, and the Johannesburg telegraph office was short staffed, causing 
major delays in telegraphic communication for Exchange members.353 Inbound messages also 
presented a challenge to the Exchange. The Exchange was only receiving daily cable 
messages from London once a week.354 At the time, the telegraph infrastructure of the 
Transvaal and Orange River Colonies remained under the control of military authorities.355 
The importance of stable communication infrastructure, however, remained clear to all 
involved. After numerous appeals for assistance, the Committee received a favourable 
response from the new government – “Lord Milner had represented the urgency of Exchange 
Telegraphic requirements to the Commander in Chief [of the Military], who had instructed the 
Director of the Army Telegraphs to do what he could to improve the present service”.356 The 
use of the share dealing supplement of Bramhall’s Comprehensive Cipher Code was 
authorised by the Press Censor’s Office by June 1902.357 On 12 July 1902, a letter was 
received from the High Commissioner, informing the Committee that cables labelled “Gamma” 
and bearing the signature of stamp of the Exchange Secretary would be allowed to be sent 
from Johannesburg and received in Durban and Cape Town, uncensored.358 Ultimately, on 
July 17, 1902, the censorship of telegrams (except press telegrams), was lifted.359 
The Exchange quickly resumed its former dominant position in the share dealing spheres, as 
well as the broader society of the Southern African colonies. Daily price lists were sent to the 
Bulawayo Stock Exchange from July 1902 onwards.360 As before the war, the Cape Town and 
Durban Stock Exchanges approached the JSE for technical advice on their operations on a 
number of occasions.361 As for its position in broader society within the Colonies, the Exchange 
easily settled into the new arrangements. Members of the Exchange contributed £972 (raised 
by Exchange member subscriptions) towards the Coronation festivities in honour of King 
Edward VII,362 and Victoria Day was retained as a Stock Exchange Holiday.363 Furthermore, 
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80 tickets were issued to Members of the Exchange to attend the Banquet for General 
Kitchener on 17 June 1902. The banquet was preceded by the entry of the Imperial Light 
Horse Corps into Johannesburg, “for inspection by General Kitchener”, an occasion for which 
the Exchange halted trading.364 Favourable sentiments towards the new political 
arrangements abounded. On 9 August 1902, the Exchange closed for the Coronation of 
Edward VII.365 As for the new king, the coronation signified a new era for the Exchange. 
4.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the early development of the JSE as an organisation, from the 
perspective of organisational legitimacy. The chapter considered whether the JSE met the 
expectations of its members and, to a lesser extent, the public, media, and state.366 It 
represents the first part of a broader exploration of whether the JSE and its rules, procedures, 
structures and symbols were acceptable or appropriate within its particular social context. The 
JSE’s role as a market intermediary (defined by its ability to provide efficient, regulated trading 
facilities) represented only the first layer of its legitimacy. Besides its ability to deliver such 
practical outcomes (pragmatic legitimacy), the Exchange’s legitimacy also rested on whether 
it could deliver socially valued consequences (consequential legitimacy), by appropriate 
trading procedures (procedural legitimacy) and structures (structural legitimacy), in a 
comprehensible and culturally justified way (cognitive legitimacy).  
At the time when the JSE was established, the young Johannesburg had a reputation as a 
place of disorder and gold-fuelled greed. It was a frontier settlement where each man fended 
only for himself. Thus, the founder of the Exchange, Benjamin Woollan, was anxious to 
promote the trustworthiness of the Exchange – to position it as a valuable component of 
industry. Similar to the LSE, the formation of the JSE as a self-regulating organisation was 
also a contradiction of the Hobbesian theory (as discussed in Chapter 1), which predicted that 
stock markets would only develop after the necessary regulation against fraud was in place.367 
Despite its self-regulation, however, by the JSE’s first birthday, the Committee of the 
Exchange was still viewed as grossly incompetent, and reports of fictitious values, worthless 
shares, defaults, and price manipulations abounded in the press. The Exchange’s inability to 
deliver the expected practical outcomes was evident, and thus also its lack of pragmatic 




366 At this point in its history, the Exchange was a fairly obscure and self-serving endeavour (or at least 
perceived to be). It mainly aimed its legitimation efforts at Exchange members, with some of these efforts 
simultaneously serving as legitimation efforts of the Exchange towards the public, media and the state. 
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legitimacy. The first major attempt to gain legitimacy was to align the Exchange rules with 
those of the LSE, in 1890. By introducing a better set of rules and procedures to govern 
trading, the Committee reduced uncertainty, and improved the protection of member interests. 
Thus, the new rules could be seen as an attempt to gain some degree of pragmatic legitimacy. 
The new rules also afforded the Exchange a degree of procedural legitimacy (in that its rules 
were aligned with those of the well-known and prestigious LSE).  
The most obvious hurdle in the way of the Exchange’s initial legitimation was the public 
perception of a relationship between share trading and gambling, as Woollan acknowledged 
during his inaugural speech. Although share trading could occur without a stock exchange, 
the presence of an exchange provided a degree of certainty. It also enabled the aggregation 
of the capital necessary for larger ventures. The speculation in shares (often perceived as 
gambling) was necessary for the existence of the primary market.368 Society did not perceive 
gambling favourably at the time. Thus, in an attempt to improve the Exchange’s moral 
legitimacy, the Committee sought to dissociate the Exchange from various forms of gambling. 
This was done by banning dices and other forms of betting at or near the Exchange. 
Unfortunately, it was not enough, and the gambling culture remained part of the Exchange for 
some time. It was well known to the public that besides speculating in shares, one could also 
bet on horses and partake in lottery draws at or near the Exchange building. Trading was also 
suspended on various occasions throughout the Exchange’s first decade to allow members to 
attend the local horse races. The Committee of the Exchange was, it seemed, a prisoner to 
the will of the Exchange members, making them somewhat powerless to effect the drastic 
change needed for the Exchange’s moral legitimation. 
The relationship between the Exchange and its owners, the Johannesburg Estate Company 
(under control of mining magnate Barney Barnato), also represented a significant hurdle 
towards legitimacy. After the takeover of the Exchange by the Estate Company in March 1889, 
significant tension became apparent. The Estate Company was interested only in maximising 
profit, while the Committee of the Exchange was more interested in the stability of the House. 
The Committee, lacking in absolute authority, was left all but powerless to address this. By 
1893, however, the Committee had started negotiating increased control over the affairs of 
the Exchange, which culminated in its independence by July 1897. By protecting the rights 
and livelihoods of Exchange members and the stability of the House from the negative 
influence of the Estate Company, the Committee won the respect of the Exchange members. 
In that process, the Committee also secured its autonomy and control of the Exchange. This 
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represented a significant development in the legitimation of the Exchange. With its 
independence came the ability to govern the Exchange effectively without outside influence, 
opening the possibility to gain some level of pragmatic legitimacy, particularly in the regulative 
sense. With the Committee’s autonomy confirmed, the creation of proprietary rights further 
aligned member interests with those of the Exchange as an organisation. This created an 
incentive for Exchange members to support legitimation efforts, since a lack of legitimacy 
would ultimately undermine the value of their proprietary rights and profit share. The 
Committee also sought to enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of members, by issuing audited 
financial statements of the Exchange to proprietary members and, later, full annual reports.  
After securing its autonomy and aligning member interests with those of the Exchange, the 
Committee set out to improve the regulation of the market. The Committee could only achieve 
this by ensuring that the rules were sound and comprehensive, that procedures existed for 
every transaction, and that rules could be enforced. An important function that rose to 
prominence at this time was its judicial function, which facilitated the settlement of disputes 
among members. The Committee’s judicial power to suspend non-compliant members 
strengthened its control over members significantly. The Exchange thus derived legitimacy 
from its structure, as a member-based organisation with a strong judiciary capacity, able to 
uphold the rules and general order. The Committee as a judicial entity also contributed to the 
Exchange’s moral legitimation, by administering justice amongst Exchange members, which 
also protected the investing public. As the Exchange continued its pursuit of legitimacy, the 
alignment of its practices with national legislation, with the assistance of the Exchange 
Solicitors, constituted its legitimation towards both the state (through compliance) and the 
public (through the protection of investors). 
The professionalisation of its membership represents another key theme in the Exchange’s 
legitimation efforts. After its establishment, the Exchange welcomed men from all stations, 
which contributed to its turbulent character during its early history. As the Exchange grew, the 
Committee imposed increasingly stringent barriers to entry to ensure that those admitted to 
membership were worthy of the responsibility it entailed. Prospective members had to be 
proposed and seconded by existing members, thus needing some social capital. A prospective 
member also needed significant financial capital to pay the rapidly rising entrance fees and 
subscriptions, as well as to provide sufficient sureties. Through these stringent requirements, 
the Exchange functioned as a closed organisation. Only members enjoyed the privileges of 
an insider, but the cost of such privileges was their submission to the control of the 
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Committee.369 Despite these barriers to entry, membership rose rapidly to the extent that that 
quarterly member lists had to be made available to the Committee as well as the Doorkeepers 
of the Exchange. Similar lists also had to be sent to local mines along the Reef, to distinguish 
JSE members from so-called “outside brokers”. The distinguishing factor that the Committee 
wished to highlight was that outside brokers were not subject to the control of the Exchange, 
a fact often advertised in local newspapers. The control over members and the ability to 
enforce the Exchange Rules represented essential components of the Exchange’s pragmatic 
(or regulative) legitimation. Furthermore, the barriers to entry and control over members 
contributed to the Exchange’s moral legitimation by ensuring that individuals of questionable 
moral character and standing would not be admitted to membership, and that members acting 
improperly would be held to account. 
Perhaps the most tangible medium for the Exchange’s legitimation was its Official List, the list 
of shares recognised by the Committee. The Committee’s inquiries into the legal status, 
working capital, financial standing, and general character of each applying company meant 
that the public and media often credited listed shares as carrying the Committee’s stamp of 
approval. In some way, the due care taken by the Committee (not least by requiring audited 
financial reports in the application for listings) contributed to the legitimation of companies 
listed on the Exchange, as well as the Exchange itself. Besides the scrutiny exercised by the 
Committee, this legitimation also resulted from the ease of trade implicit in an official listing, 
and the Committee’s protection afforded in case of disputes. Thus, the Exchange Rules and 
the authority of the Committee contributed to the Exchange’s pragmatic legitimacy, by 
providing certainty to investors in terms of procedure, delivery, and liquidity. While the Official 
List contributed to the pragmatic and procedural legitimacy of the Exchange, the lack of 
clearing facilities similar to those of the major exchanges at the time, detracted from its 
structural legitimacy. The establishment of a clearing house regularly resurfaced during 
discussions at the Exchange between 1891 and 1899. Unfortunately, the South African War 
stinted efforts to establish a clearing house, which would have brought the JSE up to standard 
with other major stock exchanges at the time.  
The most direct threat to the Exchange’s pragmatic and moral legitimacy was the number of 
defaults during the Exchange’s early history. If a member could not honour his transactions, 
he was declared a defaulter. While the Exchange had definite procedures to deal with defaults, 
the knock-on effect of default threatened the stability of the market. The press often depicted 
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defaults as scandals. This most likely detracted from the moral legitimacy of the Exchange in 
the eyes of the public, since the Exchange was often cast as the enabler of such reckless 
behaviour. After the defaulter’s affairs were concluded, and he was expelled from the 
Exchange, the Committee also informed other (associated) Exchanges of the default. This 
was a clear strategy to improve its moral legitimacy, by barring defaulters from merely 
transferring to another exchange and carrying on business there. Thus, sharing information 
with other Exchanges regarding defaulters served as a measure of justice amongst 
Exchanges for the protection of brokers and the investing public.  
Towards the end of the 19th century, the shifting political atmosphere in the ZAR threatened 
the legitimacy of the Exchange. In 1895, the rising dissatisfaction of the Uitlander (foreigner) 
population with their treatment by the ZAR government resulted in the Jameson Raid. 
Although many Exchange members were opposed to the Raid, the involvement of several 
members posed a significant threat to the Exchange’s pragmatic and moral legitimacy (at least 
from the perspective of the state). Fortunately for the Exchange, the Raid had no lasting effect 
on its relations with the state, which seemed to return to normal before the end of 1896. 
Unfortunately, however, the Jameson Raid was a precursor to tensions leading to the South 
African War in October 1899. As a complete deterioration of the institutional framework, the 
war threatened the legitimacy of the Exchange. A moratorium would hinder the Committee’s 
ability to exercise control over members, since it effectively suspended all transactions, as 
well as the agreement embodied by Exchange membership. The Exchange closed 
approximately one week before the declaration of war, and remained closed for more than two 
years. After the war, as society settled into the new arrangements under British control, the 
Exchange slowly resumed business. Thanks to the safekeeping of its records, the institutional 
memory of the Exchange remained broadly intact, and the Exchange was able to resume its 
former dominant position amongst the Southern African stock exchanges. 
By the time the war commenced, the Exchange had no doubt gained some level of pragmatic 
legitimacy, in its ability to facilitate share trading with relative efficiency and certainty. However, 
this had not yet translated into the moral and cognitive legitimation of the Exchange. 
Throughout this period, the Exchange enjoyed significant growth in its membership, listings, 
and its profit. The lack of legitimacy under which the Exchange (paradoxically) thrived was 
perhaps only a lack of moral and cognitive legitimacy. If it had completely lacked competence, 
and thus pragmatic legitimacy, it would certainly have failed, as had happened to other 
exchanges, such as those at Barberton and Kimberley.  
Despite the significant development of the Exchange during this period, a gap remained 
between its legitimation efforts and its public perception. The Exchange was still seen as an 
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oddity, a gambling house, a bunch of fools clamouring for material gain. It would take some 
time for the Exchange to become recognised and understood by the public, media, and 
government. The primary inhibitor of the Exchange’s legitimation was the lack of an investment 
culture amongst the general population of Johannesburg, which would lend cultural support to 
the Exchange’s operations and existence. Fortunately, through its improved ability to facilitate 
transactions in the market, and the capital it accumulated by 1902, the Exchange was ready 
for the next phase in its development.  
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Chapter 5 The Exchange from War to War, 
1902-1918 
‘Angin’ round in Pritchard Street, ‘Angin’ round the Square, 
‘Angin’ round the Stock Exchange an’ Station; 
I ain’t any use no more, Can’t get on the loose no more, 
There ain’t no excuse no more, Now it’s “How do, ‘BROTHER’ Boer.” 
Now there isn’t any war, Settle down to Peace an’ Law 
An’ the Coronation.1 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite its tumultuous youth, the Exchange emerged surprisingly stable and intact from the 
South African War. After the war, many young British men found themselves in Johannesburg, 
looking for a new livelihood, and settling down to peace and law, as captured by this poem 
which appeared in the Mafeking Mail in July 1902. The Treaty of Vereeniging, signed on 31 
May 1902, transformed the ZAR into the Transvaal Colony of the British Empire. After the 
devastating war, during which the Exchange had been closed for more than two years, the 
new political arrangement ushered in a crucial period of development for the Exchange. The 
business of the Exchange was, however, at that stage still affected by the aftermath of the 
war, which included delays in cable messages, and censorship.2 Hardly any business was 
transacted, due to the general scarcity of scrip and the poor telegraphic communication.3 
Notwithstanding poor trading conditions, the Committee embarked on its first significant 
undertaking soon after the war. In August 1902, the same month as King Edward VII’s 
coronation, excavations for the new Exchange building commenced. This signalled the end of 
the Exchange’s youth, and that it was becoming an institution in its own right. Although the 
Exchange emerged reasonably unscathed from the South African War, the post-war period 
would prove that a depressed market was far more detrimental to the Exchange than political 
instability. The financial pressure on the Exchange resulting from a listless market determined 
the course of the Exchange between the South African War and the Great War. 
  
                                                 
 
1 “’Angin’ Round”, Mafeking Mail, 5 July 1902. While the poem makes light of the devastation that the war 
caused, particularly due to the scorched earth policy of the British, it was mostly British men who gravitated 
towards the Exchange after the war. 
2 JSE/GC7:41. 
3 “Johannesburg Exchange”, Cape Daily Telegraph, 7 January 1902. 
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5.2 THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE EXCHANGE 
The Exchange’s prudent accumulation of capital before the war proved to be beneficial once 
the war was over. Armed with £21 000 in fixed deposit, the Committee set out to secure stands 
to erect a new Exchange building.4 In July 1902, the Exchange purchased several stands on 
Marshall Square for £22 750. Furthermore, the Proprietary Members of the Exchange 
authorised the Committee to raise “by bond, debenture or otherwise” a sum of not more than 
£125 000 for the erection of a new building.5 By public competition, the design “High Change 
No. 1” by eminent architects Leck and Emley was selected for the new building.6 Excavations 
for the new building commenced in August 1902.7 Occupying an entire block between Fox, 
Hollard, Main, and Sauer Streets, the building was “treated with red brick, dressed and rock-
faced stone dressings, mouldings, pilasters, ashlar”,8 and was described as being ornamented 
in the style of the Palace of Whitehall.9 Inside, the Exchange Hall (or trading floor) was 
surrounded by a total of 210 offices over three floors.10 The interior walls were “lined with 
marble and ornamental tile dado” while the columns were “scagliola with bronze bases and 
fine terra-cotta caps”.11 The new building also had a strong room with 294 safes, as well as 
Reading, Writing and Billiards Rooms for Exchange members.12 Although it was initially 
reported that the building had poor acoustics, which made verbal trading difficult, this was 
resolved by hanging large pieces of green baize (similar to that found on pool tables) in the 
Exchange Hall, and covering the floor with cork carpets.13 The foundation stone of the new 
building was laid by Lord Milner on 6 April 1903, and Milner was received by Exchange 
members in “morning dress”, including top hats, to celebrate the occasion.14 The building was 
occupied by December 1903.15 The cost of the building eventually came to approximately 
£125 000 and was financed through the issue of debentures in early 1903.16 The wealth that 
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Telegraph, 12 July 1902.  
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Randlord mansions. 
7 Montague Bell and Lane, A Guide to the Transvaal, 54; JSE/GC7:78; JSE/GC7:83; Henry Heathcote Statham, 
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8 Statham, New Stock Exchange, 353. 
9 Montague Bell and Lane, A Guide to the Transvaal, 54. The Palace of Whitehall was the main residence of the 
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11 Statham, New Stock Exchange, 353. 
12 Montague Bell and Lane, A Guide to the Transvaal, 54; JSE/GC7:254; JSE/GC7:326. 
13 JSE/GC8:181; JSE/GC8:326; JSE/GC8:466. 
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Speech”, Rhodesia Herald, 11 April 1903. 
15 Montague Bell and Lane, A Guide to the Transvaal, 54; JSE/GC7:310. 
16 JSE/GC7:93; JSE/GC7:99; JSE/GC8:247; JSE/GC8:250. 
137 
 
Exchange members had accumulated during the preceding years meant that the debentures 




Figure 5.1 | The New Stock Exchange plans 
Source: H.H. Statham, “New Stock Exchange, Johannesburg, S.A.” The Builder LXXXVIII, no. 3343 (1905): 353. 
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Figure 5.2 | The New Exchange Building17 
Source: Praagh, The Transvaal and its Mines, 270. 
While the Committee needed to raise only £125 000 through 1 250 debentures of £100 each, 
within one month, applications had been received for 1 819 debentures, or £181 900.18 
Eventually, the debentures were allotted to approximately 40 individuals, including prominent 
Exchange members such as George and Leopold Albu and the Farrar Brothers, as well as 
former and future Chairmen John Philip, Alphonse Sprinz, Matthew Dold, David Crombie 
Greig, and Andrew Mackie Niven.19 The debentures of the Exchange were officially listed in 
April 1903, and were soon being accepted as securities for Exchange members.20  
The jubilation surrounding the Exchange building and the general prosperity of members was, 
however, short-lived. After the Exchange took occupation of the building, the offices started 
filling up with tenants, both members and non-members.21 However, due to a deflated market, 
                                                 
 
17 A drawing of the new building, which appeared in the Rand Daily Mail of 12 May 1903 (“The New 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange”), shows the Union Jack hoisted above the main dome, symbolising its 
incorporation into the British Empire.  
18 JSE/GC7:93; JSE/GC7:103; JSE/GC7:109; JSE/GC7:111. 
19 JSE/GC7:112-113; Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 85. 
20 JSE/GC7:117; JSE/GC7:173; JSE/GC7:385. 
21 By March 1904, 103 offices were occupied, and this increased to 195 offices by 25 July 1904 (JSE/GC7:397; 
JSE/GC8:28). In May 1904, the market was described as “satisfactory” (“The Sharemarket”, Rand Daily Mail, 
16 May 1904). 
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many of the tenants in the new building departed throughout the latter half of 1904 and 1905, 
leaving the Committee with the difficult task of paying for and maintaining the building.22 
 
Figure 5.3 | The interior of the New Exchange Building 
Source: Statham, New Stock Exchange, 375. 
In September 1904, High ‘Change was described as “one of the most dreary ever experienced 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” with turnover being “miserably small”.23 In October 
1904, a Russian attack on British fishing vessels (thinking that they were Japanese torpedo 
boats) also placed “a most profound” downward pressure on prices.24 The market remained 
quiet throughout 1905, and by March 1906 the Exchange had to reduce operating costs, which 
included retrenchments.25 At this time, the Exchange made offices available to other 
organisations, such as the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), in an attempt 
                                                 
 
22 JSE/GC8:93; JSE/GC8:433; JSE/GC8:457-458; JSE/GC8:476-477; JSE/GC8:498-499; JSE/GC9:9-10; 
JSE/GC9:21-30; JSE/GC9:66-69; JSE/GC9:97-98; JSE/GC9:155. 
23 “The Sharemarket”, Rand Daily Mail, 2 September 1904.  
24 This is now known as the “Dogger Bank” incident. See “Russian Attack on British Shipping”, Bulawayo 
Chronicle, 29 October 1904. 
25 “The Rand”, Rand Daily Mail, 19 September 1905. See also JSE/GC9:155-157; JSE/GC9:146-147. 
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to increase rent income.26 By November 1907, however, market conditions remained poor, 
and many brokers could be seen enjoying playing diabolo after High ‘Change.27  
Towards the end of 1907, the Committee proposed the formation of a club in the basement of 
the Exchange Building, to increase revenue for the sake of covering debenture payments.28 
The Melbourne and Adelaide Stock Exchanges had successfully implemented a similar 
scheme. Through the scheme, these Exchanges managed to redeem their debentures and 
bring them out of financial difficulty.29 The new club would require a minimum of 750 members, 
and would be aimed at “business people in the neighbourhood” as well as “those Mine 
employees, who grudge or cannot afford the heavy Entrance Fees and Annual Subscriptions 
of other Clubs”.30 Ultimately, only 306 applications for membership were received, which 
meant that the new club would operate at a significant loss, placing further pressure on the 
financial position of the Exchange. Thus, it was decided to abandon the formation of a club.31 
Still, the Exchange had to endure mass cancellation of authorised and unauthorised 
clerkships, as many members returned to one-man stockbroking.32 The Committee even 
considered shutting down some of the lifts in the building, or selling the building.33 The most 
viable way of improving the financial position of the Exchange seemed to be the reduction of 
entrance fees in order to attract new members and, hopefully, more market activity. Desperate 
times forced the Exchange to admit 50 new members in May 1908, at a reduced entrance fee 
of 50 guineas, and a reduced surety of £500.34 A small number of new members was soon 
admitted. However, existing members protested, arguing that both the new entrance fee and 
security were completely inadequate, and that it was not in the best interest of the Exchange.35 
Unlike the rapid growth in membership the Exchange had enjoyed before the South African 
War, it took until March 1909 to admit 50 new members under the reduced fees.36  
An important shift in power resulted from the Exchange’s financial predicament. In light of the 
poor market conditions after 1905, the new debenture holders emerged as a powerful new 
                                                 
 
26 JSE/GC9:151; JSE/GC9:202. 
27 “Diabolo”, Rand Daily Mail, 1 November 1907. Diabolo is a game involving the spinning of hourglass 




31 JSE/GC10:96; JSE/GC10:97; Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 81. 
32 JSE/GC10:109-113; JSE/GC10:123; JSE/GC10:129-130. 
33 JSE/GC10:70; JSE/GC10:97-99. 
34 JSE/GC9:428-429; JSE/GC10:137; JSE/GC10:140. The normal entrance fee at the time was 100 guineas, and 
sureties normally amounted to around £2 000. 
35 JSE/GC10:165-166. 
36 JSE/GC10:330; JSE/GC10:344. This brought in approximately £3 755, relieving some of the financial 
pressure on the Exchange. 
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class of Exchange members, alongside the General Committee, and proprietary members of 
the Exchange. The debenture holders were heavily invested in the Exchange building, and 
thus also in the success of the Exchange. As the Exchange was unable to pay the coupon 
payments associated with the debentures, the General Committee requested a suspension of 
such payments for two years starting on 30 June 1908.37 By December 1908, the debenture 
holders accepted the suspension of payments on condition that all excess revenue be placed 
in a special account, and that payment be made immediately when the account showed a 
balance of £4 000. Furthermore, the Committee was prohibited from repurchasing any 
debentures or proprietary rights without the consent of the debenture holders.38 The General 
Committee accepted this unanimously, bringing them under the control of yet another party, 
after managing to gain independence from the Johannesburg Estate Company.39 The first 
payment (of £5 000) to the debenture holders was made on 31 December 1908.40 The 
Exchange managed to make similar payments on a semi-annual basis until June 1910, at 
which point the outstanding debenture issue stood at £50 000.41 The Committee was rendered 
powerless by the Exchange’s financial predicament and the power of debenture holders. Thus, 
it was unable to pay out any significant dividends to proprietary members.42 The remedy for 
this came in June 1910, when the Committee decided to replace the outstanding debentures 
with a bank loan, which would end the dominance of the debenture holders.43 After 
unsuccessfully negotiating with the Transvaalsche Bank,44 the Committee pursued a loan from 
the Scottish Union Insurance Company in London. However, the death of King Edward VII 
delayed the negotiations to some extent.45 The loan was negotiated on the basis that the Stock 
Exchange was a corporate body (not a “collection of persons”) and that the Scottish Union 
Insurance Company provide the insurance of the Exchange.46 The security for the loan 
included only stock exchange assets, thus creating no personal liability for Committee 
Members or Proprietary Members.47 Ultimately, the offer was accepted on 1 June 1910, and 
the Stock Exchange Debentures were deleted from the Official List on 3 September 1910.48 




39 JSE/GC10:80; JSE/GC9:475. Any new issues of debentures would have to be approved by current debenture 
holders. 
40 JSE/GC10:184-185; JSE/GC10:254. 
41 JSE/GC10:270; JSE/GC10:359; JSE/GC10:380; JSE/GC10:466; JSE/GC10:480; JSE/GC11:34. 
42 JSE/GC8:228. 
43 JSE/GC11:34. See also “Rand Police Courts”, Rand Daily Mail, 6 July 1910. 
44 JSE/GC11:66-67; JSE/GC11:80; JSE/GC11:85. 
45 JSE/GC11:101-102. 
46 Ibid. 
47 JSE/GC11:108; JSE/GC11:113. 
48 JSE/GC11:106; JSE/GC11:110; JSE/GC11:113; JSE/GC11:151. 
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Although the Committee regained control of the Exchange, market conditions further 
deteriorated. This significantly affected the annual profit of the Exchange, as shown in 
Figure 5.4. By the end of 1911, nearly half of the Exchange’s offices were empty.49 The 
Committee once more considered selling the building, this time to the Government.50 After a 
breakdown in negotiations, the plan was abandoned, but the Committee proceeded with 
retrenchments and a general reduction in costs.51 The Quotation of Companies Committee 
was also tasked with devising a plan to attract new listings to generate revenue.52 In December 
1911, the retiring Secretary of the Exchange expressed his parting wish that the “lengthy and 
heavy depression” would soon be over so that the JSE might return to its place among the 
“leading financial institutions of the world”.53 
 
Figure 5.4 | Annual profit of the JSE, 1902-1918 
Source: Constructed from JSE/GC7 – JSE/GC13.54 
Despite the good wishes of the former Secretary, the position did not improve. By early 1912, 
it was even proposed that the second floor be converted into an art gallery, or bedrooms.55 
After a wave of member resignations, the Committee decided in February 1913 to admit 
                                                 
 
49 JSE/GC11:268; JSE/GC11:291. 
50 JSE/GC11:268; JSE/GC11:274. 
51 JSE/GC11:274; JSE/GC11:275; JSE/GC11:297. 
52 JSE/GC11:276. 
53 JSE/GC11:322. 
54 In 1906, the Exchange’s year-end was changed from March to December (JSE/GC9:213). 
55 JSE/GC11:340; JSE/GC11:364; JSE/GC11:480. In April 1912 the market was described as “weak” (“Local 
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another 50 members at reduced entrance fees and securities, as well as to admit members of 
Colonial Exchanges at a reduced rate. While the latter was overturned by a vote of the 
proprietary members, fearing a further depression of business, the Committee reduced 
entrance fees and securities for 50 new members, hoping that it would stimulate business and 
market liquidity in Johannesburg.56 As before the South African War, the Exchange’s 
prosperity depended on the number and quality of its members. The poor market conditions, 
however, placed significant pressure on members, forcing many to leave the profession.  
5.3 EXCHANGE MEMBERSHIP 
After emerging from the South African War, the Exchange sought to restore order to its 
operations, and regain control over its members. Since Exchange members were increasingly 
politically active in the wake of the Jameson Raid and the South African War, the Committee 
decided that no Stock Exchange official could hold office in any association (political or 
otherwise) without its consent.57 Furthermore, the Committee ruled that members would be 
liable for expulsion if they became affiliated with any other stock exchange.58 Members were 
also held responsible if their clerks were dealing at other exchanges.59 Applicants for 
membership and clerkship were interviewed to ensure that they were not invested in any non-
Exchange business, did not owe money to any Exchange member, and did not belong to any 
other exchange.60 Members were also not allowed to advertise, and the public was informed 
that no advertising broker was a member of the JSE.61 These efforts at the professionalisation 
of its membership coincided with the retirement of the Exchange’s first Chairman, Benjamin 
Woollan, in April 1904.62 Along with the new building, this signalled the end of the Exchange’s 
youth. In June of the following year, the Exchange Solicitors captured the Exchange’s new 
focus when advising the Committee on the Exchange rules. The guiding principle for the 
interpretation of any rule of the Exchange, according to the Solicitors, was “that the Stock 
Exchange is a Club, the Members of which owe to each other the greatest good faith”.63 By 
                                                 
 
56 JSE/GC11:455-456; JSE/GC11:461-463. 
57 JSE/GC7:57; JSE/GC10:460. Exchange member (and later Sir) William St. John Carr was Mayor of 
Johannesburg (JSE/GC7:332). Chairman H. Solomon served on the Legislative Council in Pretoria 
(JSE/GC7:308). D.C. Greig served on the Town Council and Exchange Committee (JSE/GC7:208). 
58 JSE/GC7:64; JSE/GC7:89; JSE/GC8:157. Initially, it was proposed that no member be allowed to transact 
with members of other exchanges in Johannesburg, but this proposal was lost, most likely due to the 
Committee’s desire to maintain some market liquidity in light of the depressed market conditions. See also 
JSE/GC8:121; JSE/GC8:128; JSE/GC8:130; JSE/GC8:134; JSE/GC8:157. 
59 JSE/GC9:393; JSE/GC9:397-398; JSE/GC9:402-403. 
60 JSE/GC8:103; JSE/GC8:111; JSE/GC8:117; JSE/GC8:212. 
61 JSE/GC8:364; JSE/GC10:337; “Gambling Evil”, Rand Daily Mail, 1 May 1909.  





ensuring that members acted in good faith towards each other, the Committee also secured a 
degree of stability in the market. In cases where members had not acted in good faith, the 
Committee had measures in place to minimise the effect. Besides the rules governing every 
transaction, the Committee also retained surety bonds of former members until they were 
satisfied that no further claims would or could be brought against them after expulsion or 
resignation.64 Members also had to apply to resign, and notice was given of a member’s 
intention to resign, in order to give other members time to bring any claims against such 
member under the attention of the Committee.65  
Besides the shift towards professionalisation and good faith, the most significant consequence 
of the South African War was that the Exchange found itself in a socio-political environment 
aligned to the nationality of the majority of its members. After the war, the Exchange started 
actively engaging with its new socio-political environment, and England was frequently 
described as “home” in the Exchange records.66 The Exchange purchased stationery, clerk 
badges, and towels marked “Stock Exchange” from London (“from home” in the minutes).67 
Furniture for the new building was purchased in and shipped from London.68 Insurance policies 
with “foreign companies” were left to lapse, and insurance was procured from “good English 
Companies”.69 In terms of its social engagement, the Exchange was represented at several 
events involving prominent British personalities. Exchange members were, for instance, 
invited to a banquet for Sir Arthur Lawley in late 1902.70 Towards the end of 1902 and early 
1903, the Committee was also involved in representations to Joseph Chamberlain, at the time 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as well as to the Town Council, regarding the country’s 
post-war economic position.71 Subsequently, the Town Council invited the Exchange to help 
organise a banquet celebrating Chamberlain’s visit to South Africa.72 Ultimately, 89 members 
of the Exchange received tickets to attend.73 Chamberlain was asked to lay the foundation 
stone of the new Exchange building, but he “was of the opinion it would be inadvisable for 
political reasons”.74 Chamberlain was, however, received at the Exchange on 16 January 
1903, during High ‘Change. The Hall was decorated for the occasion, and nearly 1 300 people 
                                                 
 
64 JSE/GC9:52-53; JSE/GC11:139. 
65 JSE/GC9:52-53. 
66 JSE/GC7:388; JSE/GC9:49; JSE/GC9:135. 
67 JSE/GC8:85; JSE/GC8:88; JSE/GC9:135; JSE/GC9:173; JSE/GC9:49. 
68 JSE/GC7:311-312; JSE/GC7:335; JSE/GC8:54; JSE/GC8:56-59; JSE/GC8:63. 
69 JSE/GC8:403. 
70 JSE/GC7:32. 
71 JSE/GC7:61-62. Eventually it was decided that each public body should make their own representations to 
Chamberlain, as they saw fit (JSE/GC7:71; JSE/GC7:90). 
72 JSE/GC7:63. 
73 JSE/GC7:63; JSE/GC7:66; JSE/GC7:71; JSE/GC7:73. 
74 JSE/GC7:75. Ultimately, Lord Milner laid the foundation stone of the new building. 
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were welcomed into the Exchange Hall.75 In mid-1903, the Exchange hosted a walking 
competition from Johannesburg to Pretoria. The prize-giving ceremony was held in the 
Exchange Hall, with Lord Milner handing prizes to the winners of the race.76 Later in 1903, 80 
members of the Exchange made their way to the Wanderers Hall to attend a banquet for Milner 
before his departure for Europe.77 On his return from Europe, the Committee was also invited 
to attend his welcoming.78 The Exchange also closed for the visit of Prince Christian of 
Schleswig-Holstein in September 1904, the reception of Lord Selborne at the Wanderers 
Grounds in May 1905, the inspection of volunteers by the Duke of Connaught in January 1906, 
and the visit of Admiral Sir Percy Scott and the British Squadron in 1908.79  
After the discovery of “a large diamond of good quality” weighing over 3 000 carats, at the 
Premier Transvaal Diamond Company in January 1905, the Exchange wrote a letter to the 
Company asking that the diamond be exhibited in the Stock Exchange.80 This request was 
declined, “owing to the restrictions regarding insurance of the diamond”.81 This was, of course, 
the Cullinan Diamond, which was later cut into several stones for the Crown Jewels of the 
United Kingdom.82 Members of the Exchange also collectively enjoyed British pastimes. In 
October 1902, for instance, the General Committee meeting was cancelled due to the “visit of 
the Australian Cricketers”.83 Members of the JSE played cricket against members of the 
Commercial Exchange in 1908 and 1911, and against the Johannesburg Country Club in 
1909, for which the Exchange closed early.84 
The Exchange also increasingly aligned its practices with the new legal environment. In 1903, 
after several court rulings on share transactions, it was found that some of the Exchange rules 
were at variance with English common law. With the assistance of the Exchange Solicitors, 
37 rules were modified for the sake of compliance.85 When a court case came to the attention 
of the Committee in October 1905, regarding the effect of broker insolvency on open 
transactions (Koenigsberg v. Taylor, 1905), the Exchange Solicitors informed the Committee 
                                                 
 
75 JSE/GC7:75; JSE/GC7:81; JSE/GC7:83-85. 
76 JSE/GC7:202; JSE/GC7:206; JSE/GC7:208; JSE/GC7:224. 
77 JSE/GC7:229. 
78 JSE/GC7:285. 
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82 Sir Thomas Cullinan, after whom the diamond was named, was admitted as a member of the Exchange in 
April 1904 (JSE/GC7:424, JSE/GC7:438). 
83 JSE/GC7:35. 
84 JSE/GC10:352; JSE/GC10:100; JSE/GC11:190. 
85 JSE/GC9:293-294; JSE/GC9:296. 
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that the judge had followed the principles established in the English courts. The Solicitors also 
argued that an appeal would be futile since the Supreme Court would also follow the same 
principles established in the English courts.86 Similarly, in April 1907, when a case was heard 
about a broker’s liability to his client after the default of the other principal, English common 
law, as well as judgment by English courts and the rules of the “English Stock Exchange”, 
were taken into account.87  
The Exchange also showed its reverence for British royalty. The birthday of King Edward VII 
(9 November) was, for instance, declared a stock exchange holiday.88 When the news of his 
death was received in May 1910, the members of the Exchange decided “unanimously” that 
the Exchange should be closed in honour of the late King.89 Members also requested that the 
Exchange be closed on the day of the King’s funeral.90 The Exchange collectively sent the 
following cable to Queen Alexandra: 
Madam, the members of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange beg most respectfully to 
tender to your Majesty their expression of deep sympathy on your recent bereavement. 
They pray that the remembrance of the National and worldwide benefits conferred by King 
Edward through his conduct and example, may bring comfort to your Majesty in this hour 
of sore trial. They fervently trust that King George may long be spared to follow in his 
illustrious father's footsteps, to the benefit of the Empire, and to Your Majesty's 
consolation.91 
In this new socio-political environment, the Exchange membership grew to its largest number 
since its establishment. Between 1903 and mid-1905, the Exchange boasted nearly 500 
members, approximately 400 of whom were proprietary members.92 This large membership 
necessitated a clear hierarchy on the Exchange floor. As in London, unauthorised clerks now 
had to wear distinguishing buttons on their jackets to show that they were not authorised to 
trade.93 Such clerks were also not allowed to sit in the ring or on the benches during High 
‘Change.94 The growth in membership also necessitated stringent entry requirements. 




88 JSE/GC7:41; JSE/GC8:121; JSE/GC10:263.  
89 JSE/GC11:91-92. See also “South African Tributes”, Bulawayo Chronicle, 13 May 1910. Queen Victoria died 
during the time the Exchange was closed for the South African War, therefore no record of such action in the 
case of her death.  
90 JSE/GC11:91-92; Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 83. 
91 JSE/GC11:91-92. A reply was received from Queen Alexandra, dated 11 May 1910, which read "Queen 
Alexandra sends you her sincere thanks for your kind message of sympathy in her sorrow" (JSE/GC11:98). The 
Exchange also closed for the coronation of King George V on 22 June 1911 (JSE/GC11:251). 
92 Montague Bell and Lane, A Guide to the Transvaal, 55.  




Applicants for membership had to be proposed and seconded by existing members of the 
Exchange, who had held membership for at least six months, and had to be over the age of 
21. Furthermore, the names of applicants were posted on the notice board for at least seven 
days, to allow existing members to express any objections against their admission. After being 
personally examined by the Candidates Examining Committee, members were elected by a 
two-thirds majority ballot of the General Committee.95 Despite its large membership at the 
time, poor market conditions placed downward pressure on the membership of the Exchange 
from 1905 onwards. Membership declined from 398 in January 1902 to 268 in December 
1918, representing a 33% decline in Exchange membership, as shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5 | Number of Exchange members, 1902-1918 
Source: Constructed from JSE/GC7 – JSE/GC13.96 
Notwithstanding the shift in the socio-political environment and the fragile market conditions, 
the Exchange still closed for Jewish97 and Christian98 holidays. The Chairman and members 
of the Exchange were also invited to attend the laying of the foundation stone of the Fordsburg 
Hebrew Congregation in April 1906,99 and the Witwatersrand Hebrew Benevolent Fund held 
its annual meetings in the Exchange boardroom from 1915 to 1917.100 The requests for Jewish 
holidays give some approximation of the Exchange’s Jewish membership. In 1902, for 
                                                 
 
95 “Gambling Evil”, Rand Daily Mail, 1 May 1909. 
96 The membership of the JSE neared 500 by mid-1905 (Montague Bell and Lane, A Guide to the Transvaal, 
55). See also “Gambling Evil”, Rand Daily Mail, 1 May 1909. 
97 JSE/GC7:246; JSE/GC8:64; JSE/GC9:488; JSE/GC10:236; JSE/GC10:449; JSE/GC11:158; JSE/GC11:293; 
JSE/GC11:409; JSE/GC12:181; JSE/GC12:405; JSE/GC13:1; JSE/GC13:91. 
98 JSE/GC7:65; JSE/GC7:184; JSE/GC8:271; JSE/GC8:342; JSE/GC9:194; JSE/GC9:396; JSE/GC10:107; 
JSE/GC10:346; JSE/GC11:14; JSE/GC11:247; JSE/GC11:372; JSE/GC12:360. 
99 JSE/GC9:207. 
100 “Witwatersrand Hebrew Benevolent Association”, Rand Daily Mail, 27 July 1915; “Witwatersrand Hebrew 
Benevolent Association”, Rand Daily Mail, 25 July 1916; “Witwatersrand Hebrew Benevolent Association”, 






































































































































































instance, 100 members signed a petition requesting the Exchange to be closed on Jewish 
New Year.101 Normally the Exchange closed early or did not open at all on many occasions, 
at the drop of a hat. However, by late 1906, the Exchange found itself occupying a more central 
role in the lives of Johannesburg's financiers and brokers. Thus, the Committee decided in 
October 1906 that it would not entertain petitions for Stock Exchange holidays, unless such 
petitions were submitted to the Committee well in advance of the proposed holiday, “excepting 
in cases of emergency arising out of unforeseen circumstances”.102 In 1910, the Exchange 
holidays were limited to a small number of public, Christian and Jewish holidays.103  
Between 1902 and 1918, the proprietary members represented an important body of members 
within the Exchange. When the proprietary rights of the Exchange were established in 
November 1897, each right was sold for £20, and 469 rights were created.104 Throughout 1903 
and 1904, the Committee repurchased and cancelled several proprietary rights in an effort to 
increase the value of the rights.105 By August 1904, only 401 proprietary rights remained in the 
hands of Exchange members.106 As a result of the declining revenue of the Exchange and the 
demands of the debenture holders, the Committee struggled to pay out any significant 
dividends to Proprietary Members.107 Thus, it was decided in July 1905 that members could 
hold two rights, but that it would still represent only one vote. The number of members holding 
two rights was also limited to 100.108 The Chairman pointed out that many members were 
forced to sell their proprietary rights due to the “present condition of the market”.109 Some 
changes were, therefore, necessary to protect members. To stimulate demand for proprietary 
rights, the Committee decided in November 1907 that members could hold up to five 
proprietary rights, but that voting power would be limited to two votes.110 Despite their efforts, 
this did not create the anticipated demand for proprietary rights. The only remedy was to make 
proprietary rights compulsory for new members. By early 1913, amid its financial woes, the 
Committee decided that all individuals admitted to membership must hold at least one 
                                                 
 
101 JSE/GC7:22. In 1907, 106 members signed a similar petition (JSE/GC9:488). 
102 JSE/GC9:320. 
103 JSE/GC11:247. The Exchange only recognized the following holidays: “New Year’s Day, Good Friday, 
Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Victoria Day (24 May), Union Day (31 May), King’s Birthday (first Monday in 
August), Day of Atonement (Jewish), first Monday in October, Dingaan’s Day, Christmas Day, and Boxing 
Day, and on such other days as shall be specially ordered by the Committee or proclaimed by the Government 
as Public Holidays” (JSE/GC11:247). 
104 Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 79. See also JSE/GC8:47. 
105 JSE/GC7:336; JSE/GC7:394; JSE/GC8:38. 
106 JSE/GC8:47. In total, only 411 rights existed. This meant that only 10 rights were available for purchase by 
prospective members. 
107 JSE/GC8:228. 
108 JSE/GC8:378; JSE/GC8:387. 




proprietary right, which had to be obtained within six months of admission.111 This decision 
made proprietary rights a tool to align the interests of individual members with those of the 
Exchange. However, the value of rights only started appreciating by September 1915.112  
 
Figure 5.6 | Average proprietary right value, 1902-1918 
Source: Constructed from JSE/GC7 – JSE/GC13. 
The proprietary rights indicated the desirability of Exchange membership – they showed what 
applicants would pay for the privilege of membership.113 Thus, the value of proprietary rights 
is perhaps the most reliable indicator of the challenging conditions within which the Exchange 
had to operate after 1905. The proprietary rights also served as additional security in case of 
default. For this reason, the Committee strongly objected when it was found that certain 
members pledged their proprietary rights to banks as securities, arguing that only the 
Committee had the power to alienate a right.114 When the value of proprietary rights was high, 
this contributed to the safety of the market, but as the 20th century marched on, the value of 
the proprietary rights declined significantly. This is shown in Figure 5.6. 
                                                 
 
111 JSE/GC11:466-467. This was embodied in Rule 56a, and did not apply to “Banking, Trust or other 
[companies]” (JSE/GC13:25).  
112 Proprietary right dividends amounted to £2-10-0 for 1911 (JSE/GC11:320), £2-10-0 for 1912 
(JSE/GC11:442). No dividend was declared in 1913 (JSE/GC12:64), and the Exchange was closed in December 
1914 when the next dividend was to be declared. The next dividend was only paid in December 1916, of £2-10-
0 (JSE/GC12:431). As the market and the Exchange recovered slowly, a slightly larger dividend of £3 per right 
was paid to proprietary members (JSE/GC13:26) and by December 1918 the proprietary dividend was “left in 
the hands of the Finance Committee” (JSE/GC13:116) and thus not recorded in the minutes. 
113 All members admitted from 1913 onwards were required to hold at least one right. 














Through its alignment with the new socio-political environment under British rule, its increased 
control over members, and the professionalisation of its membership, the Exchange slowly 
emerged as an important public institution. However, the poor market conditions meant that 
default remained a threat to the stability of the Exchange and the market. 
5.4 MEMBERS IN DEFAULT 
Despite the stringent admission requirements and high sureties, default remained a significant 
threat to the Exchange after the South African War. Less than a year after the war, the 
Exchange experienced its first significant default when member Edwin Rush defaulted on 
transactions totalling £4 808.115  
After the war, the number of defaults generally increased until 1909, owing to poor market 
conditions. From 1910 onwards, however, the number of defaults declined significantly. 
Comparing the number of defaults before and after the war, there was approximately 1 default 
per 100 members every year in the period 1890 to 1898, as compared to 1.2 defaults per 100 
members annually during the period 1902 to 1909. From 1910 to 1918, this declined to 0.6 
defaults annually per 100 members.116 This is shown in Figure 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.7 | Number of defaults, 1890-1918 
Source: Constructed from JSE/GC2 – JSE/GC13. 
While it is notably uncommon throughout the early history of the Exchange, such defaults often 
sent ripples of panic and further default throughout the market. Naturally, it was a priority for 
                                                 
 
115 JSE/GC7:47; JSE/GC8:316. From December 1904, the particulars of defaults were no longer recorded in the 
minutes of the General Committee, instead being recorded in Default Minute Books, which no longer exist. 
































































































































the Committee to keep defaults under control. Thus, a new rule was formulated in March 1903, 
which prohibited members from making any arrangements with creditors once they had 
informed the Committee that they were unable to meet their engagements.117 The most likely 
reason for this was to ensure that members first settled their debts with other Exchange 
members before settling with outside parties, thereby ensuring that no further defaults 
occurred which would destabilise the market. Later, in May 1903, one case of expulsion was 
reported in the local newspapers, which gave some insight into the Committee’s stance 
towards defaulters. The former member, Albert Herzberg, brought a claim against the 
Committee for damages of £10 000, citing unlawful expulsion from the Exchange.118 According 
to the JSE records, Herzberg had arranged with his creditors to avoid default, which was 
prohibited by the rules of the Exchange, resulting in Herzberg’s expulsion.119 The Cape Daily 
Telegraph reported that Herzberg had engaged in “rash speculation, purchasing shares when 
he knew he could not meet them, obtaining loans from members which he knew he could not 
repay, issuing cheques on the day of his default, and gambling heavily on the race course on 
the day the cheques were dishonoured”.120 Ultimately, judgment was handed down in favour 
of the Exchange, with costs, against Herzberg.121 While the case likely detracted from the 
Exchange’s legitimacy, its victory over the former member sent a clear message about the 
status of defaulters in the Exchange, and the Committee’s attitude towards credit 
arrangements. 
Given the poor market conditions, the Committee maintained a strict attitude towards credit 
arrangements. In May 1905, the prohibition of credit arrangements was expanded so that no 
unsecured loan between Exchange members for longer than two days would be considered 
in the distribution of a defaulter’s Exchange assets.122 This was done to prevent members from 
using such loans to obscure their imminent default.123 The Committee had far fewer qualms 
about secured loans between members, since such loans were protected by scrip or other 
securities deposited by the borrower.124 These rules would prove vital in 1908 when it was 
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reported by former Chairman D.C. Greig that many potential defaults in the market were 
obscured by credit arrangements or compromises between members (a practice that had been 
prohibited since 1903).125 Furthermore, members who knew such potential defaults had failed 
to inform the Committee, which was required by the rules.126 After his complaint, the Exchange 
rules were revised to prohibit any compromise or credit payments on account, which most 
likely contributed to the high number of defaults in 1909. The revised rules also provided that 
any money received as part of a compromise should be paid to the Committee, to contribute 
towards claims against the defaulter.127 Such credit arrangements occurred again in late 1909 
when several members were censured and required to post fresh securities for two years, 
after making compromises with their creditors to avoid default.128  
The market was still under pressure by late 1911 and early 1912, forcing members to post 
additional sureties, the value of which had declined due to the general downward pressure on 
the market.129 By early 1914, the situation had not improved, in part due to the brewing 
hostilities in Europe. Members were reminded that they were prohibited from dealing on behalf 
of defaulters, and a new rule was introduced which authorised the Committee to announce 
default or cessation of membership in the press “as they deem fit” and to inform the Secretaries 
of South African exchanges, as well as the LSE.130 Once a member had defaulted, he found 
himself before a closed door at the Exchange. The Doormen of the Exchange were instructed 
not to call members at the request of former members who had been declared defaulters.131 
Members were also cautioned not to deal with, or on behalf of, former members who had been 
declared defaulters.132 The threat of default and the resultant shame proved too much to bear 
for some, pushing some brokers to commit suicide.133 As before the war, the Secretary 
maintained a list of defaulters, for the information of Exchange members.134 In the Exchange’s 
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emergence as a public body, however, the Exchange Solicitors highlighted that the list was 
“very dangerous” and would “expose the Exchange to an action for libel by the persons whose 
names were entered in it”.135 The Solicitors advised that the Exchange would be liable for the 
accuracy of the list, but at the same time conceded that the list was useful for the protection 
of members. Thus, the Solicitors recommended that members inform the Secretary in writing 
of any complaints or instances of dishonourable conduct, and that the Secretary file such 
letters. Upon inquiry, the Secretary could then disclose only whether complaints against a 
particular person had been made, but not the details of such complaints.136 The increasingly 
strict attitude of the Committee towards default coincided with a renewed focus on control over 
the market, and thus the instruments traded in the market. A stable, well-regulated body of 
members would be of no use if the market were flooded with instruments of questionable origin 
and value. 
5.5 THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL LISTS  
The legitimacy of the market remained a concern to the Committee after the South African 
War. The most direct form of control the Committee had over the legitimacy of the market was 
its control over the Official List of the Exchange. Thus, in January 1903, a newly formed sub-
committee undertook the process of revising the Exchange’s quotation rules. Several 
companies had been refused a quotation, on account of their lack of importance and poor 
shareholder protection, although the rules contained few specific provisions. The revised 
quotation rules were intended to provide the Committee and companies applying for a 
quotation with more specific listing procedures and requirements.137 After a new draft 
Company Law was submitted to the Legislative Council in April 1903, however, the 
implementation of the revised quotation rules was postponed until its promulgation.138 In the 
meantime, however, in a bid to strengthen its control over the market, the Committee ruled in 
February 1904 that members were not allowed to deal in shares that were not officially quoted 
or granted a special settlement.139 After the promulgation of the new Company Law, several 
rules were introduced in March 1905, including the following: 
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Subject to such Rules & Regulations as may from time to time be framed, the stock or 
shares of any Company or Association may be admitted to the Official List of the Stock 
Exchange, provided such Company or Association is, in the opinion of the Committee of 
sufficient magnitude and importance.140 
The revised quotation rules gave the Committee the power to obtain “all information possible 
[…] as the Committee may require to establish the bona fides” of companies applying for 
listing.141 Through the stringent quotation process, the Committee’s value originated from its 
role as a provider of information. While it did not guarantee the success of any listed company, 
the Committee provided members (and thus their clients) with “all information necessary and 
available with regard to any company granted an official quotation”.142 All applications were 
posted in the Exchange Hall for seven days, along with information on the capital, directors, 
property and assets of the company, for the information of members.143  
The Committee started quoting working capital shares (as opposed to the entire capital of a 
company) by 1905.144 At this point, the Official List included a large number of instruments, 
including a variety of mining and financial stocks, as well as municipal and water loans.145 The 
size of the market did not, however, ensure its legitimacy. In a guide published by the South 
African Association for the Advancement of Science in 1905, it was noted that “[s]ome gold-
mining companies […] have not put a spade into the ground. They are created for the purpose 
of raising capital with which to speculate in the shares of gold-mining companies that do work. 
Naturally, the shareholders have no objection to this course, so long as good dividends are 
paid; but it hardly seems legitimate business to the outside world”.146 Notwithstanding the 
report, an official quotation still afforded a share some level of credibility, or legitimacy.147 Even 
the prospect of quotation implied the bona fides of a company to potential investors. Thus, 
many companies declared in their prospectuses that they intended to apply for quotation on 
the JSE.148 
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Besides working capital shares, the Exchange also made use of special settlements, for a 
brief period, between 1903 and 1906. Instead of granting an official listing, the Committee 
sometimes elected to grant a special settlement to less popular shares.149 When the 
Committee realised that significant business could be generated by allowing such shares 
some official recognition, it was decided to institute special settlements, similar to the practice 
existing in London at the time.150 On the LSE, special settlement was subject to less exacting 
requirements than an official listing.151 This was also the case at the JSE. Despite its strict 
requirements for official listing, the requirements were relaxed for special settlement 
applications. In fact, the Committee reserved the right to exercise their discretion on a case-
by-case basis, since no definite working capital requirements existed for special settlement.152 
Instead of the settlement at regular intervals associated with official listings, the special 
settlement would take place on a particular day, as determined by the Committee.153 The 
Committee also informed the London, Cape Town, Durban, Maritzburg and Bulawayo 
exchanges when a particular special settlement date had been confirmed.154 In certain cases, 
shares officially quoted on the JSE would be granted special settlement on the LSE.155 
Unlike the LSE, which did not exercise much scrutiny of the special settlement applications,156 
the General Committee indeed examined each application thoroughly, even interviewing the 
applicants about their business model.157 Applications for special settlement were not 
considered in cases where the company in question had not done sufficient physical work to 
justify a valuation of such company.158 As with an official listing, companies applying for special 
settlement had to prove its “property and position”.159 A special settlement lent some credibility 
to the share in question, much like an official quotation, since it came under the control of the 
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Exchange. A special settlement did not, however, guarantee the standing of the shares.160 In 
fact, during the Secretary’s visit to London in November 1905, the Secretary of the LSE’s 
Share and Loan Department advised him that “it was most undesirable that the public should 
grow to take the view that […] Settlement […] conferred as it were, a stamp of guarantee by 
the Committee of the soundness and stability of that Company”.161 The LSE Secretary 
emphasised that the LSE saw their duty as only to facilitate business by enabling the 
conclusion of such transactions between members.162  
After hearing the Secretary’s report on London practices, it was proposed that a special 
settlement be granted based solely on whether there was sufficient trading activity in a 
particular share, and that further investigations should only be performed in case of fraud 
allegations. After some discussion, however, the Committee decided to retain its more 
rigorous approach to special settlements, most probably for fear of damaging its reputation in 
case fraudulent transactions came to light.163 Through the granting of special settlements, the 
Committee attempted to bring the significant volume of trade in unlisted shares under its 
control. By June of 1906, however, the Committee had come to terms with the LSE practice 
of granting special settlements with much less scrutiny and investigation. Thus, the Committee 
informed members of the Exchange that the practice of enquiring “into the merits of such 
Companies” would be abandoned and that special settlements would be granted where 
sufficient trading activity could be proved.164 This proposal was challenged by some of the 
Committee members, who saw the scrutiny as a way to ensure “the genuineness” of such 
applications.165 This was a challenging decision for the Committee, since the reckless granting 
of special settlements could impair the legitimacy of the Exchange. The heated disagreement 
about the role of the Exchange in granting special settlements led to the resignation of the 
Exchange’s Chairman, who found himself “entirely out of sympathy with the Committee in the 
matter”.166  
Ultimately, after much disagreement, it was decided to revise the rules of the Exchange to 
bring any share dealt at the Exchange under the jurisdiction of the Committee, not only those 
shares granted an official quotation or special settlement.167 The newly revised rule, which 
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was accepted on 16 July 1906, also abolished special settlements.168 Essentially, the 
Committee chose the integrity of the market over financial security. The market was extremely 
depressed at the time, and the Exchange stood to generate significant revenue from fees 
relating to special settlements, and yet declined this for the sake of retaining strict control over 
the instruments, which were associated with, and traded at, the Exchange. By February 1909, 
however, in a bid to increase the revenue of the Exchange, the Committee decided 
(unanimously) that shares not quoted on the Official List might be admitted to an Unofficial 
List on payment of five guineas per annum.169 The Committee realised that some official 
recognition provided the shares on the unofficial list with some measure of legitimacy, and that 
the income from unofficial quotations would bring a welcome relief from the financial pressures 
endured after 1905. Between 1902 and 1918, the number of listed instruments increased only 
during 28% of all months, compared to 49% of all months between 1890 and 1902.170 As is 
shown in Figure 5.8, the Exchange experienced a significant decline in listings between 1902 
and 1918, as compared to the period before the South African War. Delisting was also more 
commonplace after 1905.  
The reduced number of new listings, combined with poor market conditions and the burden of 
the new Exchange building, contributed to the financial instability of the Exchange. As a result, 
the Committee sought ways to stimulate Exchange business. After 1910, this was achieved 
through the listing of government stocks, although this did not result in a significant increase 
in listings until 1917. When the government made these stocks available to the Post Office, 
the Exchange quickly offered to quote them free of charge.171 The JSE consulted with the 
Cape Town Stock Exchange on the terms under which government stocks were quoted in 
Cape Town.172 The Cape Town Exchange informed the JSE that government stocks were 
quoted free of charge, but that the old Cape government, and later the Union government, had 
informed them “that they did not care whether Stocks were quoted or not”.173 Nonetheless, the 
Public Debt Commissioner accepted the offer to have Union Stocks quoted free of charge.174 
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After some negotiations, the brokerage rate was reduced from ¼% to 1/8% for Union Stocks, 
and the rules regarding brokerage were amended to accommodate government stocks within 
its scope.175 In June 1917, the Committee considered the quotation of several colonial stocks, 
at a nominal fee of 50 guineas (instead of charging for each stock).176 The Public Debt 
Commissioner declined, however, stating that the fee was not justifiable due to the limited 
dealings in the stocks. Nonetheless, the Commissioner appealed to the Committee to quote 
the stocks, arguing that it would improve demand for such instruments.177 By September 1917, 
another attempt was made to quote certain Cape stocks.178 This time, the Secretary for 
Finance was happy to cover the cost, and several stocks were quoted on 23 October 1917.179  
Through its authority over the Official List, as well as the creation of the Unofficial List, the 
Committee exercised significant control over the instruments traded in the market. This was a 
marked departure from its earlier history, and an essential component of its legitimation 
between the South African War and the First World War. Its strict control over the market (even 
beyond Johannesburg) meant that the JSE was the dominant force amongst the stock 
exchanges of South Africa. 
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5.6 RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER EXCHANGES 
The relationships that the JSE had cultivated with other exchanges before the South African 
War persisted once the war was over. As before the war, the Committee informed the 
exchanges at London, Cape Town, Durban, Maritzburg, and Bulawayo when members 
defaulted or were expelled.180 Several local exchanges often contacted the JSE for technical 
advice on transactions.181 Sometimes, when disputes arose between members of other 
exchanges, the JSE adjudicated and frequently asked the Exchange Solicitors to confirm their 
legal opinion with Counsel.182 Although the Exchange had not gained legitimacy in the 
broadest sense at this point, it seems to have been considered the leading exchange in 
Southern Africa. Despite its status, however, the JSE had to endure a new irritation after the 
war – the emergence of local exchanges in close proximity.183 The Open Call Exchange (also 
in Johannesburg) represented a significant irritation to the Committee, particularly when JSE 
members were found dealing there.184 The Rand Daily Mail reported in May 1904 that large 
crowds were attending the two daily calls at Macnamara’s Open Call Exchange.185 The JSE, 
however, had secured its status as the legitimate share market in Johannesburg. It was 
reported in March 1907 that “No Call Exchange can be a permanent institution which lends 
itself to [directors puffing their own stocks]. The legitimate market, that is stocks registered 
and listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, are after all the best investments”.186 
Macnamara’s Open Call Exchange was not the most trustworthy of enterprises, although it 
tried to convince the public in a variety of ways. Macnamara’s logo, for instance, shows a 
lighthouse representing the Open Call Exchange, rising triumphantly from “The Sea of 
Speculation”, as shown in Figure 5.9. However, its doubtful character remained apparent. The 
Open Call Exchange offered significantly fewer mechanisms for investor protection than the 
JSE. Its sole proprietor, John Macnamara, was also a furniture salesman and real estate 
agent.187 Those opposed to the dominant position of the JSE did, from time to time, appeal for 
a public stock exchange. The limited (and expensive) membership of the JSE meant that it 
was not accessible to the public. This could be circumvented by a public stock exchange, 
according to one proponent, so that each investor “could be the guardian of his own 
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interests”.188 However, such appeals did not result in much meaningful change. The JSE 
retained its dominant position amongst the stock exchanges of Southern Africa. 
 
Figure 5.9 | Macnamara’s Open Call Exchange 
Source: “John Macnamara & Co.”, Rand Daily Mail, 13 Jul 1908. 
Despite its dominance, the poor market conditions after 1905 forced the Exchange to protect 
its business against competition more aggressively, even from exchanges further afield. In 
September 1906, the Committee decided to amend the Exchange rules to enforce a minimum 
brokerage of 0.5% on contracts of £50 or more, and five shillings on contracts of less than 
£50.189 After the amendments came into effect, the Maritzburg Exchange wrote to the JSE in 
protest. The Committee simply replied that the Cape Town Stock Exchange had a similar rule 
under consideration, and took no further action.190 The protest seems to stem from the fear 
that the minimum brokerage would prevent JSE members from sharing brokerage with the 
Maritzburg brokers as commission for new business.191 It was, perhaps, an attempt by the 
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JSE to force investors further afield to deal directly with JSE members. The Maritzburg 
Exchange also protested the expulsion of their members from the JSE during their visit to 
Johannesburg. A new rule was proposed, which would allow the members of “recognised 
Stock Exchanges” to be visiting members for one calendar month, but Exchange members 
rejected the proposed rule by 72 votes to 21.192 It was clear that the Exchange members 
wanted to shield their business from outside competition, especially during challenging trading 
conditions brought about by the post-war depression.  
In July 1909, the issue of brokerage re-emerged, when the Pretoria Stock and Share Brokers 
Association appealed to the Committee to allow shared brokerage between members of the 
JSE and the Association.193 According to the Association, the strict enforcement of the 
minimum brokerage made trading prohibitively expensive, and its members would lose certain 
clients to the JSE.194 Having only seven members or member firms, the Association did not 
have the stature to convince the Committee of the benefits of a partnership.195 The only way 
to transact business at lower brokerage was for non-members desirous of such lower 
brokerage to become members of the JSE themselves.196 Hence, by strictly enforcing the 
minimum brokerage, the Committee was encouraging non-members to become part of the 
Exchange and thus to fall under the jurisdiction and control of the Committee. This commission 
structure remained in force until 1912, when the Committee revisited the matter after the LSE 
had made some modifications to their commission structures, effectively bringing the 
brokerage charged in Johannesburg in line with that of London and Melbourne.197 The 
modification of brokerage scales brought about some displeasure from the Cape Town Stock 
Exchange. The Committee of the Cape Town Stock Exchange argued that their business, as 
well as that of JSE members dealing in Cape Town, would suffer due to the higher brokerage. 
Like the Pretoria Association, the Cape Town Stock Exchange proposed shared brokerage, 
particularly for smaller transactions (under £50), but the Committee did not accede.198 The 
Committee encouraged members of the Cape Town Stock Exchange to apply for JSE 
membership, to take advantage of lower brokerage rates.199 In some way, the poor market 
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conditions that forced the Exchange to become more exclusive also contributed to its control 
over the market. 
As other local exchanges looked to the JSE for guidance, the JSE also looked to the LSE at 
times of uncertainty.200 Once the JSE had regained its footing after the war, it sought to 
strengthen its relationship with the LSE. Thus, the Committee informed the LSE that “this 
Committee anticipates during the next few years the flotation of a large number of new 
companies and the reconstruction of others and in order to protect the interests of speculators 
and investors generally, considers that the co-operation between the Committees is 
advisable”.201 The Committee of the JSE requested that the LSE inform them of any 
application for official listing that was refused, as well as the reason for such refusal, adding 
that such communication would be kept confidential.202 The LSE did not reciprocate, however, 
stating that they were not able to comply with the request.203 Nonetheless, the Committee still 
followed the LSE closely when revising rules,204 improving the transferring system,205 dealing 
with rumours and false information in the market,206 and revising the specifications of surety 
bonds.207 JSE members were also anxious to remain informed of London prices.208 After the 
war, the Committee established a Benevolent Fund “on the same lines as obtained in London 
House” to enable them to make contributions to charity.209 When visiting London in 1905, the 
Secretary of the JSE visited the LSE to enquire about the administration of their Benevolent 
Fund.210 Subsequently, a letter addressed to JSE members pointed out that such a fund had 
been successfully established by the LSE many years earlier “and has proved a great benefit 
to many who, without its existence, would have been left destitute”.211 Besides donations to 
charity, the funds could also be applied in aid of “members who have been incapacitated from 
conducting their business, also late members who, in the opinion of the Committee shall be 
deserving of assistance, and widows and children of deceased members”.212 The 
establishment of the Benevolent Fund could be seen as an attempt to strengthen the 
                                                 
 
200 JSE/GC8:32; JSE/GC8:77-78; JSE/GC8:400; JSE/GC9:73; JSE/GC9:216; JSE/GC9:427; JSE/GC10:156; 




204 JSE/GC7:51; JSE/GC7:292; JSE/GC7:323; JSE/GC10:305. 
205 JSE/GC7:83; JSE/GC10:276. 
206 JSE/GC7:201. 
207 JSE/GC7:376; JSE/GC7:449; JSE/GC7:451. 
208 JSE/GC10:251-253; JSE/GC10:266; JSE/GC11:163; JSE/GC11:169. 
209 JSE/GC8:406; JSE/GC10:348; JSE/GC10:356; Bettington, The Story of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
210 JSE/GC8:406; JSE/GC8:472. 
211 JSE/GC10:468. 
212 Ibid. See also JSE/GC10:462.  
164 
 
Exchange’s moral legitimacy from the perspective of current and former Exchange members, 
as well as that of the general public. 
Through its dominance over other local exchanges, and its alignment with the practices of the 
LSE, the Exchange positioned itself as the centre point of share dealing in Johannesburg and, 
by extension, South Africa. Thus, the Exchange increasingly focused its efforts in service of 
the public. 
5.7 THE EXCHANGE AS A PUBLIC BODY 
In many ways, the relationship between the JSE and other exchanges acted as a catalyst for 
its transition from a private concern to a public body. In taking action on behalf of other 
exchanges, the JSE was not acting exclusively in the best interests of its members, but 
increasingly in service of the broader investing public. Before the war, the Exchange had often 
been viewed as a self-serving, private club. However, as it moved into the public sphere after 
the war, the Exchange was increasingly viewed as a symbol of economic progress, thus also 
subject to increased external influence and scrutiny. As early as 1900, the Exchange was 
described as “the most sensitive barometer of peace and war”.213 It was also described as a 
“barometer of South African prosperity” in 1905.214 The shift from private to public significantly 
influenced the Exchange’s ways – it was no longer only accountable towards its members, but 
also towards a growing community of investors. 
Several episodes in the Exchange’s post-war development illustrate its refocusing towards the 
public. In 1904, for instance, the Committee considered the implications of the death of a 
member or principal for a transaction before the maturing of the transaction. A new rule was 
formulated, allowing the Committee to close such transactions at official prices, or to determine 
prices when official prices were not available on a particular day, on the day of maturity.215 
Crucially, the Exchange Solicitors advised that the new rule should not only apply to Exchange 
members but to every person. This was because the English courts had, towards the turn of 
the century, increasingly enforced the rules of the LSE on the public “and consequently the 
Courts here should follow their example, and carry out your Rules”.216 Contrary to earlier 
perceptions of the Exchange, it was now being viewed as an organisation where all who dealt 
with it were bound by its rules and regulations.217 In a dispute between members of the Durban 
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and Cape Town exchanges (where the JSE adjudicated), William Schreiner argued in January 
1904 that broker’s notes were issued under the rules of a particular Exchange, and the 
principal, being represented by the broker, would be bound by such rules “because his 
broker’s knowledge in the matter is his own knowledge”.218 
As this transition unfolded, the Government took an increasing interest in the JSE. In 
April 1907, the Chief Inspector of Revenue requested information from the Committee 
regarding the annual turnover of share transfers at the JSE, the proportion of bearer shares 
intended to be registered and held, the proportion of local and international business effected 
through the Exchange, and the procedures for settlement used by the JSE.219 The purpose of 
this request was to investigate ways of increasing tax revenue, through an ad valorem tax of 
3/8% on all transactions (which, according to the Chief Inspector, would result in tax revenue 
of approximately £40 000).220 The Committee objected to such a tax as “far too heavy”, arguing 
that the stamp duty was a sufficient tax. The Committee also argued that the tax would drive 
business away, to London. After hearing their arguments, the Chief Inspector decided not to 
pursue the tax, but the Exchange was now within the Government’s gaze.221 Little over two 
years later, however, after the findings of the Gambling Commission, the new Stock and Share 
Dealing Act of 1909 brought the Exchange under the ambit of the Government authority.222 
This is discussed in the next section.  
Stamp duties represented an important interface between the government and the Exchange. 
Shortly after the war, the Stamp Duties Amendment Proclamation imposed a duty on loan 
capital issues, payable before the issue.223 However, according to the Exchange Solicitors, 
this was not applicable to the Exchange, and thus had little impact on its operations.224 By 
February 1911, however, stringent stamp duties were applied to broker’s notes and 
marketable securities, much to the frustration of the Exchange given the poor market 
conditions.225 The new stamp duty amounted to one shilling for broker’s notes under £100. 
Broker’s notes over £100 would be taxed a further 6d for every additional £100. Marketable 
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securities were also subject to stamp duties.226 Before this announcement, broker’s notes only 
required a one shilling stamp, with no charge for effecting transfer. The new stamp duty was, 
therefore “a serious matter for the future welfare of the Stock Exchange”.227 Thus, the 
Chairman and Secretary met with the Chief Inspector of Revenue in March 1911 to request a 
more lenient course of action.228 Through the meeting, and later negotiations with the Colonial 
Treasurer and Minister of Finance, the Committee managed to secure a new stamp duty scale, 
as shown in Table 5.1.229 
Table 5.1 | Stamp duties on broker’s notes from 1 July 1911 
Value of transaction on broker’s note Stamp duty payable230 
£25 and under 1d 
Between £25 and £100 6d 
Between £100 and £500 1/- 
Over £500 (For every £500 and part thereof) 1/- 
Maximum  £5 
Source: JSE/GC11:217, 220-221. 
Soon afterwards, the Committee received communication from the Cape Town Stock 
Exchange, the Chamber of Mines, and the African Banking Corporation, regarding the 
implementation of the new stamp duties. The Cape Town Stock Exchange enquired how to 
apply the new duties to shares that were not lodged for transfer.231 After consulting the 
Receiver of Revenue in Johannesburg, the Committee advised Cape Town that registration 
would not be compulsory, and that scrip could thus “float about as at present”, further advising 
them how to implement the new requirements.232 There was some disagreement, however, 
about what constituted transfer. The Cape Town exchange viewed it as transfer of ownership 
in the books of the company in question, while the Receiver of Revenue viewed transfer simply 
as one party handing scrip to another.233 The question was whether every transaction would 
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be liable to transfer duty (by stamping the relevant document), or only transactions where 
change of ownership took place in the records of the relevant company.234 After further 
discussions with Inland Revenue to clarify the implementation of the new stamp duties, the 
Chairman informed the Committee that all transactions were subject to transfer duty. However, 
the Exchange Solicitors challenged this interpretation, arguing that transfer duty was only 
payable upon change of ownership.235 Ultimately, the Government acknowledged that, 
although a duty on all transactions was desirable, it would be “impossible to collect”.236 As in 
England, stamp duties would only be levied upon change of ownership, from the ultimate buyer 
who desires to register the shares in his name.237 Transactions completed before 1 July 1911 
(when the new duties came into force) would be registered free of any duty, if accompanied 
by an affidavit or broker’s note proving the date of the transaction.238  
Through its engagement with the Government, the Exchange ensured that trade in the many 
instruments on its official list would remain uninhibited by excessive duties – a feat that a small 
band of rogue brokers would never have managed. However, the Exchange’s increasingly 
prominent position in society, supported by its recognition as a barometer of economic 
progress, and its regulation through the Stock and Share Dealing Act of 1909, meant that it 
was increasingly visible and subject to scrutiny. Thus, through its emergence as a public body, 
the Exchange needed to focus on improving investor protection, and protecting the integrity of 
the market. 
5.8 STRENGTHENING MARKET INTEGRITY 
Despite attaining some level of pragmatic legitimacy before the South African War, the 
Exchange still needed to convince various audiences that it was legitimate on a moral level. 
The need for its moral legitimation, particularly towards the public and the state, was brought 
about by its increased visibility after the war. Thus, the Committee set out to strengthen the 
integrity of the market (and thus the Exchange’s moral legitimacy) in two ways. First, by 
strengthening its control over the market, and second, by attempting to dissociate the 
Exchange from gambling. In an effort to gain control over all the transactions associated with 
the Exchange, the Committee had ruled before the war that unquoted shares could no longer 
be dealt during High ‘Change. In December 1902, however, it was proposed that the 
Committee no longer recognise any transactions in unquoted shares. Such shares were dealt 









extensively outside the Exchange, between the chains. While associated with the Exchange 
in the public mind, such transactions were not under the control of the Committee.239 After 
“ascertaining the feeling of Members”, however, the motion was withdrawn.240 The Committee 
had the difficult task of ensuring control over the market without further depriving members of 
their livelihood, in light of the poor market conditions. Extensive street dealing between the 
chains was reported during the Christmas holidays of 1902. The Committee ruled that any 
member found to be engaging in street dealing would be suspended. The Committee also 
arranged to have a stock exchange official on duty on Exchange holidays to ensure that no 
street dealing took place.241 By 1905, however, this remained a nuisance for the Committee, 
to the extent that members were again threatened with suspension, or expulsion.242 The risk 
for the Exchange was that the Committee had no control over the instruments traded, or the 
method of transaction. Furthermore, the shares were traded on the sidewalk, where various 
forms of gambling occurred. 
As it struggled to gain control over the market, the Exchange also struggled to dissociate itself 
from gambling.243 Although playing cards in the Exchange games room was prohibited in 1904, 
the Exchange still closed on account of the horse races that took place in Johannesburg.244 In 
1905, however, certain members expressed their frustration at the closing of the Exchange for 
non-business occasions such as race days. One member turned over an inkpot on a petition 
to close the Exchange for yet another race day.245 The time was opportune for the Committee 
to tighten its control over the market, for 1905 was characterised by several questionable 
transactions, which threatened the legitimacy of the Exchange. In March 1905, the Committee 
learnt that a member of the Exchange (and his outside partners) had been buying shares of 
Southern Reefs Limited on the market until only a few were available. The member then 
entered into a transaction with other members who “sold short and were unable to buy on the 
market”, resulting in a large profit for the member in question.246 Another member reported 
this to the Committee, adding that “if no enquiry is made we shall have other schemes of the 
same kind, which cannot fail to bring the Stock Exchange into great disrepute”.247 The member 
who reported the matter to the Committee soon withdrew his letter under pressure from an 
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interested party. However, after pressure from the Committee, the member revealed further 
information, prompting an investigation.248 The outcome of the investigation is not recorded, 
but such transactions certainly threatened the legitimacy of the Exchange. Not long 
afterwards, the theft of several share certificates from the Rooderand G.M. Company Ltd. by 
the Company Secretary was reported in the local newspapers, prompting the General 
Committee to take action. According to the Stock Exchange Solicitors, the stolen certificates 
which had been endorsed in blank would still be good delivery. This posed a moral dilemma 
to the Committee, since it would be difficult to hold any bona fide buyers of such shares 
responsible for buying shares from the Company Secretary, in whose custody the shares had 
been legitimately placed by the shareholders.249 A complicating factor was that the shares 
changed hands so frequently that the registered owner of the shares in the records of the 
company did not always correspond to the real owner at a particular point in time. Companies 
would only stop transfer if instructed by the registered owner, or if the legal holder of the shares 
successfully obtained an interdict from the Court.250 The Committee had to find the difficult 
balance between protecting the integrity of the market, and ensuring that no defaults resulted 
from dealings in stolen scrip. 
It was only by 1909 that the Exchange would, somewhat ironically, rid itself of the association 
with gambling, through an enquiry of the Gambling Commission. The Commission was 
formed, amongst other things, to regulate and control horseracing, to restrict betting and 
wagering, and to regulate the information disseminated about such enterprises. It furthermore 
aimed to “suppress more effectually all forms of lottery” within the Colony and, bearing out the 
unwavering connotation between gambling and share dealing, also to consider whether 
legislation should be introduced to regulate stock and share dealing “by the general public in 
places not specially licensed for that purpose”.251 In his appearance before the Gambling 
Commission in Johannesburg, the Chairman of the JSE stated: 
Every member is bound by the rules and regulations, which now are or may be for the time 
being in force, and is entirely under the control of a committee of fifteen, elected by ballot 
by the members of the Stock Exchange. The committee have the entire management and 
control of the affairs of the Stock Exchange, including the regulation of the transaction of 
business in the Stock Exchange, the admission, expulsion or suspension of members and 
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their clerks, the hearing of and adjudication upon disputes between members, or members 
and their clients, the investigation of and adjudication upon all charges by whomsoever 
made, affecting the character or dealings or any member; the manner and conditions 
subject to which the business of the Stock Exchange shall be transacted, and the conduct 
of the persons transacting the same. […] As far as possible the rules and regulations are 
framed on similar lines to those of the London Stock Exchange.252 
The Chairman pointed out to the Commission that by adjudicating in disputes, the Exchange 
Committee provided the “outside public” with considerable protection in all transactions with 
Exchange members.253 The Chairman also emphasised that the Exchange’s primary function 
was “to see that every bargain made in the house is carried out in accordance with the rules 
and regulations of the Stock Exchange”.254 After presenting an official statement to the 
Commission, and cross-examination by the Commission, the Chairman informed the 
Committee that the Gambling Commission raised only two points – sureties, and sharing of 
brokerage with outside brokers.255 In comparison with the requirements of the LSE, the 
Commission ultimately agreed that the amount and period of sureties required by the JSE 
were sufficient.256 Concerning the sharing of brokerage, the Chairman informed the 
Commission that the Exchange rules were sufficiently clear, and that outside brokers were 
treated as clients.257 The Committee wanted to preserve its control over the Exchange 
members, by not distinguishing between outside brokers and ordinary clients. Thus, JSE 
members remained the only brokers recognised by the Committee. Due to the efforts of the 
Chairman and Committee and the recommendations of the Gambling Commission, the 
resulting Stock and Share Dealing Act of 1909 favoured “the interests of the Stock 
Exchange”.258 The Commission’s most pertinent recommendation was that all stock 
exchanges needed to be licensed. According to the Commission, such licences should be 
granted only if the Government was satisfied “as to the stability of the enterprise and the rules 
and regulations under which the business is to be carried on, which your Commissioners 
suggest should be on similar lines to those at present in force in Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange”.259  
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The Commission held out the JSE as the exemplary stock exchange, and with its two-decade 
heritage and experience, no rival exchange could compete. The new bill imposed significant 
barriers to entry for rival exchanges, and placed pressure on so-called bucket shops “which 
were responsible to nobody and which no doubt had done a great amount of harm”.260 John 
Macnamara, who operated the Open Call Exchange, objected to the new bill, arguing that it 
gave the JSE a monopoly “to the exclusion of numerous outside brokers, many of whom are 
just as respectable and solvent as the best of their brethren inside the House”.261 Macnamara 
argued that most JSE members were not operating under sureties, since the JSE only required 
sureties for the first two years of membership.262 His objections, however, fell on deaf ears, 
and the JSE continued unchallenged as the dominant stock exchange in South Africa. Despite 
initial fears, the inquiry by the Gambling Commission actually strengthened the legitimacy of 
the Exchange, through its ability to withstand scrutiny in the public realm. The Exchange also 
received favourable coverage in the press during the Gambling Commission proceedings. It 
was reported that nearly £2 million in capital had been raised for various well-known mining 
companies “and it is safe to say that if the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had not been in 
existence this amount could not have been so easily provided”.263  
Despite a significant strengthening of its public standing through the activities of the 
Commission, by 1912, the Exchange still had to endure the occasional jibe. During an illicit 
liquor court case in May 1912, the magistrate told the accused “If you were a clever thief you 
would not be caught”, to which the accused’s solicitor replied, “He would have to be on the 
Stock Exchange to do that”.264 The Exchange took great exception to this comment (which 
also appeared in the newspapers) but was informed by the Exchange Solicitors that a case of 
libel could not be brought against the solicitor in question “in as much as a corporate body 
could not be libelled”.265 Nonetheless, the Exchange gained significant legitimacy following the 
investigation of the Gambling Commission, and emerged as the dominant force amongst the 
stock exchanges of South Africa. Unfortunately, tension brewing towards the north would soon 
have the Exchange fighting for its survival.  
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5.9 THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
On Friday 31 July 1914, little more than a month after the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo, and three days after the commencement of the war, the Exchange 
records first mention the crisis brewing in Europe. On this day, the Committee met to discuss 
the news that the LSE had closed until further notice.266 The Chairman highlighted that “the 
position was considered extraordinarily serious to warrant such a drastic step” and informed 
the Committee that he invited the managers of the local banks, as well as the Exchange 
Solicitors, to attend the meeting in order to decide whether to close the JSE.267 The bank 
managers thought it would be wise to close the JSE, in light of the LSE’s closing.268 The next 
day, on 1 August 1914, the Committee met again, and decided (in light of the NYSE’s closing) 
to close the JSE for the protection of members and the public.269 The Committee recognised 
the hardship that closing the Exchange inflicted on its members in depriving them of their 
livelihood. However, the Committee understood that if the Exchange remained open, it would 
become “the dumping ground for stocks from all parts of the world”, which would ruin many 
more people.270 Despite the closing, the Exchange building remained open as a Club, and the 
Committee continued meeting regularly to attend to matters arising from the closing of the 
Exchange (such as non-delivery of shares, and dividend payments).271 The closing of the 
Exchange added further pressure to its financial position. Rent for offices occupied by 
Exchange members was reduced to one-third of normal rent, as well as subscriptions.272 
As the market ground to a halt, the Committee had to find ways to prevent a complete collapse. 
Within days of closing, the Finance Committee of the Exchange submitted four proposals. 
First, that interest may be charged where stocks were not taken up, to allow members carrying 
stocks to recoup some of the carrying costs.273 The Exchange Solicitors advised that this was 
not within the powers of the Committee, since a new rule would have to be formulated and 
this would not be possible since the Exchange was closed.274 Second, the Committee 
proposed that a seven-day grace period be allowed for the delivery of scrip, once the 
Exchange reopened.275 The Exchange Solicitors supported this proposal, in that it represented 
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merely the suspension of a particular rule and not the creation of an altogether new rule.276 
Third, it was proposed that all options expire on the first day of re-opening.277 The Exchange 
Solicitors deemed this proposal unnecessary, since the existing rules made sufficient 
provisions for the expiry of options.278 Finally, the Committee proposed that the strict 
enforcement of the rules should be suspended temporarily.279 The Committee also worked 
with the Victoria League, and the Education Department, to distribute used newspapers to 
“distant country readers” where reliable news was not readily available. This was to discourage 
panic and reduce the number of “misrepresentations” and “absurd rumours” about the war.280 
Without accurate and reliable news, the spread of rumours would create panic through the 
country, and this would be detrimental to the financial market. 
The indefinite closure of the Exchange created particular problems relating to time-dependent 
transactions such as options. A letter from an Exchange member, regarding call options, 
demonstrates one instance of such difficulty. The member pointed out that “it was unfair that 
consideration received for a 30 or 60 days Call should entitle the purchaser to an option for 
an indefinite period”.281 The Committee conceded that the position involved hardship, but that 
such action was inevitable.282 Besides the hardship created by the inadvertent extension of 
options, Exchange members were also frustrated that they would not be allowed to charge 
interest on stock not taken up, after the Exchange Solicitors declared that such provisions 
were not within the power of the Committee.283 Members argued that it was “a distinct hardship 
upon members to be compelled to carry scrip for an indefinite period without being able to 
charge a reasonable rate of interest”.284 The only solution that the Committee could conceive 
of was to order members to charge interest, and to confirm such action through the Court, 
through a test case.285 The Committee was so desperate to assist the members in the 
abnormal circumstances that they were willing to move beyond their legal powers and hoped 
to ratify their resolution later, for the sake of their members' protection and liquidity. On 6 
October 1914, the Committee sent a cable to the LSE, asking if it could give a “probable date 











285 JSE/GC12:189; JSE/GC12:192-193. Interest was to be charged on transactions that matured during the time 
the Exchange was closed, and such interest would be allowed on ordinary transactions, options, and loans, at a 
rate of 8% per annum. 
174 
 
of re-opening”,286 to which the LSE simply replied “No”.287 At more or less the same time, a 
notice was posted in the Exchange informing members that “…it would be wise to transfer into 
their own names, shares registered in the names of ‘aliens’, as the London Stock Exchange 
would shortly issue a notice fixing a date after which they would cease to be good delivery”.288 
The Exchange also established a volunteer corps during this time, and volunteers met to “drill 
in the Hall”.289 The effects of the geographically distant war had made its way into the 
Exchange Hall.  
After hearing the test case in the Witwatersrand High Court in early November 1914, Justice 
Bristowe ruled that the Committee’s order to charge interest was ultra vires, and thus not within 
the power of the Committee.290 The Judge did, however, recognise that it was a “reasonable 
proposition” and recommended that the Committee approach the government to validate the 
resolution through a proclamation in the Government Gazette under Martial Law.291 Thus, on 
9 November 1914, the Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of Finance, James Leisk, in 
Pretoria, requesting that either the resolution be enacted through a proclamation, or that the 
Committee be given powers through a proclamation to enact the resolution. The Committee 
added that similar powers were granted to the Committee of the London Stock Exchange.292 
Leisk soon replied that the unusual character of the request necessitated further investigation 
as to whether Martial Law could be applied.293 Despite the Exchange’s shift in focus towards 
serving the public, and its regulation under the Stock and Share Dealing Act of 1909, Leisk 
did not acknowledge the Exchange as a public body. Instead, he described the Exchange as 
“a very limited section of the community”.294 Leisk pointed out that the Government would be 
reluctant to employ Martial Law to aid the Committee in their “embarrassed situation” since 
Martial Law was only used to protect the “general community and for the maintenance of 
order”.295 He did, however, express his sympathy with the Committee’s proposal that interest 
should be allowed, and invited a deputation to discuss the matter.296  
On 24 November 1914, a four-man deputation from the Exchange made their way to Pretoria 
to consult with Leisk.297 After the meeting, Leisk agreed to draft a proclamation allowing the 
















Committee to pass certain resolutions necessitated by the war. Leisk also requested that the 
Exchange should not reopen without the consent of the government, but conceded that 
“consent would not be withheld in the event of the London Exchange resuming business”.298 
Leisk seemed to understand the gravity of the Exchange as a public body. The proclamation 
would ensure stability in the market, and protection of the Exchange members against the 
hardship caused by the closing of the Exchange. Two days later, however, Leisk informed the 
Committee that the Crown Law Advisers objected to the proclamation. The Crown Law 
Advisers argued that the proclamation would indebt certain Exchange members to others, 
which would not be the case under normal circumstances, and that this would not be 
recognised by ordinary civil courts when Martial Law was lifted.299 Thus, the Secretary for 
Justice, Jacob de Villiers Roos, suggested that the Committee should suspend the rule 
requiring a notice period for new rules, which would enable it to pass a new rule without 
reopening the Exchange.300 The Chairman did not agree with this interpretation, and urged 
Leisk to proceed with the proclamation.301 Thus, on 7 December 1914, Leisk proposed to the 
Committee that a Martial Law regulation be submitted to the Minister of Defence, and then 
published in the Government Gazette. This would give the Committee powers to enact new 
resolutions in general (rather than having government enact the resolutions on the Exchange’s 
behalf and thus incurring some liability in the matter).302  
The Martial Law regulation was published in the Government Gazette on 11 December 1914, 
giving the Committee the power to pass resolutions regarding the conditions of settlement 
upon the reopening of the Exchange, and the charging of interest on transactions which 
matured during the time the Exchange was closed.303 Ultimately, after all the trouble the 
Committee went through during this time, the Chairman informed the Committee on 15 
December 1914 that the Paris, New York, and Canadian Exchanges had re-opened, and that 
the LSE was expected to re-open on 2 January 1915. The Government, as well as the 
managers of the various banks, all expressed their approval of the reopening of the Exchange. 
Thus, the Exchange reopened on Monday, 4 January 1915.304 The original resolutions on 
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interest were passed, and the strict enforcement of the Exchange rules was suspended for six 
months after reopening to allow matters to return to normal.305  
Once the Exchange reopened, it faced a new challenge. In January 1915, the Chairman of 
the Exchange brought Rule 9 of the LSE Emergency Rules to the attention of the Committee. 
This rule provided that securities would only be good delivery on the LSE if they had remained 
in the possession of British subjects since 30 September 1914.306 The JSE, and 
Johannesburg, in general, was home to many individuals who might have been considered 
enemy subjects, so the implications of this rule represented a major threat to the stability of 
the market.307 Despite the potential destabilisation of the market, the JSE decided to follow 
suit. Sellers of shares were thus required to declare that (“to the best of their belief”) the shares 
in question had been in the physical possession of British subjects since 30 September 1914 
and had not been in enemy ownership since such time.308  
In the days after the sinking of the Lusitania, on 7 May 1915, very little business was transacted 
on the Exchange.309 As the attack on the Lusitania fuelled anti-German sentiment globally, 
and in South Africa, similar sentiments made their way to the Exchange.310 In May 1915, the 
Committee posted a notice at the Exchange, as well as in the press, whereby enemy subjects 
were asked not to enter the Exchange “during the continuance of the present war”.311 It was 
initially proposed that the words “enemy subject” should be replaced with “German subject”, 
but this motion was lost, and the original announcement was posted.312 The announcement 
was reported in the press as reflecting “local opinion”, since “no British subject can be 
expected to work alongside Germans or to have any association with them”.313 At the time, 
the LSE was awash with notes reading “Don’t deal with Germans”.314 Shortly afterwards, 
certain members of German descent who had become naturalised British citizens informed 
the Committee that they had changed their names. One, B. Lichtheim, changed his name to 
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B. Lighthome, and another, H. Neuhaus, changed his name to H. Newhouse.315 Another 
member changed his name from M.A. Becker to M. Askew.316 Where members were found to 
be enemy subjects, the Committee ruled that no concession be made regarding membership 
subscriptions of those members denied entry to the Exchange.317 The Exchange Solicitors 
advised the Committee to retain any proceeds from the sale of proprietary rights belonging to 
enemy subjects until the termination of the war, since it was not within the powers of the 
Committee to pay any amount to an enemy subject or his agent.318 The Acting Secretary of 
Finance later informed the Exchange that shares could be transferred from enemy subjects 
resident or interned within the Union to any person permanently resident within the Union. 
However, transfers to any person resident in enemy territory would not be permissible.319 This 
provision created some annoyance in the public sphere, with the Rand Daily Mail arguing that 
it was not inconceivable that such shares could be realised and converted to gold, which could 
find its way to Germany, thereby effectively enabling “financial assistance to be given to the 
enemy”.320 At this time, it also became apparent that South West Africa, a German colony, 
represented a significant threat to the sub-continent. Fearing that South West Africa might be 
a gateway to South Africa, South African forces under the leadership of General Louis Botha 
defeated Victor Franke’s German forces in May 1915. Shortly afterwards, the Committee sent 
a telegram to General Botha in Windhoek, which read as follows: 
Members of the Stock Exchange desire to congratulate you and your men on the successful 
termination of their arduous work which has secured for South Africa the whole of the sub-
continent and has saved the Union from a grave danger and has materially assisted in the 
persecution of the Great War.321 
The Exchange remained firmly in support of the government war effort. In July 1915, the 
Committee approached General Jan Smuts, offering to raise a War Loan through the 
Exchange, since “many people might like to apply from a patriotic feeling”.322 Smuts informed 
the Committee, however, that he thought it inadvisable, and that the public could take up 4½% 
Treasury Bills if they wished to help. Smuts also appealed to the Exchange, as the “Leaders 
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of Finance” to take care “not to imperil the financial stability of the Country”.323 Still, the 
Exchange desired to aid the war effort. Later in 1915, the basement of the Exchange was 
made available to munition workers, who used the space to construct paper cylinders and 
finish hand grenades, before the explosives would be added at another site (thus no 
explosives would be handled in the basement of the Exchange).324 It was also decided that no 
subscriptions be charged to Exchange members and clerks on active service.325 
By December of 1915, the Exchange had wholly departed from its multicultural heritage, when 
it was unanimously resolved that from 1 January 1916, only British subjects were eligible for 
membership of the Exchange.326 Although it represented only a minor part of the Exchange 
membership, the German contingent at the Exchange represented a significant threat to its 
legitimacy since the start of the war. When debating the Enemy Trading Bill at the Unionist 
Party Club in April 1916, the Chairman of the Exchange, D.C. Greig, explained the difficulty 
created for the Exchange when war broke out, because of the number of members of “enemy 
origin”.327 Greig pointed out that the “strength of the German element on the Exchange had 
been greatly exaggerated” and informed the audience that since the beginning of 1916, the 
constitution of the Exchange did not allow non-British subjects to become members of the 
Exchange.328 According to the Exchange Solicitors, however, the Committee could not cancel 
the membership of those who were subjects of enemy powers “simply on the ground of their 
nationality”.329 The Committee could not pay any dividends or other amounts to Proprietary 
Members who were enemy subjects, and such amounts were to be paid to the Custodian of 
Enemy Property.330 The solution was to ask such individuals (members who were enemy 
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subjects) to resign their membership voluntarily.331 After being notified of this resolution, five 
of the individuals sent letters declining to resign, and two agreed to resign.332  
As the war dragged on, the Exchange slowly regained its footing. Profits improved from 1915, 
returning to pre-war levels by 1916. The decline in membership of the Exchange also halted 
in 1916. The value of proprietary rights also stabilised from early 1917. The Official List saw 
increased listing activity towards mid-1917, after a long period of near stagnation. The period 
from late 1916 until the end of the war was characterised by relatively few upheavals, as the 
Exchange emerged from the chaos that it had endured earlier. Ultimately, news of the 
Armistice on 11 November 1918 brought about the “general demand for the closing of the 
Exchange”, and the day afterwards was celebrated as a public holiday.333 A large gathering 
met at the Exchange on 13 November 1918 to celebrate the news.334 The Chairman of the 
Exchange, D.C. Greig, stated at the gathering that “the hour was one of solemn thanksgiving, 
of gratitude to Almighty God that His Divine Providence had preserved them through all perils 
and crowned their arms with victory”.335 The Chairman hailed the victory as one of “civilisation” 
over “barbarism” and “Christianity” over “paganism”.336 He dismissed Republicanism by asking 
the gathering, rhetorically, whether their King did not act “most nobly as any King should do in 
these times of trial” and whether they would allow “any shape of disruption to come between 
you and him”.337 The National Anthem and “Rule, Britannia” could be heard as the gathering 
departed from the Exchange Hall.338 A few days later, the Exchange received the following 
cable from Wilfred Atlay, the Chairman of the LSE: 
The Stock Exchange desire to express to your members and those of all South African 
Exchanges at the time of the signing of the armistice their heartiest congratulations on the 
definite victory of the allies in the cause of freedom and justice.339 
The Exchange replied, informing Atlay that “members here rejoice with you in great victory”, 
and a copy of Atlay’s cablegram was also sent to the Cape Town, Durban and Maritzburg 
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Exchanges.340 The Great War highlighted the role of the Exchange as a public body, and 
reaffirmed its British identity. Now that the war was over, the Exchange could focus its efforts 
at further recovering from its unfortunate financial position and the general malaise that 
plagued it between 1905 and 1918. 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the development of the JSE from the South African War to the First 
World War. During its earlier history, the Exchange proceeded mostly unhindered by 
government or public interference, since it was viewed as a private concern, and often merely 
as a spectacle. After 1902, however, various audiences took an increasing interest in the 
affairs of the Exchange, most likely due to its growing prominence in public life. Consequently, 
the Exchange was in the delicate position of being significantly more visible without having 
gained universal legitimacy. Thus, the Exchange sought to extend its legitimation efforts 
beyond its members, towards the public and government. 
The new Exchange building was an important symbol of the Exchange’s legitimation. Its size, 
imposing facade and ornamented interior was, unlike earlier Exchange buildings, befitting of 
a prestigious institution. The building contributed to the Exchange’s legitimation in two ways. 
First, the building was a symbol of the Exchange’s pragmatic legitimacy, since it implied that 
the Exchange had been able to deliver practical outcomes to its members and clients, to the 
extent that it could afford a striking new building. Second, the building was a symbol of the 
Exchange’s moral legitimacy, since the building projected the Exchange as a socially valued, 
powerful, and permanent entity – the stronghold of share trading in Johannesburg, even before 
it was universally accepted as such. Besides the appearance of the building, the welcoming 
of various influential figures of British society to the Exchange signalled its legitimacy through 
its connection with legitimate others.341 Their presence at the Exchange also bears out the 
ease with which the Exchange settled into the new socio-political environment. As the ZAR 
became the Transvaal Colony of the British Empire, the Exchange found itself in a more 
comfortable institutional environment, better aligned with the values and heritage of its 
members (primarily of British descent). This alignment also manifested in the legal 
environment, as the Committee amended the Exchange rules between 1903 and 1907 to 
comply with English common law. The new focus on English common law meant that the 
Exchange rules were, for the first time, applied not only to brokers but also to their clients. 
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Although the JSE was not yet regulated by national legislation, the general enforceability of its 
rules symbolised its maturing into a public body, and supported the pragmatic legitimation of 
the Exchange through the control over the market it enabled.  
The JSE remained the dominant exchange in Southern Africa. It maintained mostly amicable 
relations with the exchanges at Cape Town, Durban, Maritzburg, and Bulawayo by providing 
technical advice, and often intervening in disputes. However, the emergence of Macnamara’s 
Open Call Exchange in 1904 threatened the JSE’s legitimacy, particularly on a moral level. 
For some time, the JSE was the only exchange in Johannesburg, and thus solely responsible 
for public perceptions of share trading. Macnamara’s prominence in the press and its 
reputation as a bucket shop meant that it detracted from the moral legitimacy of share trading 
in general, and thus also from the legitimacy of the JSE. It was not only a threat to the JSE’s 
(meagre) share of the business that was being transacted, but also to the integrity of share 
trading in and of itself, and the way business was done on the JSE. In contrast to the JSE’s 
closed, exclusive structure, Macnamara’s opened share trading to the public, without the 
services of a broker. Thus, Macnamara’s became a point of reference for the Exchange’s 
legitimation efforts. The Exchange pitted itself (its stature, its stringent entry requirements, its 
authority over its members, and its strong regulation) against the haphazard Macnamara’s.  
The contrast between the JSE and Macnamara’s became particularly evident in 1909, through 
the inquiry of the Gambling Commission. The Commission was formed to consider the 
regulation of various forms of gambling (which, tellingly, included stock and share dealing). 
Considering the poor market conditions and the resulting wave of defaults in 1909, the 
Committee of the Exchange initially feared that the Commission would impose further 
constraints on share dealing. Nonetheless, the Committee of the Exchange took the 
opportunity to call attention to its authority over members, its regulation of the market, and the 
resulting protection of investors. Thus, the Commission became a proxy for the government 
(and perhaps the public) in that it conferred legitimacy on the Exchange. As a legitimate entity 
itself, the Commission’s endorsement of the JSE legitimated it in the eyes of the government 
and the public, particularly through favourable press reports of the proceedings. The 
authorisation of the Exchange’s operations, embodied by the Stock and Share Dealing Act of 
1909 (which resulted from the inquiry), further strengthened the Exchange’s legitimacy, and 
provided a strong justification for its existence.  
While the Exchange membership experienced a degree of professionalisation before the 
South African War, this process accelerated after 1902. Members were now expected to fulfil 
their Exchange duties and transactions above all else, and to devote their full time and 
attention to stockbroking. This is a notable departure from the earlier history of the Exchange, 
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when it counted storekeepers, police officers, carpenters, and musicians among its ranks. 
Over time, the social network underpinning the application for membership (having to be 
proposed and seconded by members of the Exchange) gave rise to a relatively homogeneous 
group of brokers. As Max Weber proposed in Die Börse, the homogeneity of the group 
strengthened their mutual expectation of good faith (or honour). It also contributed to the 
Committee’s ability to act as a tribunal. The cohesion between members promoted the 
Committee’s authority over members and its control over the market, which were crucial 
components of the Exchange’s pragmatic legitimation after the South African War.  
The onset of the Great War in July 1914 presented the Exchange with several challenges to 
overcome for the sake of its moral legitimacy, particularly towards the public and the state. 
Primarily, the Exchange’s decision to follow the LSE Emergency Rule 9 (which provided that 
scrip would only be good delivery if it had been in British hands since 30 September 1914) 
was vital for strengthening the Exchange’s moral legitimacy. By not accepting scrip held by 
enemy subjects, the Exchange aligned itself with the moral expectations of its social 
environment. Allowing enemy subjects to profit from share trading during the war might have 
been construed as financial assistance to the enemy, which would have detracted from the 
Exchange’s moral legitimacy. The antagonism towards enemy subjects was further 
strengthened in the wake of the Lusitania disaster, when the Exchange first barred members 
who were enemy subjects from entering the House, and later ruled that only British subjects 
could be JSE members. This further strengthened the homogeneity of the Exchange 
membership, and poised the Exchange for an active role in the war effort. Thus, the Exchange 
came out firmly in support of the war effort, as was expected of it by society. Besides offering 
to General Jan Smuts to raise a war loan, the Exchange also made the basement of the 
building available for the partial assembly of grenades. It was vital for the Exchange to be 
perceived as doing its part.  
Besides moral considerations, the Exchange’s engagement with the government during the 
war proved important to its legitimation. In a bid to provide some relief to members and 
investors, the Committee explored several wartime procedures for managing open 
transactions. However, the Exchange rules did not provide for new rules under such 
extraordinary circumstances, leaving the Committee powerless to implement the necessary 
wartime measures. Thus, the Committee engaged with the government to sanction its desired 
course of action. Although the Stock and Share Dealing Act of 1909 had confirmed the 
Exchange’s status as a public body, the Secretary of Finance, James Leisk, initially viewed 
the Exchange as a narrow segment of the community and thus not worthy of government 
intervention. Ultimately, the Committee managed to convince Leisk of the Exchange’s public 
importance, resulting in a Martial Law regulation. Shortly afterwards, however, the Exchange 
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reopened (rendering the proclamation useless) when the major international markets 
reopened. While the proclamation did not have any real effect on the Exchange’s operations, 
it did signal the government’s endorsement of the Exchange, and reaffirm its importance as a 
public body. 
Through its successful integration into the British Empire, its endorsement by the government, 
and its demonstrated commitment to national interests, the Exchange endeared itself towards 
the public and the state on a moral level. The Exchange managed to demonstrate its 
importance, not only as a trading facility but also as a public body, a barometer of South 
Africa’s economic wellbeing. It became evident between 1902 and 1918 that the Exchange 
could deliver practical outcomes to its members and clients (pragmatic legitimacy) and comply 
with the normative expectations of its social environment (moral legitimacy). Several 
developments during this period, including the Stock and Share Dealing Act of 1909 and 
several instances of government endorsement provided strong justification for the Exchange’s 
existence and operations. This provided a solid foundation for the next phase of the 





Chapter 6 The making of a national exchange, 
1919-1945 
The […] complaint – that stock exchanges are useless – is founded on a misunderstanding 
of their purpose. It is frequently made by those who have discovered that, even if the Stock 
Exchange were to close, the crushers would still continue to rumble from Randfontein to 
Springs. So they would, but the point is quite irrelevant to the question of why stock 
exchanges exist. These institutions are there simply to provide a market for securities, and 
they are thus as much an integral part of our economic system as limited liability 
companies, cheque books and savings banks.1 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its history, the JSE represented a gateway to prosperity for some, but a veritable 
Mammon for others. Between 1919 and 1945, however, a greater understanding of the 
Exchange’s role in the economic system slowly liberated it from associations with gambling 
and immorality (as exemplified by the quote above). The Exchange started to enjoy the 
admiration of the public, because of its newfound status as an important public institution, and 
the prominence that many of its members attained in South African society. The Government, 
however, took a growing interest in the Exchange during this period, often in response to 
turmoil in the market or investment scandals in the press. Through this increased scrutiny 
from, and its interaction with, the Government, the Exchange’s position within the broader 
financial system was affirmed on several occasions. The Great War had emphasised the role 
of the Exchange as a public body, and after the war, a series of events would elevate it to a 
national institution.  
6.2 RECOVERING FROM THE WAR 
After the Great War, the Exchange slowly returned to normal. By May 1919, a general 
restriction on trading between Johannesburg and London was still in place.2 Restrictions on 
enemy property also presented a challenge to the Exchange, when it was found that shares 
in the names of three Exchange members could not be transferred to their new owners.3 The 
shares were vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property. Thus, the new owners needed the 
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sanction of the Custodian to effect transfer. Although this did not represent a significant 
number of shares, the restrictions posed a threat to the integrity of the market. Many investors 
feared that they would accidentally come into possession of such tainted scrip and would not 
be able to effect transfer into their own names. To remedy the situation, the Committee 
attempted to make an application to the court on behalf of the individuals wishing to effect 
transfer. However, it was advised that the holders themselves needed to take combined action 
through the court.4 Ultimately, a court order was only granted in June 1919, which allowed the 
new owners to transfer the shares into their own names.5  
Besides the shares held by members who were enemy subjects, their presence at the 
Exchange represented a further threat to the order of the House. In September 1919, the 
Committee received a petition from 61 members of the Exchange, protesting at the continued 
membership of individuals who were considered enemy subjects. The petitioners pointed out 
“how repugnant it must be to the stock exchange members to be compelled to deal with and 
come in daily contact with subjects of countries whose methods of warfare and treatment of 
Prisoners of War have made them infamous all the world over”.6 The petitioners also 
suggested that enemy subjects be asked not to enter the House, and that every effort should 
be made to induce their resignation.7 In general, the feeling towards enemy subjects placed 
the Committee in an awkward position. One such member, Max Pollak, wrote to the 
Committee stating that “he identified himself with the views of the Government of the Czecho-
Slovak Republic in his repugnance of [German] methods”.8 Another, Eugen Hesselberger, 
wrote to the Committee, asking for protection against another member who had informed him 
that “his presence was objected to and […] he would be exposing himself to serious 
consequences”.9 After consulting with counsel, the Committee found that it did not have the 
power to terminate membership on the grounds of nationality, and that such memberships 
remained in place after the war.10 However, allowing enemy subjects to retain their livelihood 
posed a significant threat to the Exchange’s moral legitimacy. 
As the peril of enemy membership slowly subsided, the Exchange was faced with a new 
complication, when bank officials in the city threatened to strike in June 1920.11 Nearly 2 300 
members of the South African Society of Bank Officials intended to strike for better working 
                                                 
 




8 JSE/GC13:200. In November 1916, Pollak was asked, as an enemy subject, to resign his membership. 
9 JSE/GC13:205. 
10 JSE/GC13:189; JSE/GC13:198-199. 
11 JSE/GC13:280. “Forecast of Bank Ballot”, Rand Daily Mail, 29 April 1920.  
186 
conditions and an improved pay scale for bank officials.12 The Exchange depended heavily on 
the banks in its daily operations. Therefore, a strike would bring trading in the House to a 
complete halt.13 Throughout the latter half of 1920, the strike loomed over the Exchange, until 
22 December 1920, when the strike officially commenced.14 During the strike, which lasted 
only two days, banks were open for one hour a day, from 10 am to 11 am, and transactions 
were limited to cash.15 Ultimately, the strike had no lasting effect on the Exchange. By 
3 February 1921, however, the Committee learned of another looming strike by mining 
engineers on the Rand.16 During the subsequent days, the unrest developed into a full-blown 
unauthorised strike for better wages, which included mineworkers “along the Reef, from 
Nourse Mines to Randfontein”.17 The strike continued until 15 February 1921, but again had 
no substantial effect on market activity.18  
Although the strikes in 1920 and 1921 had only a limited effect on the Exchange, the general 
labour unrest of the time culminated in the Rand Revolt in early 1922. The revolt, by 
approximately 22 000 white mineworkers, was primarily motivated by plans to increase the 
proportion of black mineworkers on the Rand. Another contributing factor was the reduction in 
wages by various mines, because of declining profitability and lower gold prices at the time.19 
Anticipating the coming unrest, the Committee granted the Chairman and Deputy Chairman 
the power to close the Exchange “in case of urgency” on 10 January 1922.20 The Committee 
also arranged to insure the building, contents and rental income with Lloyds for three months 
against riot and related damage.21 What started as a labour strike rapidly escalated into an 
armed rebellion by white mineworkers.22 As a result of the armed conflict, more than 200 
casualties were recorded, and the Exchange was closed from 10 to 20 March 1922.23 
Eventually, by 17 March 1922, the revolt was brought under control by armed forces (including 
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tanks, artillery and bomber aircraft) under the command of Prime Minister Jan Smuts.24 After 
the Exchange had reopened, several of the so-called “revolutionaries” were held in the 
basement of the Exchange building as they awaited trial, ostensibly due to the limited facilities 
to hold the large number of revolt prisoners.25 
After the revolt was quashed, the Exchange settled into a relatively uneventful period. The rest 
of 1922, indeed until mid-1926, passed without any considerable development at the 
Exchange, besides the Committee’s efforts to attract new members. The most notable post-
war development for the Exchange came in September 1926, when the Committee received 
a letter from the Committee of the Cape Town Stock Exchange. In the letter, the Cape Town 
exchange complained that the JSE rule prohibiting the sharing of brokerage between JSE 
members and outside brokers meant that double brokerage had to be charged when business 
was done between the Johannesburg and Cape Town exchanges. The Cape Town exchange 
thus proposed its affiliation to the JSE, and that shared brokerage be allowed between its 
members, for which each of the Cape Town members was willing to pay an annual “affiliation 
fee”.26 The Committee replied in the negative, but proposed that the members of the Cape 
Town Stock Exchange (12 in number) become members of the JSE.27  
In early November 1926, the Chairman and the Secretary travelled to Cape Town to meet with 
members of the Cape Town Stock Exchange. At this meeting, it was agreed that all the 
members of the Cape Town Stock Exchange would become JSE members, and that the Cape 
Town Exchange would cease to exist.28 All the shares (nine in total) listed on the Cape Town 
exchange would also be listed on the JSE without payment of a quotation fee, provided that 
the companies apply to the JSE and that such applications be endorsed by the former 
Secretary of the Cape Town exchange.29 The 12 ex-members of the Cape Town exchange 
were ultimately admitted in November 1926, at an entrance fee of £157-10-0 and surety of 
£1 500 for two years.30 As dictated by the rules, the new Cape Town members had to purchase 
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Journal 63, no. 2 (2011): 318-338. 
25 “Johannesburg Stock Exchange”, Rand Daily Mail, 21 March 1922. 
26 JSE/GC14:376-377. 
27 JSE/GC14:377-378.  
28 JSE/GC14:392-394. The Cape Town exchange was established in 1901, due to the disruption caused by the 
South African War and the closing of the JSE. See Morgenrood, Cape Town’s Forgotten Stock Exchange, 145. 
29 JSE/GC14:392-394. The shares transferred from Cape Town to the JSE Official List were Cape Times, 
Fletcher & Cartwright, Lion Match Company, Schweppes (South Africa), Stuttaford and Company, 
Municipality of Bulawayo 6% stock, Cape Explosive Works Limited 5.5% debentures, Irvin and Johnson 
(South Africa) shares and debentures, and the Schweppes Transvaal Agency (JSE/GC14:426-434). 
30 JSE/GC14:392-396. The twelve members were J.J. Twentyman Jones, E.W. McL. Thomas, Henry Heatlie, 
W.D. Trycross, J.M. Wilks, Leopold Herz, H.V. Raphael, R.M. Grant, Alfred Bolus, J. Kossuth, H.W. Abbott, 
and J. Johnston.  
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proprietary rights.31 The absorption of the Cape Town Stock Exchange, as well as 
arrangements with other groups of brokers in Pretoria, Kimberley, and Port Elizabeth, meant 
that investors outside Johannesburg now only had to pay commission once, not twice as 
before. In reporting this new arrangement, the Rand Daily Mail reported that “apparently, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange is the centre of the financial activity of the Union”.32 Thus, the 
JSE strengthened its position as a national exchange. The entrance fees and subscriptions 
from the 12 new members also improved the Exchange’s financial position, which had slowly 
been recovering since 1915.33  
 
Figure 6.1 | Annual profit of the JSE, 1919-1930 
Source: Constructed from JSE/GC13 – JSE/GC15. 
Despite suffering from a comparably low membership after the Great War, resulting in lower 
income through subscriptions and office rentals, the Exchange still maintained a reasonably 
steady annual profit. While annual profit dipped as low as £1 253 in 1914, the Exchange 
maintained profits in excess of £6 000 every year between 1913 and 1930, except one. This 
is shown in Figure 6.1. Unfortunately, the profit of the Exchange was only recorded in the 
Committee minutes for the period 1919 to 1930.34 However, the relative socio-political stability 
after the war, and improved market conditions, meant that the Exchange no longer suffered 
                                                 
 
31 JSE/GC14:409; JSE/GC14:411; JSE/GC14:418; JSE/GC14:460. 
32 “Only one Commission from now on”, Rand Daily Mail, 20 November 1926. Before this arrangement, 
investors would have had to pay commission to their local broker, as well as the Johannesburg broker who 
executed the deal on the floor of the Exchange.  
33 At its lowest, the Exchange’s annual profit was £1 253 in 1914. From 1915, profits slowly recovered. 
34 JSE/GC19:254; JSE/GC19:474; JSE/GC20:197; JSE/GC20:455; JSE/GC21:292, JSE/GC22:123. The 
Committee approved the Exchange’s financial statements, but no figures were recorded in the minutes.  
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from the poor financial position it had before the war.35 The sustained improvement in profits 
meant that by August 1930, the Committee could set the process in motion to rid itself of debt. 
Thus, the Committee made the landmark decision of borrowing funds from its own Benevolent 
Fund to repay the balance of the Scottish Union loan it had secured in 1910 to replace the 
Exchange debentures.36 While it still needed to repay a loan of £6 500 to the Stock Exchange 
Benevolent Fund, the interest payable on the loan represented a growth in the Benevolent 
Fund, to the benefit of Exchange members who might depend on the fund.37 Ultimately, on 31 
March 1943, the Committee made the final payment of £500 to the Benevolent Fund, settling 
the loan. This was “a milestone in the history of the Exchange” since it was the first time in 40 
years that the Committee had no debt.38  
Between the South African War (1899 – 1902) and the Great War (1914 – 1918), the Exchange 
had already proven its ability to deliver practical outcomes to its members and clients (thus its 
pragmatic legitimacy). However, the poor market conditions that plagued the Exchange 
between 1905 and 1918 meant that the Exchange nearly met its demise. Its legitimacy was 
not enough to shield it from the effects of a listless financial market. After the Great War, 
however, improved market conditions allowed the Exchange to continue on its developmental 
path, as the Committee’s focus shifted towards the moral legitimation of the Exchange. The 
increasingly wide geographic spread of Exchange members made the Committee’s authority 
over them a vital aspect of its legitimation efforts after the Great War.  
6.3 MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXCHANGE 
The challenging market conditions between 1905 and 1918 meant that nearly half of the 
Exchange members had abandoned their stockbroking ambitions by the end of the Great War. 
Thus, after the war, the Committee needed to attract new members to the Exchange, to 
increase market activity and improve the Exchange’s financial position.39 Between August 
1919 and September 1925, the Committee made several attempts to induce an increase in 
membership by reducing entrance fees and sureties for prospective members.40 The 
                                                 
 
35 The fact that cigars and cigarettes were provided at Committee meetings suggests that the Exchange was not 
in such a dire financial position as it often had been before the Great War. 
36 JSE/GC15:421; JSE/GC15:425; JSE/GC15:443-444. 
37 JSE/GC15:425. 
38 JSE/GC21:32. 
39 At its peak, between mid-1903 and 1905, the Exchange had nearly 500 members. By the end of 1918, 
however, only 268 remained.  
40 Entrance fees were reduced to as low as 50 guineas, and sureties to £500. Without the proposal, the entrance 
fee would be £525 and the surety £2 000. See JSE/GC13:176; JSE/GC13:182-183; JSE/GC13:176; 
JSE/GC13:181; JSE/GC13:183; JSE/GC13:350; JSE/GC13:340; JSE/GC13:350; JSE/GC13:409; 
JSE/GC13:414; JSE/GC14:115; JSE/GC14:136; JSE/GC14:143; JSE/GC14:264-265; JSE/GC14:271. 
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Committee had to maintain a delicate balance between increasing membership for the sake 
of revenue, and retaining the protection that sureties afforded, without further diluting the 
business transacted on the Exchange.41 At the time, many clerks took the opportunity to obtain 
full membership. Thus, a new rule was introduced in May 1924, requiring clerks who 
subsequently became members (or entered a partnership) to provide new sureties “to the 
satisfaction of the Committee”.42 Early in 1928, the Committee also decided that all new 
members must hold two proprietary rights, rather than one, effectively limiting the eventual 
membership of the Exchange to 191.43  
The inaccuracy of membership records after the Great War did not allow for an accurate 
reconstruction of membership numbers on a monthly basis, as in previous chapters. The 
Committee only occasionally recorded the total number of Exchange members after the war. 
In May 1924, for instance, the Exchange had 234 members.44 By March 1929, it was reported 
that there were 271 members.45 In April 1945, the Exchange informed the Government that it 
had 231 members.46 However, when these figures are used in conjunction with the rise in 
membership due to admissions or re-admissions, and the decrease due to default, resignation 
or death, as reported in the records of the Committee, significant variances (of between 66 
and 118 individuals) arise between the reconstructed figures, and the known figures are given 
above. In previous chapters, this variance was no more than 13 individuals, suggesting that 
the reconstructed membership figures were reasonably accurate and that very few changes 
in membership were not recorded in the minutes. After the war, however, the substantial 
discrepancy suggests that the changes in membership were not as accurately recorded in the 
minutes as in the membership roll, which unfortunately no longer exists. From the given figures 
alone, however, it appears that the Exchange membership remained close to 230 between 
1924 and 1945, peaking at around 271 members in March 1929, which is significantly less 
than in previous periods.47 This suggests that the membership of the Exchange became more 
concentrated after the Great War, perhaps as a result of the severe market conditions after 
                                                 
 
41 JSE/GC14:134. 
42 JSE/GC14:151; JSE/GC14:154. 
43 JSE/GC15:40-42; JSE/GC15:52; JSE/GC15:409-410; JSE/GC15:415. At the time there were 154 proprietary 
rights held by 154 members, and a further 228 rights which were held voluntarily and could thus be purchased 
by prospective members to meet the rule (created in 1913) that each member had to hold one proprietary right. 
When it was decided that all new members should hold two rights, it was found that it was not within the power 
of the Committee to issue any further rights, thus the total number of rights would be 382, or effectively, 191 




47 Between mid-1892 to the end of 1913, the Exchange always had more than 300 members, peaking at nearly 
500 members between mid-1903 and 1905. 
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1905, the high cost of admission, and the professionalization of stockbroking, which excluded 
many “amateur” brokers who operated in the earlier history of the Exchange. The 
professionalization of stockbroking in South Africa was part of a broader wave of 
professionalization in the financial sector, driven by the need for better protection of the public, 
and monopolisation of access to the profession to protect the interests of practitioners (such 
as accountants, or stockbrokers).48 
 
Figure 6.2 | The value of a Stock Exchange Proprietary Right, 1919-1945 
Source: Constructed from JSE/GC12 – JSE/GC23. 
As before the Great War, the value of proprietary rights remained a good barometer of the 
Exchange’s wellbeing, and the desirability of Exchange membership. After peaking at close to 
£500 in May 1903, the value of proprietary rights remained under pressure until 1933, when 
South Africa’s departure from the gold standard and the subsequent boom in the market lured 
many young hopefuls to the Exchange. Thus, the value of proprietary rights increased 
dramatically from 1933 onwards, only declining in the wake of the 1937 financial crash and 
the start of the Second World War, as shown in Figure 6.2.49 The boom of 1933 had a definite 
impact on the value of Exchange membership. In 1932, the average price at which a 
proprietary right was sold was a little over £176. By 1936, at its peak, the proprietary rights 
fetched an average of £3 864 each (keeping in mind that each new member was required to 
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purchase two rights).50 The proprietary rights represented a substantial guarantee fund against 
default. Thus, the Committee strictly controlled any changes in ownership. Before selling a 
right, members needed the Committee’s consent.51 The Rules of the Exchange enabled the 
Committee to sell a member’s proprietary rights if the member became insolvent, in order to 
settle the claims of other Exchange members against the insolvent. The remaining proceeds 
could only be paid to the insolvent estate once the claims of Exchange members had been 
paid.52  
The incorporation of the Cape Town Stock Exchange and the expanding geographic 
distribution of the Exchange membership after the Great War signalled the JSE’s status as a 
national exchange. Since members no longer met at the same physical location, the 
Committee’s authority over the whole body of members became more crucial to maintaining 
the Exchange’s legitimacy. This manifested primarily as a renewed focus on the character of 
prospective members. As before, each candidate had to be proposed and seconded by 
existing Exchange Members. However, the Committee expected prospective members to 
prove that they were “men of high moral standing and undoubted financial stability”, who 
possessed “moral character and general fitness” before being admitted to membership.53  
On a more practical level, the Committee also instituted several measures to govern members 
further afield. In February 1929, for instance, the Committee decided that the practice of 
charging half of normal brokerage for transactions between broker and broker (if both were 
members of the JSE) should be codified into the rules, particularly since certain brokers were 
found to charge 33% of normal brokerage in such transactions.54 In the wake of this decision, 
the Committee received letters of protest from members in Cape Town, Pretoria, Boksburg 
and Durban.55 The dissatisfaction seemed to arise not from the minimum charge of 50% of 
normal brokerage, but rather the inequitable sharing of brokerage between members in and 
outside Johannesburg.56  
                                                 
 
50 JSE/GC15:48. In 1934, a seat on the JSE cost approximately £8 000 (or US$56 000) compared to the NYSE, 
where approximately US$95 000 was needed for admission only 3 years earlier. See “Seats on New York Stock 
Exchange”, Rand Daily Mail, 4 November 1933; “Membership £8,000 And Still a Rush to Join Stock 
Exchange”, Sunday Times, 2 September 1934. 
51 JSE/GC13:162; JSE/GC18:19-20; JSE/GC18:211-213. Members could not sell, pledge, alienate, or dispose of 
the Rights in any way without the consent of the Committee.  
52 JSE/GC14:338-339; JSE/GC14:408; JSE/GC17:114; JSE/GC17:117; JSE/GC18:16. See also “How a Stock 
Exchange Default is handled”, Rand Daily Mail, 14 January 1938. 
53 JSE/GC18:392-395. 
54 JSE/GC15:203; JSE/GC15:205; JSE/GC15:213. 
55 JSE/GC15:234-235. 
56 Ibid.; JSE/GC15:239. The use of the term ‘Country Brokers’ bears out the earlier connotation between the 
Exchange and a club, where members not resident within the town where the club was located were referred to 
as ‘Country Members’.  
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The so-called country members claimed that the rules were formulated when the Exchange 
did not have a significant body of country members, and that the rules needed to be amended 
to meet the order of the day.57 In their view, the sharing of brokerage on a 1:1 basis with 
Johannesburg brokers was unfair, since they bore most of the risk and did most of the 
administrative work for their clients, while the Johannesburg brokers only executed the deals 
on the floor.58 Furthermore, the country members argued that the Committee did not 
adequately represent them since they were not able to vote in the annual Committee elections 
unless they were in Johannesburg at the time.59 This remained the case until October 1929, 
when the Exchange rules were modified so that ballot papers could be sent to country 
members “outside Johannesburg but within the Union of South Africa”, allowing them to record 
their votes through the mail.60 The requirement of a Johannesburg address was also removed 
from the rules.61 In March 1931, the notice period for resignation was also increased from 
seven days to one month, to allow country members sufficient time to lodge claims against 
resigning members who, after resignation, would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the 
Committee.62 The Committee also required that each office of stockbroking firms outside of 
Johannesburg had to be supervised and attended to by a fully licenced JSE member.63  
On a more symbolic level, the late 1930s saw the creation of a coat of arms for the Exchange. 
The Chairman, A.D. Viney, procured the services of London-based engravers and jewellers 
Longman & Strongitharm Limited in 1935 to create a coat of arms for the Exchange.64 By 
October 1937, Viney’s efforts materialised when the Exchange was officially granted a coat of 
arms, in celebration of his four-year term as Chairman, as well as the Golden Jubilee of the 
Exchange. Viney presented the coat of arms and seal to Jack Andrew Cohen, his successor 
as the Chairman of the Exchange, adding “that he had great pleasure in doing so and hoped 
that it would enhance the dignity and prestige of the Institution”.65 The coat of arms enabled 
members to “live up to the highest traditions and prestige” of the Exchange.66 This was an 
important milestone for the Exchange. The coat of arms bore the words Dictum Meum Pactum 
(“My word is my bond”), echoing those on the LSE coat of arms. The Chairman hoped that the 
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63 This condition was later codified as Rule 66(a). See JSE/GC16:484-486; JSE/GC16:499; JSE/GC17:2-3; 





JSE would live up to these words in order to maintain “the highest possible traditions equal to 
that of the London Stock Exchange”.67  
 
 
Figure 6.3 | LSE (left) and JSE (right) coat of arms68 
Source: The Logo of London Stock Exchange, London Stock 
Exchange, Wikimedia Commons, Licenced CC BY-SA; Rosenthal, 
Eric. On' Change Through the Years: A History of Share Dealing in 
South Africa. Flesch Financial Publications, 1968. 
While the Committee managed to enforce its authority over country members by the mid-
1930s, outside brokers still represented a significant threat to its control of the market. The 
Committee perceived outside brokers as a “menace to the Exchange”.69 In 1935, for instance, 
the Committee received complaints from Pretoria members that certain Johannesburg 
members of the JSE were accepting and executing orders on behalf of outside brokers.70 In 
their view, the rules and regulations of the Exchange were being “nullified” by the large number 
of brokers and agents who were not under the control of the Exchange.71 The gentlemen 
conceded that it was not possible to bring all brokers under the control of the JSE, but argued 
that disciplinary action should be aimed at those JSE members who dealt with, or on behalf 
of, such outside brokers.72  
The legitimating force of being associated with the JSE was clear to such outside brokers. In 
June 1936, for instance, member G.M. Isaac complained to the Committee about an outside 
broker in his town who issued circulars showing the scale of brokerage “as regulated by the 
                                                 
 
67 Ibid. 






Johannesburg Stock Exchange”.73 Isaac complained that these words intended to “hold forth 
to the world that he is a Member of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange”, which he was not.74 
This meant that the other broker received the benefits of being “connected” to the JSE without 
having to pay membership fees or Transvaal brokers’ licences, as Isaac and other brokers 
did. The Committee could “do nothing beyond the publication of the usual Advertisement” 
which stated that JSE members were in no way allowed to advertise (as shown in Figure 
6.4).75  
 
Figure 6.4 | An example of the JSE advertisement 
Source: Rand Daily Mail, 1 June 1935, “The Johannesburg Stock Exchange”. 
In early 1938, Cape Town members made a similar complaint against one E. Beck, who had 
unsuccessfully applied for JSE membership. Beck was reported to be an active broker in Cape 
Town, and had convinced Reuters to provide him with a teleprinter by showing that he had 
acquired two JSE proprietary rights.76 Thus, although his application was unsuccessful and 
the proprietary rights were never transferred into his name, he was enjoying “all the privileges 
of [JSE] Membership”.77 After some investigation, it was found that members of the JSE were 
executing Beck’s Johannesburg business for him.78 Ultimately, after pressure from the 
Committee, Beck’s Reuters contract was terminated, and his business taken over by Cape 





76 The establishment of the JSE teleprinter service is discussed in detail in the next section.  
77 JSE/GC18:299-300; JSE/GC18:382.  
78 JSE/GC18:382. Rule 96 provided that the Committee would not recognize any transactions with outside 
members, but did not give the Committee control over them (see legal opinion, JSE/GC17:342-348).  
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Town members Simon & Pienaar.79 The Chairman stated that while he had full sympathy with 
the Cape Town members, the licences were granted by Government. Thus, a rule barring JSE 
members from dealing with non-member stockbrokers would take away the livelihood of 
several persons who had been granted licences by the Government.80 
In February 1938, the Exchange witnessed the detrimental effect of outside brokers first-hand, 
when the local press reported the insolvency of one A.E.J. Henkes. Henkes was an outside 
broker, and had several accomplices with whom members of the Exchange had done 
business, and shared brokerage.81 Henkes claimed that he knew of hundreds of doubtful 
transactions by JSE brokers, similar to those of which he was being accused.82 Henkes and 
his associates were not under the Committee’s control, but his claims, his insolvency and the 
associated negative press “did not enhance the prestige of the Stock Exchange”.83 Thus, the 
Committee requested members to inform them of any transactions on behalf of Henkes and 
his associates between January 1934 and February 1938.84 After taking legal advice from 
Counsel, all Exchange members who dealt on behalf of Henkes and his associates were called 
to appear before the Committee, and were requested to submit their accounting records to the 
Secretary for examination.85 During the proceedings, which lasted nearly two years, two 
members were expelled from the Exchange for persistently failing to maintain “honourable 
practice”.86 Another two members were suspended for six months, since they admitted guilt 
and had paid far less in shared brokerage to Henkes and his associates than the expelled 
brokers.87 The Henkes Scandal, it was later reported, had started with a mere £140 and over 
several years grew into commitments of “half a million pounds”.88 
In light of the difficulties associated with outside brokers, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman 
met with General Jan Smuts in June 1938. Smuts was “sympathetic” towards their cause, and 
suggested that a memorandum be drawn up for the possible introduction of a Bill which would 
address the matter.89 In the memorandum, the Committee argued that outside brokers incited 
                                                 
 
79 JSE/GC18:380. It was later reported that Simon & Pienaar had gold lettering reading “E. Beck, Simon & 
Pienaar” as well as “Members of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” at their offices. Pienaar was instructed by 
the Committee to remove the name of E. Beck (JSE/GC18:398).  
80 JSE/GC18:389. 
81 JSE/GC18:314. 
82 “Henkes says Other Brokers had Doubtful Transactions”, Rand Daily Mail, 26 March 1938.  
83 JSE/GC18:314. 
84 JSE/GC18:314-315; JSE/GC18:355-356. 
85 JSE/GC18:355-358. Counsel in this case was W.H. Ramsbottom, K.C. and R. Stratford, K.C.  
86 JSE/GC18:477; JSE/GC18:480; JSE/GC19:9-11; JSE/GC19:16; JSE/GC19:23-28. Quote from JSE/GC19:28.  
87 JSE/GC18:485; JSE/GC18:487; JSE/GC18:489-492; JSE/GC18:499; JSE/GC19:1. 
88 JSE/GC21:71-72. When the story first broke, the Rand Daily Mail reported Henkes as having liabilities of 
£173 377 (“Henkes Pleads Debts £173,377”, Rand Daily Mail, 9 November 1937). 
89 JSE/GC18:392. Smuts was at this point the Minister of Justice. He had stated in September 1934 that he had 
neither made nor lost any money on the JSE, and that he did not give a “tinker’s curse” about the profits made 
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excessive speculation through their relentless advertising, which JSE members were not 
allowed to do. The Licences Consolidation Act No. 32 of 1925 required members of all licenced 
exchanges to hold a Broker’s Licence. However, the Act did not provide that only members of 
licenced exchanges may hold a Broker’s Licence.90 Thus, while outside brokers were licenced 
by the government, they were not under the control of any Committee or other regulating body. 
The Committee argued that this was the primary cause of excessive speculation, to the 
detriment of “those who are least able to afford to speculate”.91 While it had shied away from 
any form of external regulation during its early history, the Committee now recommended to 
Smuts that “legislative action” be taken to overcome the difficulties associated with outside 
brokers.92 However, the Exchange would have to wait until late-1944 for new legislation to 
take shape. This is discussed in detail in section 6.6.93  
By the 1940s, the Exchange had entered its sixth decade of existence. Thus, it began 
engaging with its own history. Through its interaction with the Johannesburg Historic Sites 
Committee, the Exchange commissioned the unveiling of a plaque commemorating the 
location of the first Exchange Building, as well as the “locality known as Between the Chains”.94 
With the passing of long-time members, the tributes recorded in the Committee minutes shed 
light on how the Committee viewed the old members and how it related the history, heritage, 
and prestige of the Exchange to the character of the departed gentlemen. When, for instance, 
member C.J. Watson died in July 1940, he was described as “the father of the House”, having 
been a member since 1 January 1888.95 E.W. Bond and Sir Abe Bailey were both described 
in similar terms later during the same month, as was H.R.S. Gibbon in 1944.96 When member 
                                                 
 
on the Exchange during that time (“General Smuts on Pursuit of Art in South Africa”, Rand Daily Mail, 25 
September 1934).  
90 JSE/GC16:78. 
91 JSE/GC18:392-395; JSE/GC21:57; JSE/GC21:71-72.  
92 JSE/GC18:395. The only effective way the Committee could deal with outside brokers was to suspend 
members for dealing with, or on behalf of, outside brokers (JSE/GC18:8).  
93 At the time, calls were made for increased governmental control over the share market. One proponent of 
government intervention, Professor E.H.D. Arndt (University of Pretoria) argued that the selling of potatoes and 
onions was more regulated than the selling of shares. See “Changes in Law that would Clean up Business”, 
Rand Daily Mail, 19 August 1938. 
94 JSE/GC18:416-417. Emphasis added by author. See also JSE/GC20:37; JSE/GC19:327; JSE/GC19:403; See 
also “Famous Site Between the Chains”, Rand Daily Mail, 28 October 1940; “City Stock Exchange Plaque 
Unveiled”, Rand Daily Mail, 14 June 1941.  
95 JSE/GC19:387; “Funeral of Mr. Colin J. Watson”, Rand Daily Mail, 8 July 1940; “Death of Pioneer, aged 
80”, Sunday Times, 7 July 1940. 
96 JSE/GC19:398. Bond was a member since May 1889; Gibbon was a member since 1888 (JSE/GC21:445). 
See “Obituary: Rand Pioneer: Mr. E.W. Bond”, Rand Daily Mail, 25 July 1940; “Death of Mr. H.R.S. Gibbon”, 
Rand Daily Mail, 19 August 1944; JSE/GC19:404; “Impressive Memorial Service to Sir Abe Bailey”, Rand 
Daily Mail, 16 August 1940. 
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John Roy died in March 1941, it was said that he was “possessed of great charm of character, 
a man on whom one could implicitly rely, and whose word was his bond”.97  
The Committee celebrated Sir William Dalrymple upon his death in June 1941, for his 
achievements beyond the Exchange Hall. He was Johannesburg’s “First Citizen” for many 
years, served as Colonel in the Transvaal Scottish Regiment, and played a vital role in the 
foundation of schools such as King Edward, Barnato Park, Roedean and St. John’s College, 
as well as the Witwatersrand University.98 Herman Saunders, who was a member since 1898, 
was described upon his death as “a man of the highest integrity”, and “an ornament to the 
house [who] worthily upheld the highest traditions of the Stock Exchange”.99 Prominent broker 
Max Pollak was described as “a man of the utmost integrity which was the hallmark of the 
sound businessman”.100 Former Chairman D.C. Greig was also celebrated for having “worthily 
upheld the highest traditions of probity and integrity”, and it was said that he “raised the 
standing and dignity of the Stock Exchange” during his 11 years as Chairman.101 Of another 
former Chairman, Jack Andrew Cohen, it was said that the “prestige of the Exchange was well 
maintained under his Chairmanship”.102 In many instances, the members were remembered 
for their integrity and character.103 The tributes were often published in the Rand Daily Mail, 
suggesting the newspaper’s endorsement of individual stockbrokers, and the Exchange as a 
whole, as legitimate. The distinguished lives of many of the Exchange members served, in 
some way, as a symbol of the Exchange’s moral legitimation. Due in part to the renown and 
benevolence of prominent members, brokers were generally no longer loathed as seedy 
characters. Instead, they were celebrated for their contributions to society and the Exchange. 
They became accepted as legitimate actors in the financial infrastructure of South Africa, 
which also contributed to the overall moral legitimacy of the JSE.  
6.4 THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL LISTS 
Besides the Committee’s authority over members, control over listings (still) constituted an 
important avenue for the Exchange’s legitimation. Listings, both official and unofficial, also 
                                                 
 
97 JSE/GC19:495-496. Emphasis not original. This was the motto of the Exchange – dictum meum pactum. See 
also “Funeral of Mr. John Roy”, Rand Daily Mail, 12 March 1941. 
98 JSE/GC20:61; “Death of Sir William Dalrymple”, Rand Daily Mail, 21 June 1941. 
99 JSE/GC20:398; “Death of City Stockbroker”, Rand Daily Mail, 3 December 1942. 
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represented a vital source of income for the Exchange, besides member subscriptions.104 
Thus, after the Great War, the Committee sought to extend its control over trading conducted 
in the House to the Unofficial List. Although the Unofficial List was established in 1909, the 
Committee primarily focused its efforts on the regulation of the Official List.105 During the 
1920s, however, the Committee shifted its attention towards better controlling the Unofficial 
List.106 Although smaller, less prominent companies often made applications for unofficial 
listings, the Committee started exercising a level of scrutiny similar to official listings after the 
Great War.107 The scrutiny exercised by the Committee, and the information on applicants 
kept by the Exchange Secretary provided brokers and investors with some assurance as to 
the character of the companies so listed.108 The Committee also revised unofficial listings 
annually, unlike official listings, which persisted more or less indefinitely.109 Where an 
application for official or unofficial quotation had been refused, or where the applicant had not 
complied with the conditions of listing, members were forbidden to deal in such shares after 
February 1920.110  
While dealings in the shares of companies previously refused a quotation were prohibited, 
dealings in unlisted companies that had not applied for listing were (paradoxically) not 
prohibited by the rules.111 Naturally, this was a nuisance for the Committee, because such 
transactions were often executed by Exchange members, and thus associated with the 
Exchange, but did not fall under the control of the Committee. In July 1928, therefore, the 
Committee proposed a rule to prohibit such dealings.112 However, the Chairman argued that 
it would “stultify business” and simply drive such transactions “underground”, and the motion 
failed.113 The only way to exercise control over such transactions was to refuse them any 
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recognition in case of disputes. In January 1930, for instance, a dispute arose regarding the 
dividend declaration date of unquoted shares that had been traded at the Exchange.114 The 
purchasers of these shares wrote a letter to the Committee querying “what steps the 
Committee propose to take in order to protect their members against possible loss”. 115 The 
Committee replied that “while the Committee endeavour to protect members in every possible 
way they have no jurisdiction or power over companies whose shares have not a quotation”.116  
While the Wall Street Crash of late 1929 hardly features in the records of the JSE, Great 
Britain’s departure from the gold standard in September 1931 unnerved the Committee, and 
the entire South African market.117 As the news travelled across the globe, the Committee 
decided to close the Exchange on the 23 September 1931 “as a precautionary measure and 
to reassure the public”.118 When news was received that South Africa would remain on the 
gold standard, the Exchange was reopened on the same day.119 By October 1931, the matter 
of the gold standard had entered public discourse, and the press approached various 
Exchange members for statements. This left the Committee in a difficult position – members 
of the Exchange were not in agreement about whether South Africa should abandon the gold 
standard.120 In particular, JSE Chairman D.C. Greig’s fervent opposition to South Africa 
remaining on the gold standard seemed to be at odds with the views of most Exchange 
members.121 Greig was reported to have been “deputed” by the Committee to urge the Minister 
of Finance to follow Great Britain in abandoning the gold standard.122 While the Committee 
recognised that Greig had shared his personal views, it argued that the public and the press 
considered him the spokesperson of the Exchange.123 Because of its potential to influence the 
market unduly, the Committee asked the Chairman to “relegate his personal views to the 
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background if these views are not supported by a definite majority of the members of the 
Committee or as the Institution as a body”.124 After some discussion, the Chairman apologised 
for his action.125 In November 1931, however, Greig resigned as Chairman, because his views 
on the gold standard still differed from the rest of the Committee.126 After being asked to 
reconsider, however, Greig returned to the Chair one week later.127 Greig's remarks were 
problematic to the Committee, not only because of the potentially destabilising impact on the 
market, but also because the comments created the impression that the Exchange openly 
opposed government policy on the gold standard.128  
Nonetheless, when the Minister of Finance released “the Reserve Bank [from] the obligation 
of redeeming its notes in gold” in December 1932, Greig publicly hailed it as a sign that South 
Africa had abandoned the gold standard.129 The Minister’s decision, as well as rumours that 
an official announcement was imminent, resulted in a significant increase in trading on the 
Exchange.130 When the official announcement of South Africa’s departure from the gold 
standard was made on 30 December 1932, it created “feverish excitement” in and around the 
Exchange, which persisted well into 1933, before being briefly quelled by proposed changes 
to mining taxation in June 1933.131 By early 1934, however, the pace of business in the market 
was again brisk due to the record high gold price, attracting investors to the Exchange in 
September 1934.132  
Unlisted shares remained a threat to the Exchange’s moral legitimacy throughout the early 
1930s, particularly after the boom of 1933 resulting from South Africa’s departure from the 
gold standard. The substantial surge in business during this time fuelled the desire for listed 
and unlisted shares alike.133 By March 1933, the dealings in unlisted stocks in the House 
soared. Price clerks were instructed not to record any prices of shares that had not been 
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granted a quotation.134 Towards mid-1933, the Committee received a letter from a member, 
A. Pratt, pointing out that large volumes of unlisted shares were being traded in the Exchange, 
and that this was not prohibited simply because these companies had not applied for a 
quotation. Once the companies had applied but did not succeed, trading the shares of such 
companies was prohibited by the rules. Pratt considered this “untenable if tested in a Court of 
Law”.135 This was a difficult position – the Committee wanted to retain control over the Official 
and Unofficial Lists, thus allowing dealings in any and all shares was not a feasible solution. It 
also did not want to prohibit such dealings, as it had decided in 1928, as it would simply be 
forced “underground”, particularly in light of the high demand for shares during the 1933 
boom.136 The only solution was to let the word spread that the Committee did not consider 
such transactions as being under its jurisdiction and would therefore not offer any protection 
to members in cases of dispute concerning unlisted shares.137  
A case in point was the Capital Gold Mining Company. The Committee received a letter from 
an individual in January 1934, complaining that he had bought £400 of shares of the company, 
which he subsequently discovered were completely worthless, after a rumour surfaced that 
the company had been refused an official quotation.138 The individual pointed out in the letter 
that the prices appeared in the Rand Daily Mail, as well as on the notice boards of certain 
Pretoria Brokers, and that the broker’s note contained the words “The rules of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and its Committee’s decisions shall govern generally this 
transaction”, creating the impression that the shares of the company were recognised by the 
JSE.139 The Committee simply informed the individual that it declined to adjudicate since the 
share was not listed on the JSE, and that the Company had never even applied for listing, 
thus it was not refused a listing.140  
The Committee continued with its strategy to refuse adjudication on disputes regarding 
unlisted shares until February 1934. At this time, the Committee received a petition signed by 
63 members of the Exchange, after refusing a quotation of Far East Rand “B” shares.141 The 
petitioners pointed out that the public often purchased shares in anticipation of a quotation, 
and the rule prohibiting dealings when a quotation was refused caused hardship for those 




136 JSE/GC15:127; JSE/GC16:280. 
137 The Committee did censure one member for dealing in unlisted shares during High ‘Change, but this appears 






members of the public “unversed in the methods of the Exchange”.142 The petitioners also 
pointed out that the effect of this rule was that protection of the Exchange, which was generally 
expected by the public, would only commence after significant losses had been incurred.143 
Thus, the petitioners asked that more specific regulations be made available to companies 
applying for a quotation, so that they may know the exact requirements they would need to 
comply with.144 Thus, after discussing the matter, and considering the LSE’s practices, the 
Committee decided on 15 March 1934 to prohibit dealing in all shares that did not have an 
Official or Unofficial Quotation.145 However, the Committee decided to allow members to deal 
in shares quoted on the LSE.146  
Despite the increased control the Committee managed to wrangle by 1934, its listing 
procedures were still viewed with some scepticism a year later. In his 1935 New Year’s 
speech, the Chairman of the Exchange highlighted that the government was considering 
legislation to control company flotations, a development he openly endorsed.147 When the 
Companies Act Commission was formed later in 1935 to amend the existing legislation (with 
the new English Companies Act as a model), the efforts of the Commission, as well as public 
discourse, focused on company flotations.148 One advocate of the amendments, James 
Dekker, a Johannesburg attorney, stated that many flotations were the work of “shady 
company promotors” and expressed concern over the lack of investor protection.149 Much of 
the blame, according to Dekker, was to be laid on the JSE Committee for the lack of control 
over the market. When such companies managed to secure the minimum subscription through 
a “glowing and optimistic prospectus”, many went on to apply for listings on the JSE. For those 
who succeeded in their application, Dekker pointed out that “the shares of a worthless 
company become merely a gambling counter, the promoters offload their shares and in due 
course the company goes into liquidation”.150 Thus, Dekker suggested that the Committee 
should be subjected to some form of external supervision.151  
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Later, when the Chairman of the Exchange testified before the Companies Act Commission, 
he argued (perhaps in reply to Dekker’s allegations) that the Committee exercised “a very 
considerable measure of moral and wholesome control over the granting of quotations to 
companies”.152 While the Stock Exchange provided, according to the Chairman, reasonable 
protection to the public, they could not always be protected from themselves.153 The 
Committee knew that an official listing lent a degree of legitimacy to the company in question, 
such that companies advertised in the local newspapers that they would apply for an official 
quotation as soon as the necessary allotment was completed.154 Similarly to the LSE, 
however, the Committee did not want people to see this as their endorsement of the shares 
in question. This is perhaps best exemplified by a JSE member’s comments to the Rand Daily 
Mail a few years earlier. The member emphasised that brokers could not “act as policemen 
on the Stock Exchange” and pointed out that although every effort was made to ensure that a 
company quoted on the Exchange was bona fide, clients often disregarded their broker’s 
advice and invested in risky shares.155  
When the Companies Act Commission report was issued in November 1936, it contained 
several recommendations for the protection of the investor, particularly regarding the issuing 
of prospectuses, and the information required in annual financial statements. The Commission 
found that the procedures for quotations employed by the Committee were satisfactory and 
“operated with advantage to the investing public”.156 Furthermore, the Commission 
recommended that state control over the Exchange was not necessary, but that the Exchange 
should cooperate with the Registrar of Companies and the Government Mining Engineer to 
ensure sound quotations.157 Despite emerging unscathed from the inquiry, the Exchange 
faced a new challenge to both its pragmatic and moral legitimacy when the market crashed in 
May 1937, following fears about the future of gold.158  
After the 1937 crash, the Committee received communication from the Secretary for Finance 
(on instruction from the Acting Minister of Finance, Oswald Pirow), pointing to the “disastrous 
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consequences” of the crash, particularly for small holders of shares.159 Pirow conceded that it 
was not possible to eradicate speculation completely, but felt that some restrictions should be 
imposed “on those who lack the restraint to keep their speculative transactions within the limits 
of their means”.160 Never wasting a good crisis, the Committee admitted “the evils of excessive 
speculation” was a problem but laid the blame on the numerous Bucket Shops in operation.161 
Thus, the Committee suggested that all share transactions in South Africa should be effected 
through the medium of “brokers under the control of a licenced Stock Exchange”.162 The 
Committee knew that the JSE was the licenced Stock Exchange of choice, and that the bucket 
shops driving excessive speculation were not licenced.163 The Committee drew Pirow’s 
attention to the provision of the Licences Consolidation Act, No. 32 of 1925, which enabled 
any person to become a licenced broker, upon payment of £10. The Committee also argued 
that excessive speculation could not be eliminated if there continued to be a large number of 
brokers “subject to no rules”.164 The JSE itself was remarkably stable in the wake of the crash. 
Only three defaults were recorded in 1937, and one default in each of the years between 1938 
and 1940. From 1941 to 1945, no defaults were recorded.165 
In response to the crash, a Sub-Committee was formed to investigate the course of action to 
deal with members dealing for clients on insufficient margins, and to prohibit members from 
dealing on behalf of outside brokers and Bucket Shops.166 After some investigation and 
consultation with the Exchange Solicitors, the Sub-Committee made a number of 
recommendations in response to Pirow’s appeal.167 The Exchange Rules were amended to 
allow the Committee to expel members for committing any act which was considered 
“detrimental to the interest or welfare of the Stock Exchange”.168 The amendments included 
(1) dealing for clients on insufficient margin, (2) the extension of unsecured credit to clients, 
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and (3) sharing of brokerage with non-members as acts that were considered detrimental to 
the Exchange’s interests. The banning of shared brokerage was, of course, to stop members 
from acting on behalf of outside brokers and bucket shops.169  
By early 1938, the worst of the crash had subsided. The Chairman, in his New Year’s Speech, 
pointed out that cooperation between Exchange members, as well as between the Exchange 
and the mining houses, mitigated the adverse impact of the crash. Order was restored to the 
House through the new rules. The press applauded the Chairman for the policy he had 
followed to strengthen the internal and external operations of the Exchange. In fact, the Rand 
Daily Mail praised brokers in general for weathering the storm well. The paper argued that 
“there is no reason for any diminution of public confidence in them”, and thought them to be a 
“solid and sensible group of men”.170 The United Party’s absolute majority in the 1938 
elections, under the leadership of J.B.M. Hertzog, further stabilised an otherwise lacklustre 
and insecure market.171 Furthermore, news of the Munich Agreement in September 1938 
eased fears of a European war, and sent the JSE into a buying frenzy.172  
Despite the progress the Exchange made in response to Pirow’s appeal, and the favourable 
market conditions, some still blamed the Exchange for the crisis. When discussions of the 
crash and its aftermath took place in Parliament in early 1939, the higher number of quotations 
granted during the boom (shown in Figure 6.5) elicited bitter criticism. One Member of 
Parliament, E.A. Rooth, stated that although it was not easy to obtain a listing on the JSE, he 
wondered why “so many of our major swindlers obtain a quotation”.173 Rooth also stated that 
“the standard of morality of stockbrokers is as high as that of the average bookie”.174 When 
discussing Rooth’s “caustic remarks” in March 1939, the Committee decided that the 
Chairman would respond to Rooth’s comments in his speech after the Committee elections in 
April 1939.175 
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Thus, when Jack Andrew Cohen was re-elected as Chairman, he pointed out in his speech 
that only 47 companies had been granted a quotation between 1 January 1934 and 31 March 
1939. Furthermore, the Committee first deferred 41 of these quotations to allow further 
enquiry. 19 applications were also declined over the same period. Therefore, according to the 
Chairman, “it was fairly obvious that great vigilance had been exercised in the granting of 
quotations”.176 Between 1941 and 1945, listings increased substantially, bringing financial 
stability to the Exchange and further emphasising its importance. 
Besides the changes in listing practices and the stricter attitude of the Committee, another 
significant development occurred as a result of the boom. In September 1933, the Committee 
concluded negotiations with the Postmaster General to establish a Stock Exchange teleprinter 
service. Two teleprinters were installed at the Exchange, and each broker could apply for a 
receiver in their office. As part of the agreement, the Committee was responsible for the 
operation of the teleprinters, and the service was restricted to brokers who were JSE members 
and operating within the Union of South Africa, at the Committee’s discretion.177 Naturally, the 
Committee wanted to ensure control over the system, because the prices transmitted were 
the most direct link between the Exchange and the broader investing public.178 Any mistakes, 
outages or abuse would negatively influence the public view of the Exchange, and thus its 
legitimacy. The Rand Club (a favourite institution amongst JSE members) was one of the first 
institutions authorised to install a teleprinter, in October 1933.179 Amongst others, the 
teleprinter service was also installed in Pretoria, at the Pretoria Club, Pretoria News, and 
Barclays Bank Pretoria in May 1934, and the service was anticipated to reach Durban 
members by early 1935.180 Throughout the late 1930s, Reuters also negotiated 
(unsuccessfully) with the Exchange to access its teleprinter system. 
By December 1944, the JSE’s relationship with Reuters was further soured by the newly 
formed Union Exchange’s insistence on access to the service.181 Reuters questioned the 
Exchange’s right to control the teleprinter service, perhaps suggesting that it was seen as a 
public service and should, therefore, be freely available.182 Thus, Reuters suggested that their 
service could be operated under the condition that copyright of spot prices rested with the 
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Exchange, and that prices would be supplied to outside brokers with a 30-minute delay.183 
However, the two parties could not reach consensus until August 1945, when the Committee 
decided to supply Reuters with spot prices by direct wire from the Stock Exchange from 1 
January 1946.184 This agreement was subject to several conditions, including an annual 
payment to the Exchange of £750. The Committee retained the right to approve the 
subscribers to the service, as well as the terms of any agreement between Reuters and such 
subscribers.185 Reuters effectively became a distribution network for JSE spot prices and 
would also supply the Exchange’s country members. This represented a significant 
development in the history of the Exchange, since it extended the reach of the Exchange’s 
information network and enabled local and international newspapers and news agencies to 
offer official JSE prices.  
Thus, by late-1945, the Exchange started to resemble its modern form. Along with its price 
dissemination through Reuters, it now had a sufficiently diverse set of listings to rearrange the 
procedure for High ‘Change. Shares were no longer be called out alphabetically, but High 
‘Change started with government and municipal stocks, and proceeded to industrials, mining, 
finance, and then the supplementary list.186 The Exchange had 377 listings, 124 of which were 
mining companies, 32 financial companies, 113 industrial companies, and 24 on the 
supplementary list. The industrial list was reported to have doubled since the start of the 
war.187 Despite the progress the Exchange had made during the war, the war itself proved a 
significant challenge to the overall stability of the Exchange and the integrity of the market. 
6.5 WORLD WAR II 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the JSE continued to cultivate its relationship 
with the LSE. The more intimate connection between the exchanges seems to have resulted 
from various visits of JSE Chairmen to the LSE during this period. This includes visits by J.F. 
Ferguson in July 1934, A.D. Viney and P.L. Flanagan, both in 1935, and Jack Andrew Cohen 
on various occasions between 1937 and 1939.188 During 1938, the brewing political crisis in 
Europe weighed on Andrew Cohen’s mind. Thus, he told the Committee in April 1938 that not 
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only the JSE, but all stock exchanges “were passing through and would continue to pass 
through an extremely difficult period. The walls of democracy were falling and it behoved 
everyone to defend it to the last ditch”.189 Sensing the imminent hostilities, the Committee 
formulated a new rule to obviate the regulatory difficulties the Exchange had experienced 
during previous wars: 
2(a). In the event of the Stock Exchange being closed for any reason then the committee 
shall have the power from time to time to determine the conditions upon which all Stock 
Exchange transactions open at the time of such closing shall be liquidated. Any such 
determination by the Committee shall be binding upon all Members.190 
During the Great War, the Committee had incurred significant expense and effort to have a 
Martial Law regulation passed, to allow it to govern the Exchange during the war. This time, 
however, the Committee was better prepared. In August 1939, the Chairman expressed his 
optimism that a recovery in market conditions was imminent.191 After he had visited London, 
earlier in August, the Chairman told the Committee that the LSE Chairman shared his 
optimism.192 According to Andrew Cohen, the LSE Chairman thought that “Hitler missed the 
market in September” (referring to the Munich Agreement of September 1938, which was seen 
as an aversion of outright war).193 Despite their optimism, however, the first half of 1939 was 
characterised by poor market conditions, considered by some as the worst in 30 years.194  
When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, the Committee decided to close the 
Exchange, “in regard to European situation” and in light of the LSE’s closing.195 The Rand 
Daily Mail maintained an optimistic view, however, advising readers that the LSE’s closure 
was not a sign of impending war, but rather a technical necessity dictated by market 
conditions.196 By 7 September 1939, news was received of the LSE’s reopening.197 While it 
usually followed the LSE’s lead, the Committee decided to postpone reopening the JSE. 
Before reopening, the Committee first wanted clarity on South Africa’s position concerning the 
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war.198 After the Prime Minister, General J.B.M. Hertzog, had resigned due to his neutral 
stance on the war, and the new Cabinet had formed under Jan Smuts, the Committee decided 
to reopen the JSE on 11 September 1939.199 The Committee had favourable interactions with 
Smuts before, thus they probably welcomed his new cabinet.200 After reopening, the market 
experienced a notable decline in prices, particularly in non-mining shares, which prompted 
certain brokers to call for a further closing of the Exchange. However, the Chairman 
encouraged the Committee “to stand four square behind the policy of this house” since “The 
Stock Exchange is a public institution and do not open one day and close the next day because 
there has been a fall in the market”.201 The responsibility of the Committee towards the broader 
public outweighed the views of its members. 
 
Figure 6.6 | Notice of Exchange’s reopening, 11 September 1939 
Source: “Johannesburg Stock Exchange”, Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1939. 
It is noteworthy that the Exchange only closed for ten days, while in 1914 it had closed for 
over five months. During the South African War, the Exchange remained closed for more than 
two years. This suggests that the Exchange had, by this point, firmly established procedures 
to deal with major instability such as war. After the brief closing, the Committee took action to 
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strengthen the Exchange’s ability to continue delivering practical outcomes (thus, defending 
its pragmatic legitimacy). First, the Committee dealt with the ban on trading with enemy 
subjects.202 Transfer of securities to (or for the benefit of) an enemy subject was prohibited by 
law, and the Committee imposed strict requirements pertaining to instruments payable to 
bearer. The Committee soon learned that certain companies, although listed on the JSE, were 
registered in England. Under English law, such companies could only effect transfer of shares 
when accompanied by a declaration from the transferor and transferee that both were not 
enemy subjects, nor acting on behalf of enemy subjects.203 The requirement of such 
declarations was complicated by the fact that shares often floated about in the market for long 
periods, making it challenging to find the person in whose name they were initially registered. 
This threatened to destabilise the South African market, because the difficulty in transferring 
shares of companies registered in England rendered many shares “bad delivery”.204 Although 
the market remained quiet from its reopening until August 1940, the Committee implemented 
its own strategy in June 1940 to aid the war effort.205 After consulting the Minister of Finance, 
the Committee decided not to accept any selling orders from persons outside the Union of 
South Africa unless these were accompanied by a declaration that the seller owned the 
shares.206 The Committee also decided not to admit any man who was due for military service 
as an authorised or unauthorised clerk.207  
After October 1940, members of the Exchange were required to inform the Custodian of 
Enemy Property of any scrip held on behalf of persons or firms resident in “Germany (including 
Poland & Czechoslovakia), Italy, Occupied France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, 
Channel Islands”.208 Such scrip would vest in the Custodian, from 29 May 1940 onwards.209 
As Germany tightened its grip over Europe, the Committee discussed the “conditions under 
which closing might be necessitated”, and held discussions with representatives of various 
                                                 
 
202 “No Trading Allowed with Enemies”, Rand Daily Mail, 4 September 1939. 
203 JSE/GC19:267; JSE/GC19:290-291. This included the Luipards Vlei Estate and Gold Mining Company 
Limited, Lydenburg Platinum Areas Limited, Rhodesian Selection Trust Limited, East Rand Consolidated 
Limited, Nigel Van Ryn Reefs. 
204 JSE/GC19:272. 
205 “Another Quiet Day on Local Market”, Rand Daily Mail, 17 November 1939; “Market Remains Quietly 
Firm”, Rand Daily Mail, 29 December 1939; “Quiet Day Ends on Bright Note”, Rand Daily Mail, 3 February 
1940; “Market Remains Subdued”, Rand Daily Mail, 20 March 1940; “Few Price Changes in Dull Trading”, 
Rand Daily Mail, 18 April 1940; “Cheerful Market Shows Signs of Broadening”, Rand Daily Mail, 30 August 
1940. 
206 JSE/GC19:374-375. 
207 JSE/GC19:396. Clerks would only be admitted if they could prove that they were unfit for military service. 
See for instance JSE/GC20:106; JSE/GC20:207. 
208 JSE/GC19:429-430. 
209 JSE/GC19:430-431. See also Union of South Africa, National Emergency Regulations, Government Gazette 
No. 2770, 29 May 1940. 
213 
local banks.210 The bank representatives were concerned about the wide-scale mobilisation of 
troops, and therefore wished to reduce banking hours, with the blessing of the Exchange. 
Thus, from 10 June 1940, banking hours were restricted to two hours daily, on weekdays, 
between 9:30 am and 11:30 am.211 Another reason for the shortening of banking hours was, 
according to one bank representative, to allow the banks to release more young men for 
military service, which was not possible if banks remained open for their regular hours.212 The 
Committee also engaged with the Minister of Finance, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, about the 
possible closing of the Exchange if the LSE closed. Hofmeyr agreed that the Committee could 
close the Exchange without consulting him, but he wanted to be informed timeously. Hofmeyr 
urged the Committee to ensure that no securities be sold from captured territories.213 Similarly, 
a letter was received from the Dutch Government, “temporarily residing in London”, asking the 
Committee to protect the property of Dutch individuals and to guard against unsanctioned 
disposal of securities.214 By mid-June 1940, as the situation in Europe worsened, the 
Committee decided to close immediately in the event of the LSE closing.215 The Committee 
modified several rules in June 1940 to meet the war conditions (and the new banking hours), 
including rules relating to share delivery, and execution of options.216  
Besides implementing these measures, the Committee also established a Stock Exchange 
War Fund.217 This was an important vehicle for members to contribute to the war effort, 
allowing them to contribute according to their means. As one member stated: “I shall fall back 
on General Smuts’ eloquent exhortation to all non-combatants to put every ounce into 
whatever small job fall to them which will help the war or the men engaged in it”.218 Besides 
their perceived war duty, the War Fund was perhaps a way for the Exchange to endear itself 
to the public as a contributor and agitator for war support, in support of its moral legitimation. 
By raising funds, releasing men for active service, and encouraging recruiting, the Exchange 
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displayed patriotism, affirming its status as a national institution. In the context of war, the 
Exchange’s actions aligned with the values and sentiments of the day. 
In 1941, the Committee made two critical decisions in its development as a public institution. 
First, breaking the long-standing tradition of no advertising, the Exchange issued brochures 
for the first time in their history. These brochures were created to inform the public how the 
Exchange could benefit them, and would be available at branches of Barclays Bank, Standard 
Bank, and Netherlands Bank.219 Twenty five thousand copies were made available to the 
banks, financial institutions and the public, free of charge.220 In the uncertainty of war, this was 
perhaps an effort to reassure the public of the Exchange’s stability. Second, the Committee 
agreed to provide the Minister of Finance, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, with monthly turnover reports. 
The Minister requested the information on the volume of stock exchange transactions, 
referencing a publication by the NYSE (showing various market statistics) as an example.221  
The Committee initially seemed fearful of Hofmeyr’s intentions. The Chairman referred to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission “who took practically complete control” of the NYSE in 
response to the crash of 1929, and alluded to the JSE being in a similar position after the 
crash of 1937.222 After some discussions of the matter, the Committee decided to furnish the 
information voluntarily instead of waiting for the Government to enforce such reporting.223 
Thus, the Committee agreed to provide the Minister with a confidential report on the total 
number of shares bought per month, as well as a short explanatory statement on the market 
activity of the past month.224 The reports afforded Hofmeyr some protection in Parliament since 
he could say that the Exchange kept him up to date with the market activity, particularly in light 
of the uncertainty during the war.225 A summary of the reported figures is presented in Figure 
6.7. It should be noted that the reports only gave Hofmeyr an indication of the number of 
shares purchased, and not the monetary value. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the true 
turnover, since higher activity might be in lower-priced shares. Towards the end of 1945, 
however, the sharp rise in volume was associated with the post-war boom.  
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Figure 6.7 | Number of shares bought on the JSE, Nov. 1941 – Nov. 1945 
Source: Compiled from JSE/GC20 – JSE/GC23. 
Many of the Exchange members took up active service. By March 1941, approximately 30 
members of the Exchange were on active service, as were a large number of clerks.226 In April 
1942 it was reported that between 70 and 80 members and clerks were on active service.227 
After an appeal to the Exchange to release more men, it was reported in July 1942 that 143 
members, clerks and member staffs were on active service.228 In order to assist members, the 
Committee waived subscription fees for all members, clerks, and unoccupied clerkships during 
active service, as it had done in 1914.229 The Exchange kept a Roll of Honour in the Hall with 
the names of members and clerks on active service.230  
The war exacted a heavy toll on the Exchange. In February 1941, the first casualty was 
reported, when the Committee learned of authorised clerk S.L. Gettliffe’s death on active 
service, while stationed with the 1st Transvaal Scottish Regiment.231 This had a profound 
emotional effect on members. Shortly after Gettliffe’s death, two members, Jack Brownstein 
and A.D. Hiddleston, were called before the Committee to discuss comments that had been 
made regarding active service. Brownstein had seen Hiddleston’s son in uniform the previous 
day, and asked him “was he not ashamed to see his son in uniform? Had he brought up his 
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son to put him in uniform?”232 Brownstein also asked Hiddleston if he knew what his son was 
fighting for, to which Hiddleston replied “for freedom and Christianity”.233 Their words struck 
deep at the heart of the Committee’s sense of duty in the war. The Committee felt that 
Brownstein’s comments “cast aspersions on the King’s Uniform”, and suspended him for the 
duration of the war, although he was readmitted in January 1942.234 In total, the Exchange 
reported the death of four members and 10 clerks during the war.235 Many members also lost 
their sons in the war, which was regularly reported during Committee meetings. This included 
the sons of George Rennie, M.J. Susskind, J.B. Pryde, Chairman A.D. Viney, Deputy 
Chairman P.A. Moore, and E. Heilbronner.236 In the context of war, the Exchange fulfilled its 
moral obligation at the highest cost, which undoubtedly contributed to its moral legitimation 
after 1939. 
As the war progressed, the JSE remained open, but the impact of the hostilities on the 
Exchange was beginning to show. In December 1941, the Committee took out insurance from 
the Scottish Union and National Insurance Company against war damage and public 
violence.237 By early 1942, the threat of airstrikes rested heavily upon the minds of the 
Committee members. The Committee consulted with the Municipal Illumination 
Superintendent and the Civilian Protection Service (CPS) on whether to black out the 
Exchange Building windows. The CPS recommended that the building be kept unlit at night, 
which would obviate the need to black out the windows. It also recommended that the 
Exchange form a firefighting squad, and appoint night watchmen, because the wooden floors 
of the building could pose a higher risk “from an incendiary point of view”.238 By March 1942, 
firefighting and first aid lectures commenced at the Exchange, and a demonstration was held 
for the benefit of members and clerks on how to extinguish an incendiary bomb using a dummy 
bomb.239 An emergency exit route was also cut from the basement of the building to the 
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western exit.240 Responding to its civil duty, the Committee also made arrangements for 
various organisations to use the Exchange Building for warfare lectures, bayonet fighting 
demonstrations, storing ammunition, rifles and revolvers in the Exchange’s safes, Morse code 
workshops, and restoring toys for soldiers’ children.241 By May 1942, the Stock Exchange Fire 
Squad was fully equipped and operational, and all 40 out of the 40 exchange members and 
clerks passed the St. John Ambulance First Aid examination.242 Authorised clerks who were 
on leave from active service were also allowed to trade on the floor in their uniform.243 During 
this time, the Committee devised a scheme for clerks on active service to become members 
upon their return, under particular conditions. This included the creation of 100 new Proprietary 
Rights (thus, effectively 50 new memberships), specifically for returned soldiers, which could 
be purchased at £1 500 each. Clerks who had served for a minimum of six months, and 
worked as authorised clerks for two years after their discharge from military service, were 
eligible for admission under the scheme, at an entrance fee of 10 guineas, rather than £525.244  
Despite successfully weathering the instability that the war brought, the Committee made a 
decision in July 1943 that threatened the Exchange’s legitimacy. Six companies were 
identified which, in the opinion of the Committee, possessed “little more than their official 
quotation of value” and were “a tool of some syndicate”.245 The Committee, therefore, decided 
to suspend their listings from 30 July 1943 onwards.246 Initially, there was little reaction to the 
decision, but by June 1944, one of the companies, the Northern Transvaal (Messina) Copper 
Company, took legal action.247 After a mistrial, where the two judges could not agree on the 
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verdict, it was decided that the case would be reargued before a full bench on 21 November 
1944.248 The Company proposed an out-of-court settlement, whereby each party would cover 
their own legal cost, and the Company would be reinstated to the Official List.249 However, the 
Committee was unwilling to compromise.250 During the trial, the counsel for the Company 
argued that the Company was only subject to the Rules of the Exchange as they were at the 
time of listing, and that rules governing delisting which were subsequently introduced were not 
applicable to the Company.251 The counsel for the Stock Exchange argued that the listing was 
a contract, subject to the “good behaviour of the Company and the Company retaining its 
same status”.252  
The Committee learned on 12 December 1944 that judgment was given in favour of the 
Northern Transvaal (Messina) Copper Company with costs. Its shares would, therefore, had 
to be reinstated to the Official List.253 The Court found that the relationship between the 
Exchange and the Company was contractual, and because the Rule for delisting companies 
was only introduced after the Company had listed, the Committee did not possess such power 
under the agreement with the Company.254 While the court found it reasonable to delist a 
company in cases where a “material change in the communicated facts” had taken place 
(representing a breach of contract), in this case the Exchange could not prove any such 
material change.255 Consequently, the court held that the listing was made under the rules of 
the time, and that the Exchange could not change or revoke the contract “at the will of the 
Committee”.256  
The only way to resist the court order to reinstate the company was to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal at Bloemfontein.257 The fact that appeal was noted meant that the Committee 
did not have to reinstate the company for the time being.258 If the appeal failed, the Exchange 
would be in the same position as it was (having to reinstate the Company to the list). It would 
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then have to approach the Minister of Finance “and advise him that their endeavour to uphold 
the good name of the House had failed and that they looked to him to assist with legislation”.259 
This represented a marked departure from the Exchange’s earlier history, when the 
government and the courts viewed it as a private, closed group of individuals. The Committee 
was cognisant of the Exchange’s significance to the general public. Thus, the Committee 
envisaged restoring the Exchange’s legitimacy through the sanction of the government and 
the legal system. The appeal would have severe implications for the Exchange. If the appeal 
was lost, it meant that companies quoted before the new rules (created in 1933) would 
effectively be quoted in perpetuity.260 To make matters worse, the Committee received a letter 
on 22 January 1945 from A.E.G. Lovasz, the Chairman of the Northern Copper Company. He 
was now also the Chairman and Managing Director of the Beryl Mining Company (which had 
also been delisted). He informed the Committee that the Beryl Mining Company would take 
similar legal action against the Exchange to have the company’s name restored to the Official 
List.261  
On 30 April 1945 (the day that Hitler committed suicide), the Committee met to consider the 
procedure in case of a peace declaration.262 If news of peace was received, morning deliveries 
would be completed, and the Exchange would close shortly after noon.263 When news was 
received of Germany’s surrender on 7 May 1945, the Exchange paused for two minutes of 
silence in honour of their fallen colleagues before celebrating the news. The Chairman, A.D. 
Viney, said at the occasion: “We are making history. As long as civilisation lasts this day will 
be remembered as the day when the greater part of mankind was relieved of anxiety”.264 The 
celebrations concluded with the singing of “Die Stem” and “God Save the King”.265 The next 
day, the Committee decided to close the Exchange in anticipation of the Government’s 
statement, which would be released early in the afternoon, followed by a broadcast of a 
speech by Winston Churchill.266 It remained closed until 11 May 1945.267  
Despite the peace celebrations, the Exchange was certainly shaken by the Northern Copper 
debacle. One Committee member proposed that members should be allowed to deal in units 
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of 25 rather than 100 to increase public interest, hoping that it would afford the Exchange 
some protection.268 The Committee informed Lovasz that no settlement would be entertained, 
and decided to await the judgment in the Northern Copper appeal before taking further 
action.269 On 11 May 1945, the Committee learned that the appeal had been dismissed against 
the Exchange with cost.270 Essentially, the appeal was dismissed because the Committee 
failed to prove that continued listing of the company would or could be detrimental to the 
investing public. The court argued that the Committee’s assertions to such effect were mere 
“conjecture”.271 Northern Copper was therefore reinstated to the Official List the next 
morning.272 Shortly thereafter, letters were received from the Coronation Freehold Estates 
Towns & Mines Limited, as well as the New Monteleo Diamonds Limited, asking to be 
reinstated.273 Beryl Mining offered to withdraw the legal proceedings if they were reinstated, 
in light of the Northern Copper judgment.274 The Committee again declined to settle, and the 
case proceeded.275 On 27 September 1945, the Committee learnt that they had also lost the 
case against the Beryl Mining Company.276 In light of this judgment, the Committee decided 
to reinstate six companies to the Official List on 28 September 1945.277  
In retrospect, the Exchange solicitors informed the Committee that a company could not be 
delisted unless it could be shown that the company was engaging in “illegal or fraudulent 
activities” or if the court found that it would be detrimental to the public interest to allow the 
continued quotation.278 The solicitors pointed out that the Committee’s attempts to protect the 
public from worthless shares was “abortive and very costly”, arguing that the protection of the 
public after the granting of a quotation should be left to the government and the new legislation 
under preparation (discussed in section 6.6).279 The legal opinion of the Solicitors was 
forwarded to the Minister of Finance. Subsequently, the Minister invited the Committee to 
submit their views regarding the new legislation, in light of the Northern Copper and Beryl 
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Mining judgments.280 Despite the Exchange’s defeat, the first post-war boom occurred in 
November 1945, and by December 1945, was surpassing that of the mid-1930s. Some viewed 
the boom (perhaps in light of the post-war optimism) as the largest boom since 1905.281 The 
Sunday Times reported that the market value of all quotations had increased from £137 million 
to £1.3 billion over the year ending 30 September 1945.282 Thus, the Exchange proceeded 
undeterred by its defeat, and the Northern Copper debacle had no lasting effect on its 
legitimacy. 
During the war, the Exchange had come a long way towards becoming a national exchange. 
It successfully weathered the instability brought by the war, and through the changes in the 
Exchange rules, it managed to avert an extended closure. Its efforts to curb trading with enemy 
subjects, as well as its contribution of men and money to the war effort signalled its 
commitment to the broader interests of society and strengthened its moral legitimacy during 
this period. However, the most considerable development, which signalled the JSE’s 
emergence as the national exchange of South Africa, was the legislative developments 
towards the end of the war. This is discussed in the next section.  
6.6 BECOMING A NATIONAL EXCHANGE 
The Exchange’s difficulties following the Northern Copper and Beryl mining cases were 
compounded by the formation of the Union Exchange early in 1944.283 During its early history, 
the Exchange had to endure the existence of the much-loathed Open Call Exchange,284 which 
was now replaced by the Union Exchange as its main rival.285 Soon after learning of the 
establishment of the Union Exchange, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman arranged with 
Reuters to ensure that the new exchange would not have access to the JSE teleprinter 
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service.286 The Committee also lodged a formal protest with the Minister of Finance, Jan 
Hendrik Hofmeyr, concerning the granting of a licence to the Union Exchange.287 In the letter 
sent to Hofmeyr, the Committee pointed out that its policy was to protect the investing public 
by maintaining strict control over membership and quotations, and that the Union Exchange 
threatened their ability to maintain such control since individuals who were refused admission, 
and companies refused a listing could simply apply to the Union Exchange.288 The Committee 
also pointed out that the number of defaults amongst its members was less than one-third of 
one per cent between 1930 and 1944 (bearing in mind that this period included both the crash 
of 1937, and the start of World War II). This was argued to be evidence of the protection it 
provided to the investing public, which was at the risk of being nullified by the establishment 
of the Union Exchange.289 Soon after the protest, Hofmeyr informed the Exchange that he 
would investigate. However, the Committee soon learned that the license had been granted 
legally.290 Besides the protest to the Minister, the Committee also placed an advertisement in 
various newspapers, informing the public that no person advertising as a dealer of stocks and 
shares was associated with the JSE, nor under its control, and that a list of JSE members 
could be obtained from the Exchange Secretary.291  
During parliamentary debates in April 1944, one Member of Parliament, A.G. Barlow, 
questioned Finance Minister Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr as to the value of the Exchange. 292 Barlow 
argued that the Exchange was of no use to the mines nor Johannesburg at large, and 
proposed, in drawing a parallel between the Exchange and dog racing, that Hofmeyr close the 
Exchange altogether.293 Hofmeyr, who had a cordial relationship with the Exchange, replied 
that not every person invested in shares on the JSE was a gambler.294 Furthermore, Hofmeyr 
responded: “The share market does not exist for the purpose of making speculation easy. It 
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occupies an important part in the Union’s financial system”.295 A report in the Rand Daily Mail 
ridiculed Barlow’s suggestion, saying that “One might as well urge the Government to prohibit 
the sale of razors because people have been known to cut their throats with them”.296 The 
report also pointed out that claims of the Stock Exchange’s redundancy were due to 
misunderstanding, since the Exchange was “as much an integral part of our economic system 
as limited liability companies, cheque books and savings banks”.297 
 
Figure 6.8 | Notice by the Union Stock Exchange 
Source: “Union Stock Exchange”, Rand Daily Mail, 3 February 1944. 
In May 1944, the Committee informed Exchange members that Hofmeyr would appoint a 
Commission of Enquiry to “go into the Stock Exchange”, and that this would “probably cover 
[…] Government control of the Stock Exchange”.298 The Sunday Times reported in March 1944 
that the legislation would transfer the “control” of the JSE from the Transvaal Province to the 
Union Government. The paper also welcomed the proposed legislation, arguing that it would 
bring the JSE in line with London, particularly concerning new issues of shares, and investor 
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protection.299 In light of this, the Committee sought the assistance of member Tom Naudé, 
who was also a Member of Parliament.300 Naudé informed the Committee in June 1944 that 
the Minister was proceeding with the appointment of a Commission to investigate the 
operations of the Exchange, as well as to consider the amendment of legislation.301 On the 
Commission of Enquiry, Hofmeyr wrote to the Committee in June 1944: 
Following on my recent statement in Parliament that it was not proposed to take steps for 
issuing any further licences for stock exchanges under the Transvaal Act of 1909 until an 
investigation of the general position had taken place, I have had various representations 
made to me in which exception has been taken to what is described as the monopolistic 
position of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.302 
Hofmeyr wanted to bring this to the attention of the Committee so that they might comment on 
the matter.303 The Committee sent a reply, but the contents of the letter were not recorded.304 
Members of the Committee met with Hofmeyr several times before the Commission of Enquiry 
commenced its work in October 1944.305 After considering initial evidence submitted by the 
JSE in late October 1944, three main issues concerned the Commission. First, how the 
Committee would control margin accounts that brokers maintained with their clients. Second, 
whether there was excessive speculation in South Africa and, if so, how the Committee would 
control it. Third, the matter of outside brokers and how to control them.306 In addressing the 
first issue, the Committee responded that it was not practicable to specify a particular 
percentage of margin, but that it would formulate more definite procedures for clients pledging 
scrip and maintaining credit facilities with brokers.307 They argued that the “standing” or 
character of the client was as important as the cover provided, thus no fixed percentage of 
cover could apply to all potential clients.308 Since outside brokers were, according to the 
Committee, the main culprits inciting excessive speculation, the Committee suggested that no 
further Broker’s Licences be issued to outside brokers. The Committee emphasised that they 
were not prepared to admit any outside brokers to membership of the JSE by any means other 
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than the ordinary application, but that having been an outside broker would not militate against 
an individual becoming a JSE member.309 
After the initial evidence, the Committee submitted further memoranda to the Commission.310 
These memoranda contained evidence about the operations of the Exchange, as well as 
suggestions for the proposed legislation. This was, perhaps, the most significant opportunity 
for introspection the Exchange was faced with, after nearly six decades of its existence. The 
memoranda offer valuable insight into the way the Committee perceived the Exchange, or at 
least how the Committee wanted the Exchange to be perceived from the outside.311 The most 
important and comprehensive memorandum submitted to the Commission was formulated 
during April 1945, in response to the draft Stock Exchange Control Act which had recently 
been issued. The Chairman, A.D. Viney, was not willing to comment on the draft act. However, 
the Rand Daily Mail reported that the Act was favourably received amongst Exchange 
members “because of the stability which […] it would impart to operations on the Exchange”.312 
During discussions of the new Act, the Chairman suggested that as much information as 
possible should be provided to Government, and that copies of the Chairman’s speech, as 
well as statistical information, should be provided to Members of Parliament in both English 
and Afrikaans.313 The Chairman also encouraged all members of the Exchange to make 
contact with Members of Parliament they knew, to ensure that the interests of the Exchange 
were protected. Officially, the Chairman called for an attitude of “reticence” towards the new 
Act.314 General meetings of Exchange Members were held on 17 and 24 April 1945 to discuss 
the new Act, after which the final memorandum was submitted to the Commission of 
Enquiry.315 A variety of themes emerge from the memorandum. First, the Committee explained 
the core purpose and importance of the Exchange: 
The Stock Exchange is essentially a market for the purchase of securities and exists 
primarily to promote the negotiability of Government and Municipal Loans, Electricity 
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Supply and Water Board Stocks and Shares and debentures of Limited Liability 
Companies, Finance, Mining, Manufacturing and Industrial etc.316 
It is noteworthy that the Committee placed Government, Municipal, Electricity, and Water 
stocks before non-public companies, perhaps to emphasise the Exchange’s importance to the 
Government and the public. The Committee also sought to emphasise the size of the market 
(both in participants and securities traded) in several ways. Thus, the Committee pointed out 
that during “…the last few years the total market value of all securities quoted on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange has risen from £632,132,828 to £1,183,339,290”. 317 The 
Committee further reported that over 91 million government and municipal stocks were bought 
and sold through the JSE during 1944 alone.318 It also reported that the Stock Exchange had 
231 members, spread across South Africa, of which 65 members were part of 29 firms.319  
Second, the Committee emphasised its control over the market by pointing out that all 
transactions were subject to the Exchange Rules and Regulations (which were binding both 
on members of the Exchange, as well as clients). It also highlighted that the Rules and 
Regulations were based on those of the LSE and had been modified over “many years to 
conform to South African conditions and tradition”.320 Third, the Committee highlighted the 
character and standing of the Exchange Members. Applicants for membership were examined 
by the Committee “as to past history, character, business integrity and possession of capital” 
and would only be admitted on a two-thirds majority of the Committee being in favour.321 
Prospective members also needed to prove their financial standing, by purchasing two 
proprietary rights (valued at approximately £7 000 at the time). Additionally, applicants needed 
to have at least £5 000 in capital, and lodge securities of £2 000 for two years. When members 
executed transactions on the floor, it was done in good faith, according to the motto of the 
Exchange, which was Dictum Meum Pactum (my word is my bond).322 Fourth, the Committee 
emphasised the Exchange’s role as a protector of the investing public. The High ‘Change List 
and hourly price lists were issued “in protection of the public” and clients had “recourse to the 
Committee which has severe disciplinary powers over the members”.323 The memorandum 
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also highlighted the Exchange’s control over the quotation of companies. The Exchange 
ensured that the interests of shareholders and directors were aligned, and that directors did 
not have excessive powers. The Supplementary List was also held out as an essential part of 
investor protection, since smaller and more risky “Venturer” companies (as the Committee 
referred to them) could be listed, and these listings could be reviewed annually.324 
The Committee argued for the inclusion of several important provisions that would ultimately 
reaffirm its practices through national legislation. Most importantly, the Committee reserved 
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where it disagreed with the Minister of 
Finance on amendments to rules or other matters pertaining to the operation of the Exchange. 
While it did not intend to challenge the authority of the Minister over the Exchange, the 
Committee argued that without right of appeal the control of the Exchange would be “virtually 
vested in the Civil Service”.325 Another important provision in the proposed Act confirmed the 
right of the Committee to delist shares when it was found, after investigation, to be 
necessary.326 The Committee argued that it had always had this right, despite it recently being 
the subject of litigation in the Northern Copper and Beryl Mining cases. While the Exchange 
ultimately lost the cases against Northern Copper and Beryl Mining, where its authority to 
delist shares was challenged, this authority would be confirmed through the proposed 
legislation.327 The Committee also argued in favour of the protection of stockbrokers through 
the right to sell out shares held for a client, in the event of non-payment or failure to maintain 
the minimum cover.328 This right was also previously challenged, but it would be supported by 
the proposed legislation. Thus stockbrokers would be able to alienate shares that were the 
property of their clients, after giving due notice, in cases where clients failed to maintain a 
sufficient margin.329 Another provision in the Act, which prohibited stockbrokers from 
advertising, also confirmed the long-standing rule of the Exchange.330 The most critical shift 
                                                 
 
324 JSE/GC22:228-238. 
325 Ibid.; “Amendments Urged to Stock Exchange and Unit Trusts Bills”, Rand Daily Mail, 13 August 1945. 
326 “Stock Exchange Control Bill”, Rand Daily Mail, 12 April 1945. 
327 JSE/GC22:228-238. See also Union of South Africa, Stock Exchange Control Act, No. 7 of 1947, Union 
Gazette, 28 March 1947. 
328 This was contested in the Supreme Court in January 1935, when a client sued a broking firm for selling 
shares which the broker had held on behalf of the client and had received no payment for such shares. It was 
argued at the time that selling out was a well-known custom, but at this point it was not yet included in the rules 
of the Exchange (“Judgment in Share Dispute”, Rand Daily Mail, 18 January 1935). 
329 JSE/GC22:228-238. This matter had been considered by the Committee as early as August 1934, when an 
Exchange member pointed out that the traditional method of selling out, which required an Order of the Court, 
took much too long. The Exchange Solicitors advised that shares could only be sold out where the client had 
given authorization to the broker, or where it could be proved that selling out was a generally accepted custom 
of the Exchange, otherwise a Court Order would be necessary (JSE/GC17:42-43; JSE/GC17:55-59; 
JSE/GC17:163-170).  
330 JSE/GC22:228-238. See also Union of South Africa, Stock Exchange Control Act, No. 7 of 1947, Union 
Gazette, 28 March 1947. 
228 
embodied by the legislation was that all stockbrokers needed to operate under the control of 
a licenced exchange in order to continue working as a stockbroker.331 
On 30 May 1945, a few weeks after Germany’s surrender, a deputation of the Stock Exchange 
Committee proceeded to the House of Assembly in Cape Town. Members of Parliament were 
given copies of the Chairman’s speech, as well as information on the Returned Soldiers 
Scheme.332 The Acting Prime Minister, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, received the deputation as 
Smuts was in San Francisco for the drafting of the United Nations Charter.333 Since members 
of the Commission of Enquiry would visit the Exchange later in 1945, the Committee decided 
to extend the invitation to all Members of Parliament, so “they can then see how the Exchange 
was run”.334 Later in 1945, the suggestion was made to change the name of the JSE to the 
“South African Stock Exchange”.335 In fact, the Committee resolved on 28 August 1945 to 
change the Exchange’s name accordingly, and obtain legal advice from the Exchange 
Solicitors to effect this change. In November 1945, however, the Committee decided (on the 
advice of the Exchange Solicitors) to retain the name “Johannesburg Stock Exchange” 
because of the legal difficulties associated with a change in name.336 Members of the 
Commission visited the Exchange on 13 and 14 December 1945. There was also a luncheon 
at the Rand Club in their honour, and the eight members of the Commission were admitted as 
Honorary Members of the Exchange during their visit.337 
Ultimately, the Act was only promulgated in 1947, as the Stock Exchanges Control Act, No. 7 
of 1947, but through its engagement with the Commission of Enquiry and the Minister of 
Finance, the Committee managed to secure for itself important powers and rights concerning 
the management of the Exchange. For the first time, the Exchange could genuinely rely on 
statutory sanction for its existence and operations. In many instances, the new Act confirmed 
rights and powers that had long been part of the Exchange Rules and Regulations. In essence, 
therefore, the Act represented the institutionalisation of the Exchange, and marked the 
culmination of its legitimation efforts over six decades.  
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6.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the Exchange’s emergence as a national exchange during the interwar 
period and the Second World War. Although the Exchange’s competence as a market 
intermediary had been established by the First World War, it was significantly strengthened 
between 1919 and 1945. Moreover, several developments during this period contributed to 
the moral legitimation of the Exchange. As such, the Exchange’s legitimation efforts were 
aimed primarily at the government and the public, as its public duty started to outweigh its 
responsibility towards Exchange members.  
During the 1920s, the Exchange slowly recovered as it emerged from the First World War. 
This decade was characterised by several developments that promoted the Exchange’s 
legitimacy. The Committee strengthened its control over the market when it ruled that 
members could no longer deal in shares that had been refused a quotation. Furthermore, the 
procedures surrounding the Unofficial (or Supplementary) List was improved during this 
period. This contributed to the Exchange’s moral legitimacy by ensuring that companies 
applying for an unofficial listing were adequately scrutinised, and that those found to be 
unworthy of a listing could not be traded at the Exchange, for the protection of the public. 
Despite briefly closing in March 1922 as a result of the Rand Revolt, the Exchange proceeded 
mostly unhindered on its developmental path. The absorption of the Cape Town Stock 
Exchange in 1926 represented a critical development during the interwar period, as it 
contributed to the JSE’s emergence as a national exchange. As a result, the Exchange was 
seen as the centre of financial activity in the Union. The wider geographic spread of its 
members (and by implication, its clients) meant that the Committee had to update the rules to 
better suit its national status. Thus, after revisions to the rules between 1929 and 1931, the 
interests of all members (in Johannesburg and further afield) were better protected. The new 
rules on brokerage meant that investors outside Johannesburg only had to pay commission 
once, not twice as before. By providing procedural certainty, these developments extended 
the Exchange’s pragmatic legitimacy to members and investors beyond Johannesburg.  
South Africa’s departure from the gold standard in December 1932 marked the start of a period 
of significant development for the Exchange. The most tangible effect of the abandonment of 
the gold standard was the boom in the market between 1933 and 1937. During this period, 
the Exchange further strengthened its pragmatic legitimacy through improved communications 
facilitated by the Exchange teleprinter service. The Committee’s decision to ban all trading in 
unquoted shares in March 1934 further strengthened the Exchange’s legitimacy. As a result 
of this decision, Exchange members were confined to trading in shares that had received the 
Committee’s sanction – a key development for the protection of investors, and the 
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Committee’s control over market activity. Despite calls for increased external control over the 
Exchange by the mid-1930s, the Companies Act Commission’s recommendation that external 
control over was not necessary represented an endorsement of the Exchange’s status as the 
legitimate share market of South Africa. 
Another result of the boom was that outside brokers emerged as a threat to the 
professionalization of the Exchange membership. Although the poor market conditions 
between 1905 and 1933 weeded out most amateur stockbrokers, the boom attracted many to 
stockbroking between 1933 and 1937. However, the high cost, exacting requirements, and 
limited total membership of JSE membership meant that many had to resort to outside broking. 
Such outside brokers were not under the control of the Exchange. However, their actions had 
an impact on the way stockbroking, in general, was perceived. The threat of outside brokers 
was compounded by the market crash in May 1937, and the subsequent criticism of the 
Exchange by Acting Minister of Finance, Oswald Pirow. In response to the crash, the 
Committee implored Pirow to change legislation allowing outside brokers to obtain a broker’s 
licence. The Exchange rules were also modified so that members could no longer deal with, 
or on behalf of, outside brokers and bucket shops.  
By late-1937, the worst of the crash had subsided, and the Exchange was publicly praised for 
how the crash had been handled. The Exchange was also granted an official coat of arms. 
The new coat of arms, which resembled that of the LSE, represented an important symbol of 
the Exchange's legitimation. It was intended to symbolise the dignity and prestige of the 
Exchange, and to hold out the JSE as a peer of its prestigious London counterpart. 
Unfortunately for the Exchange, the controversy surrounding the Henkes insolvency case in 
early 1938, and the implication of several JSE members, threatened its moral legitimacy. As 
a result, the Committee suspended or expelled several members, and appealed to the Minister 
of Justice at the time, Jan Smuts, to bring outside brokers under legislative control.  
Despite rising fears of a European war, the Munich Agreement of September 1938 placed the 
Committee at ease. While the Committee adapted the Exchange rules in October 1938 to 
grant it emergency powers in the event of a war, it seemed to remain optimistic about the 
European situation until August 1939. The LSE also echoed this optimism. However, on 1 
September 1939, as Germany invaded Poland, the Exchange closed. The uncertainty 
surrounding South Africa’s position in the war, as well as the Prime Minister, J.B.M. Hertzog’s 
resignation, delayed the reopening of the Exchange until 11 September 1939. The short 
closure of the Exchange during this period, as compared to during the First World War and 
the South African War, testifies of the pragmatic legitimacy the Exchange had obtained by this 
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point in its history. It was well prepared for the political instability and managed to successfully 
endure the uncertainty brought on by the declaration of war.  
The Second World War provided an opportunity for the Exchange to demonstrate its moral 
legitimacy to the public and the government. In June 1940, for instance, after close 
cooperation with the Minister of Finance, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, the Committee instituted 
procedures to limit trading which would benefit enemy subjects. The Committee also 
attempted to support the war effort by not admitting men who were eligible for military service. 
Later in 1940, the Committee also established a Stock Exchange War Fund, to make financial 
contributions to the war effort. By 1942, the impact of the war on the Exchange became more 
apparent. The Exchange agreed to black out the building at night, and a Stock Exchange fire 
squad was formed. The Committee also made the Exchange building available for a variety of 
wartime events, including warfare lectures, storing wartime supplies, and restoring toys for 
soldiers’ children. The Exchange also had over 140 members, clerks and staff on active 
service at this time, and the Returned Soldiers Scheme was formulated in late 1942 to reward 
clerks on active service with an easier path to full membership. For the sake of its moral 
legitimacy, it was important for the Exchange to conform to society’s patriotic expectations 
during the war. All these efforts were intended to show the Exchange’s commitment to the 
national cause, and significantly contributed to the Exchange’s moral legitimation during the 
war.  
As a result of its contributions to the war effort, the Exchange enjoyed prominence in the press 
during 1944 and 1945. However, the loss of exclusive market control resulting from the 
formation of the Union Exchange, as well as the successful legal action by Northern Copper 
and the Beryl Mining Company, threatened its legitimacy. Furthermore, the Committee feared 
that parliamentary discussions about possible regulation of the Exchange signalled the end of 
its autonomy, particularly in light of the objections against the JSE’s monopoly of share dealing 
in South Africa. However, through the Committee’s engagement with the Commission of 
Enquiry throughout late 1944 and the first half of 1945, it was able to secure generally 
favourable provisions in the proposed legislation. In particular, the Commission of Enquiry 
heeded the Committee’s calls for the regulation of outside brokers and included several 
provisions which strengthened the Committee’s ability to control the market and protect the 
interests of Exchange members.  
As the nation celebrated the armistice, and the markets underwent a post-war boom, the 
Exchange could rest in the knowledge that the proposed legislation confirmed its status as the 
national exchange of South Africa. The Exchange’s ability to deliver socially valued 
consequences (consequential legitimacy), by appropriate trading procedures (procedural 
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legitimacy) and structures (structural legitimacy), in a comprehensible and culturally justified 
way (cognitive legitimacy), was now unquestioned. The prominence and visibility of Exchange 
members in society signalled the Exchange’s personal legitimacy, and its alignment with the 
LSE signified its congruence with the values of the profession (professional legitimacy). The 
aggregate of these developments meant that, overall, the Exchange proved its moral 
legitimacy to its members, the public, and the state, and it was also accepted as such by the 
media. Although the Exchange was at the height of its public visibility, increased 
understanding of its purpose and value, as well as the emergence of an investor culture in 
South Africa, shielded the Exchange from criticism and meant that its stakeholders tolerated 
temporary variations in performance. Ultimately, after six decades of growth, retrogression 
and recovery, the JSE gained cognitive legitimacy by becoming taken-for-granted as the 
trusted, respected, and valued centre of financial activity in the Union of South Africa.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has explored the development of the JSE over the course of six decades, through 
the lens of organisational legitimacy. Drawing on both extensive archival research and other 
published sources, the study considered how the Exchange first established its legitimacy 
towards its members, the public, the state and (by extension) the media, and how it 
subsequently maintained its legitimacy in a dynamic and often challenging environment. 
During the period of analysis, the Exchange endured significant shifts in its socio-economic 
environment, most notably the as a result of the South African War, the ZAR’s incorporation 
into the British Empire, and two world wars. Increasing public participation in share trading, 
the broader strengthening of the capitalist market economy, and the resultant increase in 
government interest in the Exchange acted as catalysts for change at the JSE. These periods 
of change and the resulting developments offer insight into how the JSE negotiated a complex 
socio-economic environment, how it endeared itself to a variety of audiences, and how it 
ultimately became accepted as a legitimate economic actor in South Africa’s financial 
infrastructure.  
Although legitimation is a non-linear process, and various types of legitimation take place 
simultaneously, the Exchange’s legitimation can be divided into four broad phases. These 
phases represent the broad waves of the Exchange’s legitimation. The phases did not occur 
in isolation, nor in strict sequence, but in subtle overlap. First, the Exchange thrived despite a 
lack of legitimacy. Second, it gained acceptance as an able market intermediary. Third, the 
moral dimension of the JSE’s activities gained social acceptance. Fourth, the Exchange 
became accepted as a necessary and respected economic actor, through a shared 
understanding and justification of its actions and existence. The study offers a discussion of 
these phases (or spheres of legitimation), followed by a summary of the key findings 
concerning its legitimation.  
7.2 LACK OF LEGITIMACY (1888 – 1889) 
Like all organisations, the Exchange came into existence without any form of legitimacy. 
Despite the desire of the Exchange’s founder, Benjamin Woollan, to safeguard the public from 
unsound investments, the first two years of the Exchange’s history were characterised by 
allegations in the press of incompetence, fictitious values, worthless shares, defaults, and 
price manipulations. However, instead of actively engaging with various stakeholders during 
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this time, the Committee only pursued the approval and support of Exchange members, whose 
sole pursuit was speculative profit (either for themselves or for their clients). All matters that 
did not affect members’ ability to generate a profit fell by the wayside, resulting in a complete 
lack of legitimacy from the perspective of the non-investing public, state and media. The 
Committee was, at this time, less concerned with the moral and cognitive aspects of the 
Exchange’s activities, and therefore focused on the will of Exchange members. Despite the 
lack of legitimacy, however, the Exchange managed to attract approximately 170 members by 
the end of 1889, and it had approximately 300 different shares on the official list by 1890.  
Several factors supported the Exchange’s early success, in spite of widespread criticism. 
While the Exchange was established primarily to enable the aggregation of capital for gold 
mining operations, the risky informal share market in Johannesburg underscored the need for 
market organisation. This was compounded by the Barberton exchange’s dubious reputation, 
and the poor communications infrastructure between Johannesburg and other towns further 
afield hosting competing exchanges, such as Kimberley and Pietermaritzburg. Individuals in 
and around Johannesburg desiring the profits promised by share trading had no choice but to 
deal with the JSE. By March 1889, the Exchange had attracted such a large complement of 
members that it was increasingly difficult to distinguish between members and non-brokers. 
Trading in unlisted shares in and around the Exchange was also common during this period. 
The Committee, therefore, struggled to delineate the market and its participants from 
outsiders, which contributed to its lack of control and thus the Exchange’s lack of legitimacy. 
Towards the end of 1889, poor market conditions left many brokers indigent and starving. The 
effect of the poor market conditions on the Exchange was aggravated by the Committee’s lack 
of autonomy under the Johannesburg Estate Company. As the market improved and trading 
increased, however, the Committee adopted specific measures that would contribute to the 
Exchange’s pragmatic legitimation. 
7.3 PRAGMATIC LEGITIMATION (1890 – 1903)  
The Exchange’s pragmatic legitimacy rested primarily on its competence as a market 
intermediary. While it could not consistently deliver this basic outcome during its first years of 
operation, the Exchange’s ability to generate profit for its members represented the first 
semblance of pragmatic legitimacy. As public participation in share trading increased, the 
Committee increasingly focused its attention on the improvement of its intermediary function, 
for the benefit of all market participants. Starting in 1890, the Committee aligned the Exchange 
rules with those of the LSE and set out to improve its control over the market. To reassure 
members that the Exchange was in good health, the Committee issued audited financial 
statements to members after 1890.  
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During this phase, the Committee’s judicial role emerged as an essential component of the 
Exchange’s legitimacy. In 1890 alone, the Committee adjudicated in 36 disputes. This 
contributed to the Exchange’s pragmatic legitimacy by providing members with assurance that 
the Committee, as an impartial third party, could resolve all trading disputes. In the informal 
market, brokers had no recourse to a higher authority to resolve disputes. Besides its judicial 
role, the Committee introduced several measures during the first half of the 1890s to display 
the Exchange’s competence as a market intermediary. The Committee published a list of JSE 
brokers to distinguish brokers under its control from outside brokers. The Committee also 
started exploring the possibility of establishing a clearing house. Although this did not 
materialise during the Exchange’s early history, it shows the Committee’s intentions to improve 
the efficiency of the Exchange’s operations. To minimise the potential knock-on effect of 
default on the stability of the market, the Committee raised sureties required of new members 
significantly during the first half of the 1890s. The Committee’s changing attitude towards the 
listing of non-mining companies during 1892 and 1893 also contributed to the Exchange’s 
pragmatic legitimation by bringing a larger number of diversified shares under the Committee’s 
scrutiny and control. This also afforded members the opportunity of dealing in an expanded 
selection of shares, beyond mining shares, which included several industrial shares and 
government bonds. 
By 1895, the Committee further increased its control over the market, when it was ruled that 
only officially listed shares would be called during High ‘Change. Companies applying for a 
listing had to provide audited annual financial reports, and listing fees were increased five-fold 
to deter smaller, less established companies from applying. Sureties were again increased for 
the protection of members against default, and evidence suggests that there was active 
trading between the JSE and the LSE during this time. Despite having proven a degree of 
pragmatic legitimacy, the Exchange was still the subject of reproval, particularly from local 
clergy. Members still engaged in a variety of colourful activities in the Exchange building, 
including defacing the walls, bringing their dogs to work, and playing games on the trading 
floor. JSE members were seen as “stock exchange gamblers”, and the activities of the 
Exchange were considered morally questionable.  
Towards the end of 1895, the uncertainty surrounding the Jameson Raid and the resulting 
leadership crisis at the Exchange represented the first significant threat to its pragmatic 
legitimacy. Although the majority of Exchange members were of British descent, and therefore 
desirous of franchise and political representation, most were opposed to the Raid due to its 
potentially detrimental impact on their livelihood. By May 1896, however, most prisoners were 
released, and the market rallied as the Committee expressed its gratitude to President Paul 
Kruger. Thus, the Exchange could again focus its efforts on its primary purpose. Little more 
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than a year later, shortly after the Exchange closed for Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee 
celebrations, the Committee managed to gain independence from its owners at the time, the 
Johannesburg Estate Company. This enabled the Committee to further improve the 
operations of the Exchange for the benefit of (and legitimation towards) Exchange members 
in a variety of ways. Several deep level mining companies were introduced to the Official List. 
The Committee also advertised in the local press that only JSE members operated under its 
control. This was a clear strategy to protect members from the competition of outside brokers. 
Crucially, the Committee decided in November 1897 to introduce proprietary rights, to align 
the interests of members with those of the Exchange as a whole. This was an important 
strategy to co-opt Exchange members into the Committee’s pursuit of legitimacy. A legitimate 
exchange meant an appreciation of proprietary right prices as well as a more substantial profit 
share. Independence from the Estate Company also allowed the Committee to focus on 
matters not directly related to profitability. Thus, after-hours dealing was prohibited to enhance 
the Committee’s control over the market. The Committee also communicated more frequently 
with the LSE regarding trading practices, sharing information concerning defaulting members 
and the establishment of a clearing house. The Exchange enjoyed significant growth in profits 
after its independence, which contributed to the appreciation of proprietary rights’ value.  
After making significant progress with its pragmatic legitimation, particularly towards 
Exchange members, the South African War (1899 – 1902) stalled the Exchange’s progress to 
some extent. However, the Committee’s prudent preparation, the preservation of its financial 
assets and records, and the trading facilities offered to JSE members by the Cape Town and 
Maritzburg Exchanges (both in British territory) allowed the Exchange and most of its members 
to emerge reasonably unscathed from the war. After the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902, 
the ZAR became the Transvaal Colony of the British Empire, and the Exchange found itself in 
a new, but more familiar, socio-political environment. Thus, to further the position of the 
Exchange and its members, the Committee wasted no time in endearing itself to the new 
order, by engaging with various British luminaries, including Kitchener, Chamberlain and 
Milner. Starting in 1903, the Committee amended the Exchange rules to align with English 
common law. New listing rules were developed, which introduced more explicit requirements 
for companies listing on the JSE. This extended the Exchange’s legitimation efforts to 
companies desiring a listing, and to some extent also to the public, since the amended rules 
focused on barring untrustworthy companies from listing, thus protecting the public. Increased 
public participation in the activities of the Exchange, as well as the scandals and widespread 
criticism that characterised its early history, attracted government interest. This ultimately 
established the three primary audiences from which the Exchange needed acceptance in 
support of its legitimation (namely, Exchange members, the public, and the government). 
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The Exchange’s occupation of the new building in December 1903 symbolised the culmination 
of its pragmatic legitimation. The Committee had succeeded in providing members with proper 
trading facilities, protection in disputes, a share of Exchange profits through proprietary rights, 
and, finally, a building of which to be proud. Although the Committee continued to improve the 
Exchange’s competence as a market intermediary, the building symbolised that the Exchange 
had been successful in fulfilling its main purpose. It lent the Exchange a degree of prominence 
and permanence. As the JSE’s competence became known and accepted, the Committee’s 
legitimation efforts shifted towards the moral dimension of its activities. However, the poor 
market conditions between 1905 and 1915 threatened to nullify the Exchange’s pragmatic 
legitimacy. Its competence could not shield the Exchange from poor market conditions and 
the resulting financial pressure. Nonetheless, the moral legitimation of its activities was the 
next frontier in the Exchange’s development. 
7.4 MORAL LEGITIMATION (1904 – 1945) 
With its competence proven, the Exchange had to move on towards convincing audiences 
that share trading in itself was legitimate. It was also crucial for the Exchange to prove that its 
techniques and procedures were sound, particularly since the outcome of share trading was 
not as tangible as other enterprises of the day. Essentially, the Exchange had to legitimate 
what it did, as well as how it did it. Thus, for the largest part of its early history, the JSE went 
through the slow process of moral legitimation. This manifested first and foremost as efforts 
to dissociate the activities of the Exchange from gambling. Although the Committee banned 
playing dice as early as 1891, and betting between the chains in 1893, it struggled to break 
members’ bond with gambling, particularly in the form of horseracing. Between 1892 and 
1898, and as late as 1905, the Exchange closed regularly or postponed High ‘Change to allow 
members to attend local horse races. Local clergy publicly bemoaned the “wickedness” of 
brokers, and the Exchange was often likened to a gambling house, with emphasis on the poor 
character of stockbrokers. However, in 1904, several developments emerged that supported 
and accelerated the Committee’s efforts at moral legitimation.  
Early in 1904, the Committee learned that the local courts, in following their English 
counterparts, would enforce the Exchange rules not only on JSE members but also on their 
clients. This was, according to prominent barrister William Schreiner, because the broker’s 
knowledge was considered the client’s knowledge. Thus, the Exchange evolved from being 
the regulator of trading in the Hall, to a market regulator in the true sense. This represented 
the most significant result of the ZAR’s absorption into the British Empire, and a cardinal 
development in the Exchange’s pragmatic and moral legitimation after the South African War, 
since it extended the Committee’s authority to all market participants. However, the 
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emergence of Macnamara’s Open Call Exchange at approximately the same time threatened 
the Exchange’s newfound control. Brokers and companies unable to meet the high 
requirements of the JSE could simply bypass its control over the market by making use of the 
Open Call Exchange. This not only threatened the JSE’s ability to act as a competent market 
intermediary (thus threatening its pragmatic legitimacy) but also its ability to protect the 
integrity of the market (thus threatening its moral legitimacy). To some extent, however, the 
poor market conditions after 1904 pushed brokers and investors towards the more trustworthy 
and prestigious JSE, which by then was seen as a “barometer” of South Africa’s economy.  
The legitimating potential of the Committee’s control over all market participants was shrouded 
by the poor market conditions, until 1909, when the Gambling Commission investigated the 
affairs of the Exchange. The Committee initially feared that the investigation would result in a 
loss of its control over the market, particularly in light of the high number of defaults occurring 
in 1909. However, the Committee successfully demonstrated its control over members as well 
as the market, and thus the protection that it offered investors. This represented a significant 
development in the Exchange’s moral legitimation, since it symbolised the Exchange’s 
dissociation from gambling. The Exchange was found to be competent, both in its role as a 
market intermediary, and as a protector of public interest. The Stock and Share Dealing Act 
of 1909, which provided legislative sanction for the Exchange’s existence and its operations, 
further promoted this endorsement by the Commission.  
Despite the progress the Exchange had made by 1909, the sustained slump in market 
conditions kept the Exchange from enjoying the benefits of its legitimacy. However, hostilities 
in Europe and the declaration of war in 1914 allowed the Exchange to demonstrate its 
commitment to society, and thus to bolster its moral legitimacy. Although the war posed a 
threat to the Exchange’s pragmatic legitimacy, particularly during its five-month closure 
between August 1914 and January 1915, several elements in the Exchange’s response to the 
war signalled its legitimacy to members, the public and the government. First, the decision to 
close, although detrimental to members, was an attempt to protect the investing public from 
having the JSE become a dumping ground for stocks. The Committee also attempted to 
introduce measures for the protection of its members, including procedures for closing open 
transactions once the Exchange reopened. Although these wartime measures were initially 
stalled by the Committee’s lack of emergency powers, the Martial Law regulation granting the 
Committee the necessary powers signalled, perhaps unwittingly, the government’s approval 
and sanction of the Exchange’s activities.  
After the Exchange reopened, the Committee continued with efforts to gain (and maintain) 
moral legitimacy. Primarily, this manifested as procedures to limit trading for the benefit of 
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enemy subjects, as well as efforts to minimise the presence of members who were considered 
enemy subjects at the Exchange. It was important in light of the anti-German sentiment, and 
particularly after the sinking of the Lusitania, that the Exchange publicly demonstrate its 
opposition to enemy subjects by not allowing them to benefit in any way from the Exchange’s 
activities. This culminated in 1916 in a new rule that only British subjects could be JSE 
members. This was, perhaps, the most explicit symbol of the Exchange’s congruence with its 
predominantly British social environment. The Committee also expanded its contribution to 
the war effort during this time, by offering to raise a war loan for General Smuts, and making 
the Exchange Building available for a variety of wartime activities, which included the partial 
assembly of hand grenades in the Exchange basement. 
By the end of the Great War, the Exchange had reaffirmed its competence as a market 
intermediary (thus, its pragmatic legitimacy). It had also proven its commitment to the values 
of the society it served and shown its value as a public institution (thus, its moral legitimacy). 
However, the listless market, which persisted at that time, along with widespread labour unrest 
during the early 1920s kept the Exchange from translating its legitimacy into commercial 
success. In a bid to increase market activity, the Exchange attempted to attract new members 
on several occasions during the 1920s. Although slow at first, these efforts resulted in the 
absorption of the Cape Town Stock Exchange. Although it consisted of only twelve members 
and a handful of listings, the JSE’s takeover of the Cape Town exchange symbolised the 
national reach of its authority and control over the stock market. Along with Cape Town 
members, the growing pockets of membership outside Johannesburg meant that the 
Committee extended its control to country members between 1929 and 1931.  
After the Great War, the watershed development for the Exchange’s legitimation was South 
Africa’s departure from the gold standard in December 1932. The favourable market 
conditions enabled the Committee to consolidate its control over the market, by banning all 
trading in unquoted shares (something it had been unable to do earlier, due to the pressure it 
would place on members during periods of low market activity). The boom attracted a large 
number of outside brokers to the profession. However, the high cost and exacting 
requirements of JSE membership meant that many of these brokers could not join the JSE. 
This posed a threat to the Exchange’s moral legitimacy, since the conduct of these brokers 
reflected on the stockbroking profession and the activities of the JSE, while they were not 
under the authority of the Committee. Along with the threat of outside brokers, increased calls 
for external control over the Exchange dominated its development during the mid-1930s. 
When the Companies Act Commission scrutinised the affairs of the Exchange during 1935 
and 1936, however, the JSE Committee successfully demonstrated its competence, both on 
a pragmatic and moral level. Thus, the Companies Act Commission recommended that no 
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external control was necessary. Much like the Gambling Commission in 1909, and the 
resulting legislation, the recommendations of the Companies Act Commission symbolised 
government endorsement of the Exchange’s activities and existence. This further 
strengthened the Exchange’s legitimacy, mainly through press reports of the proceedings and 
recommendations.  
When the market crashed in 1937, it ushered in a difficult period for the Exchange. The 
Exchange was criticised by the Acting Minister of Finance, Oswald Pirow, for its failure to 
protect minor investors from the detrimental effect of the crash. The Committee reiterated the 
threat that outside brokers posed to its market control and blamed them for the excessive 
speculation that was seen as the root cause of market instability. The Exchange rules were 
also amended to preclude JSE members from dealing with or on behalf of such outside 
brokers. Despite the criticism, however, the Exchange weathered the market crash remarkably 
well, with only three defaults during 1937, and only one subsequent default by the end of the 
Second World War. By early 1938, the worst of the crash had subsided, and the Exchange 
was praised for its handling of the crash. Shortly afterwards, however, the Exchange’s moral 
legitimacy was threatened by the Henkes insolvency case, which involved several Exchange 
members in unscrupulous dealings with outside brokers. The detrimental effect of outside 
brokers on the prestige of stockbroking, and by extension, the legitimacy of the JSE, drove 
the Committee to recommend legislative action to Jan Smuts (who was at the time the Minister 
of Justice) in June 1938. The Committee argued that the legislation should be amended to 
permit only members of licenced exchanges to obtain a broker’s licence from the state. While 
it actively avoided external influence over its affairs during its earlier history, the status of the 
Exchange as a public institution and its desire to protect its moral legitimacy motivated the 
Committee to seek statutory protection of its ability to protect the public.  
When the Second World War commenced in September 1939, the Exchange had another 
opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the values of the society it served. By this point 
in its history, the Exchange had established its competence as a market intermediary to the 
extent that it was only closed for ten days as a result of the war. Thus, the Exchange could 
continue to function as a key public institution during most of the war. By instituting procedures 
to limit trading that would benefit enemy subjects, cooperating with the government for the 
protection of investor, not admitting men eligible for military service, opening the Exchange 
building to wartime support activities, and establishing a Stock Exchange War Fund, the 
Exchange aligned itself with the expectations of society in the context of the war. The war 
casualties of several Exchange members and clerks further symbolised the Exchange’s 
commitment to the war effort. It was doing what was right, by supporting the war effort at all 
cost.  
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During 1944, several developments threatened the Exchange’s legitimacy. When it learned 
early in 1944 that the rival Union Exchange had legally acquired a stock exchange licence, 
the Committee perceived it as a threat to its control over the market. The JSE’s control over 
the market was necessary (in the view of the Committee) for the protection of investors. 
Furthermore, a Member of Parliament, A.G. Barlow, questioned the purpose of the Exchange 
and, harking back to the Exchange’s early history, Barlow drew parallels between the 
Exchange’s activities and gambling. This was compounded by the Northern Copper Company 
and Beryl Mining’s legal action against the Committee, for reinstatement to the official list. All 
three of these developments threatened the Exchange’s legitimacy, particularly on a moral 
level. The Union Exchange brought the JSE’s ability to protect investors into question. 
Barlow’s comments cast aspersion on the Exchange’s purpose and value. The Northern 
Copper case questioned the Committee’s competence as a market regulator. However, partly 
due to the legitimacy that the JSE managed to gain by 1944, the Union Exchange did not lure 
significant business away from the JSE. Barlow was ridiculed in the press for 
misunderstanding the JSE’s purpose. Furthermore, the defeat in the Northern Copper and 
Beryl Mining cases had no lasting effect on the Exchange’s legitimacy.  
Most importantly, 1944 was characterised by the Committee’s engagement with the 
government and the Commission of Enquiry on planned legislation to regulate the activities of 
the Exchange. The Committee reacted favourably to the draft legislation resulting from the 
enquiry, which was first released in April 1945, due to its perceived support of the Exchange’s 
activities and the Committee’s powers. This represented the culmination of the Exchange’s 
legitimation efforts over six decades, since the proposed legislation confirmed many of the 
powers and rights of the Committee previously subject to criticism. Although the legislation 
was only promulgated in 1947, it signalled the government’s statutory sanction of the 
Exchange’s existence and operations. The legislation symbolised the Exchange’s pragmatic 
and moral legitimation by confirming its competence as a market intermediary, implying its 
value to broader society, and providing an undeniable justification for the Exchange’s 
existence. As 1945 drew to a close, the post-war boom hailed a new era for the Exchange and 
laid the foundation for its sustained prosperity and survival.  
7.5 COGNITIVE LEGITIMATION (1936 – 1945) 
The Exchange’s cognitive legitimacy can be divided into two broad themes – the 
comprehensibility of its actions and existence, and its acceptance as a necessary and 
inevitable component of the South African financial infrastructure. As insiders, Exchange 
members quickly understood the actions, purpose and value of the Exchange. Indeed, the 
growing homogeneity of the Exchange members (particularly after 1916) and the resulting 
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mutual expectations of honour and goodwill brought about their shared understanding of the 
Exchange’s purpose, and their place within its hierarchy. Thus, the Exchange’s cognitive 
legitimation towards members came about early in its history. However, the ever-present 
public criticism and cynicism about the Exchange’s value and purpose suggest that it remained 
misunderstood and questioned for most of its early history. The challenges to the existence 
and value of the Exchange were not based on a lack of pragmatic or moral legitimacy, but 
rather on a lack of cognitive legitimacy (or comprehensibility). By 1936, however, in the wake 
of the market boom of 1933, several episodes in the Exchange’s development suggested that 
it had gained some level of cognitive legitimacy, in the eyes of both the state and the public. 
First, the recommendation of the Companies Act Commission that no external control over the 
Exchange was necessary suggested that the Commission, as a proxy for the state, understood 
the value of the Exchange and accepted its competence. If the activities of the Exchange were 
still seen as frivolous and immoral, the Commission would not have endorsed the Exchange. 
During this time, the Committee’s decision to distribute pamphlets explaining the purpose of 
the Exchange showed that it understood the value of comprehensibility. Stakeholders 
gradually understood that the Exchange, and particularly the secondary market, was a 
prerequisite for the existence of the primary market, and thus the Exchange’s ability to raise 
capital. The relative ease with which the Exchange endured the crash of 1937, the Henkes 
insolvency court case, the legal action by Northern Copper and Beryl Mining, and the criticism 
by two Members of Parliament suggest that the cognitive legitimacy it had gained by this point 
shielded it from any major retribution or permanent loss of legitimacy. By the 1940s, the 
prominent position of many JSE members in society contributed to the Exchange’s cognitive 
legitimation by focusing attention on the Exchange’s heritage and prestige. As the Exchange 
came to be seen as an enabler of their prosperity and benevolence, their individual success 
became the Exchange’s success.  
Finally, the development of national legislation for the regulation of the Exchange towards the 
end of the Second World War symbolised its cognitive legitimation. Whereas social change is 
continuous, legislative change is often episodic and reactional. Therefore, the proposed 
legislation did not legitimate the Exchange as much as it symbolised the general acceptance 
the Exchange had enjoyed for some time. The Exchange was accepted in society to the extent 
that its legitimacy was confirmed through national legislation. As the literature points out, 
however, few organisations reach the high state of universal taken-for-grantedness, where 
stakeholders struggle to conceive of any alternative. This is also true of the JSE, as evidenced 
by the presence of Macnamara’s Open Call Exchange, and later, the Union Exchange. In 
some way, the JSE’s efforts to legitimate stockbroking also legitimated these rival exchanges. 
Generally speaking, market economies and free political environments will always enable or 
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drive the formation of alternatives, through competition. What was clear, however, was the 
JSE’s dominance. The Open Call Exchange faded into obscurity, and the Union Exchange did 
not seem to lure significant business away from the JSE. By the end of the Second World War, 
the JSE was generally accepted as the legitimate stock exchange of South Africa, and this 
acceptance would persist into modern times.  
7.6 CONCLUSION 
7.6.1 Stock exchange legitimacy 
In summary, the JSE gained legitimacy, first by proving its pragmatic legitimacy towards 
members. Later, as public participation and the necessity for protecting the public grew, it 
demonstrated its pragmatic legitimacy to the public and state. While the Exchange continued 
to pursue pragmatic legitimation throughout its history, the critical level of pragmatic legitimacy 
it had gained by the First World War enabled it to shift its focus to efforts at moral legitimation. 
This manifested mainly through the dissociation of the Exchange’s activities from gambling, 
and its alignment with the normative expectations of society, particularly during times of war.  
Ultimately, after the Exchange became accepted as an able market intermediary, share 
dealing became accepted as a legitimate investment pursuit, and stockbroking became 
accepted as a respectable profession, the Exchange reached the state of cognitive 
legitimation. Stakeholders understood its necessity and value for society, and thus the 
Exchange could pursue its developmental path, mostly unhindered.  
7.6.2 Research themes emerging from the study 
Several themes emerged from this study that relate specifically to the legitimacy of stock 
exchanges, which may be subjected to further study in the case of other stock exchanges. 
First, the stock exchange is an important and complex component of a country’s financial 
infrastructure, beyond its role as a market intermediary. The success of its legitimation efforts 
made the difference between the survival and decline of a capital market. The prosperity of 
the Exchange was not merely a product of economic growth but also of its ability to relate and 
endear itself to various stakeholders, or audiences.  
Second, the stock exchange is the archetypal enterprise that thrives despite a lack of 
legitimacy. Its promises of material gain bypassed the legitimacy considerations of members, 
and particularly the public, who invested their wages despite the warnings of sceptics.  
Third, the Exchange can be seen as the structural embodiment of market organisation and 
regulation. Proving its structural legitimacy was key to the Exchange’s overall legitimation. The 
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key features of the Exchange’s structural legitimacy were the barriers to entry guarding 
membership and listing, as well as the Committee as the authority over all Exchange affairs. 
These features contributed to the Exchange’s legitimation in a pragmatic and moral sense, by 
enabling the Exchange to function as a market intermediary and protect the interests of various 
stakeholders.  
Fourth, the professionalisation of stockbroking is key for the legitimation of the Exchange’s 
activities. The professionalisation was both a result and a driver of the Exchange’s legitimation, 
since it contributed to the Exchange’s pragmatic and moral legitimacy, while also deriving 
legitimacy from the Exchange’s acceptance as an important public institution.  
Fifth, a lack of understanding of the Exchange’s activities, value and purpose hindered its 
legitimation. Conversely, increased understanding of the Exchange’s activities and the 
subsequent endorsement significantly contributed to its legitimation. Although the Exchange 
gained a critical level of pragmatic and moral legitimacy with relative ease, the 
comprehensibility of its actions and existence was by far the most lengthy and challenging 
aspect of its legitimation. The Exchange’s exclusive loyalty to its members during its early 
history constrained its legitimation through its reluctance to communicate its value to the public 
and the state. Before 1902, this may have been compounded by the disconnect between the 
Exchange members (mostly of British descent) and the broader Afrikaner population of the 
ZAR.  
Finally, the three types of legitimacy can also be seen as three phases in the case of the JSE. 
It first needed to prove its competence (pragmatic legitimacy) before proving the moral 
acceptability of its activities (moral legitimacy). The final phase (cognitive legitimacy) relied on 
the demystification of the Exchange, and the resulting legal and social justification of its actions 
and existence.  
Through its engagement, first with members, and later with the public and the government, 
the Exchange managed to secure the legitimacy of its operations, and ultimately its existence. 
In the process, the Exchange contributed to the legitimation of stockbroking as a profession, 
as well as share trading as a legitimate investment vehicle, in South Africa. This ensured the 
continued existence and success of the South African capital market and contributed to the 
emergence of a strong capitalist order in South Africa by the end of the Second World War. 
7.7 CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE STUDY 
The main contribution of the study lies in its exploration of the JSE’s history from the 
perspective of organisational legitimacy. The existing body of research on the JSE has 
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remained a-theoretical and largely descriptive. This study has shown that much of the 
Exchange’s organisational development between 1887 and 1945 can be understood as 
concurrent processes of legitimation.  
The study also represents one of the first comprehensive, long-term academic explorations of 
the development of the JSE, over its first six decades. This departs from the current body of 
literature which consists mainly of commemorative histories, and papers with a shorter and 
narrower focus. More broadly, the study has shown the importance of stock exchange 
legitimacy to explain the emergence of a broader capitalist order, of which the stock exchange, 
as an organisation, has been an integral part.  
The study has also highlighted several episodes in the development of South Africa’s financial 
infrastructure about which very little was previously known. This includes the various waves 
of legislative developments surrounding the South African stock market, as well as the 
absorption of the Cape Town Stock Exchange, which has hitherto received negligible 
academic attention.  
Finally, the study’s value lies in the exploration of largely uncatalogued and unstructured 
archival material held at the JSE. The archival material has been the subject of limited 
research during the last half-century. Thus, the study aims to stimulate further research into 
the development of the JSE and the rest of South Africa’s financial infrastructure. The results 
of the study may be of interest to market regulators, governments, and exchanges as 
organisations, to enhance understanding of the nuances and challenges of establishing and 
maintaining a stable, trustworthy and socially accepted capital market. The study has also 
shed light on the JSE’s dominance (and ultimate monopoly) over the South African capital 
market, which persists into modern times. Despite the JSE’s domination, however, recent 
years have seen the establishment of various new exchanges in South Africa. The lessons 
from this study could also be applied inform their pursuit of legitimacy. 
7.8 IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In considering the legitimation of the JSE over six decades, certain developments have 
emerged that require further investigation. By applying a similar analytic framework to the 
historical development of other stock exchanges, the focus of the current literature could be 
shifted beyond its predominantly descriptive approach. This might offer new perspectives on 
the role of stock exchanges, as organisations, in the establishment and maintenance of the 
capitalist order. A similar approach could also be applied to other types of markets, such as 
commodity or car markets, or online second-hand markets. This could show whether other 
markets follow similar or divergent developmental paths after establishment, particularly in 
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terms of legitimation. Moreover, a similar approach could be applied to explore the 
professionalisation of certain professions, particularly where such professionalisation resulted 
in a central controlling body. This may include the professionalisation of accountancy, auditing, 
and similar vocations within a particular socio-political context or region. Recent developments 
in the literature on stock exchange history include the view of the Exchange as an uncertainty-
processing social network. The high level of social information, and the importance of social 
networks for the emergence of a homogeneous broker class, necessitates further 
investigation. Although the JSE’s membership rolls no longer exist, most of the changes in 
membership were also recorded in the Committee Minute Books throughout the period of 
analysis. These records could be used to reconstruct social networks and explore the impact 
of such networks on the development and functioning of the Exchange. Other theoretical 
frameworks could also be applied to the case of the JSE, to approach its development from a 
variety of perspectives. 
The main limitations of the study include its focus on the internal affairs of the Exchange, as 
well as its focus on the qualitative aspects of the Exchange’s development during the period 
of analysis. This was motivated by the lack of available quantitative data for this period, as 
well as the qualitative, inward focus of organisational legitimacy as an analytic framework. 
However, subsequent studies could employ price data published in the local press, particularly 
the Rand Daily Mail, to gain insight into how market forces and conditions affected the 
development of the Exchange, and that of the South African economy as a whole.  
7.9 SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
Stock exchanges are often viewed by researchers and observers simply as markets in the 
traditional economic sense – meeting places (physical or virtual) for the conduct of business. 
However, as this study has shown, stock exchanges are much more than market 
intermediaries. The development of stock exchanges and, by extension, capital markets, relies 
on more than their mere competence as market intermediaries. The contemporary 
acceptance, taken-for-grantedness, and electronic platforms of the modern stock exchange 
have obscured its social origins, and its dependence on social acceptance. Understanding 
what brought about and supported the modern Exchange’s state of legitimacy offers insight 
into the functioning and survival of the Exchange, as well as potential threats to its continued 
acceptance. This knowledge is particularly useful in a contemporary context, where the social 
values determining legitimacy (more heterogeneous today than ever) are infinitely more 
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